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ABSTRACT 
This dissertacion's objective was no provide a descrip­
tive and empirical analysis of commercial bank participation 
in the Farmer Mac II loan sale program for guaranteed portions 
of U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Guaranteed Farm Loan 
Program loans sponsored by the Federal Agricultural .Mortgage 
Corporation (Farmer Mac). The descriptive analysis summarizes 
reasons for participation cited by bankers responding to a 
series of suirvey questions. Participants indicate the follow­
ing factors as important in their decision to sell loans: 
enhanced liquidity, improved profitabiliny, reduced interest 
rate risk, added capacity to meec heavy USDA guaranteed loan 
demand, and ability to pass on better loan races and term.s to 
their borrowers. Nonparticipants say loan sales are unneces­
sary because of weak USDA guaranteed and overall loan demand, 
sufficient deposit and capital levels to fund USDA guaranteed 
loans, and a preference co hold the loans they originate. In 
general, they do not sell guarantees to buyers other than 
Farmer Mac. The empirical analysis uses a logit regression 
analysis to predict the probability of a commercial bank 
participating and to identify the factors useful in making 
that prediction. Five models are estimated. The first deter­
vi 
mines Che probability of a bank selling any type of USDA 
guarantee to Farmer Mac, be it a newly originated Farm Owner­
ship (FO) or Operating Loan (OL) loan or a "seasoned" FO or OL 
loan. The other estimations look at participation by each 
loan type. Experience selling loans into other secondary 
markets always has a large positive effect on the probability 
of participating. Banks that hold a larger volume of USDA 
guaranteed loans in their portfolio also have a greater chance 
of participating in each estimation. Greater USDA guaranteed 
FO and OL loan demand and reduced competition among USDA FO 
and OL guarantee lenders increase the probability of selling 
new originations. These two variables are less effective in 
distinguishing between banks that sell "seasoned" loans and 
those that do not. No rule of thumb applies for the other 
independent variables' effects on the probability of selling 
newly originated or "seasoned" FO or OL loans. The reasons 
for selling FO and OL loans appear quite different aside from 
the variables discussed above. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress created the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corpo­
ration (Farmer Mac) with passage of the Agricultural Credit 
Act of 1987 (Pub. L. 100-233; 101 Stat. 1686). The stated 
purpose of this legislation was to improve the availability of 
mortgage credit to America's farmers, ranchers and rural 
homeowners, businesses and communities by establishing and 
maintaining a secondary market for agricultural real estate 
and rural housing loans. The legislation was somewhat contro­
versial. Some policy makers and bankers argued that Farmer 
Mac was needed because small rural agricultural banks that 
relied heavily on deposits to make loans did not have the 
capital or liability structure necessary to fund long-term 
fixed-rate farm mortgages--exactly the type of farm ownership 
financing that farmers would have found beneficial during the 
farm financial crisis. Critics claimed that Farmer Mac was 
not needed; rather, they believed it was a misguided gift to 
bankers in exchange for the federal bailout of their major 
agricultural lending competitor, the Farm Credit System (FCS) 
(Hiemstra et al. 1988) . 
As initially structured, Farmer Mac faced insurmountable 
difficulties in fulfilling its purpose. The structure severe­
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ly limited Farmer Mac's activities in order to shield taxpay­
ers from potential losses. As originally conceived. Farmer 
Mac was supposed to create an additional source of long-term 
fixed-rate funds by just guaranteeing the timely payment of 
principal and interest of securities backed by pools of quali­
fied farm land and rural home loans. Farmer Mac was not 
authorized to issue its own debt and use the funds to purchase 
loans to hold in its own portfolio (i.e., pool loans), or 
issue its own asset-backed securities (i.e., securitize 
loans); these functions would have to be performed by a third 
party. Furthermore, as initially structured, the Farmer Mac 
guarantee on the loan-backed security became valid only after 
losses equal to 10 percent of a pool's principal were absorbed 
by the pooler, originators or investors. Finally, the loans 
pooled to back the security had to meet certain diversifica­
tion requirements; in particular, a pool could not include a 
high concentration of loans with respect to any particular 
commodity or geographic area (Feldman 1996) . 
Farmer Mac was quick to ready itself for business. 
However, once its doors opened, the authorization limitations 
outlined above severely retarded business development. Farmer 
Mac needed to generate some sorely needed business, and soon. 
The legislation that created Farmer Mac (Agricultural 
Credit Act of 1987) also gave the Secretary of Agriculture the 
authority to create a secondary market for the guaranteed 
portions of Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) guaranteed 
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loans (Pub. L. 100-233; 101 Stat. 1707). This part of the 
1987 Act was in large part a response to a directional change 
in agricultural policy initiated by the Reagan administration 
(Sullivan and Herr 1990) . 
Specifically, future efforts to provide federal financial 
assistance to farmers would emphasize guaranteeing FmHA loans 
originated and serviced by commercial sources. Funding au­
thorities for credit extended directly by the FmHA would be 
drastically reduced. A secondary market in FmHA guaranteed 
loans would allegedly give small rural banks with limited 
resources and access to capital markets the liquidity required 
to meet their guaranteed borrowers' needs without necessitat­
ing a reshuffling of lenders' existing portfolios. The new 
policy direction was aimed at increasing efficiency while 
maintaining adequate credit supplies--the government would 
leave banking to the bankers and farmers would retain access 
to financial assistance. 
Farmer Mac seemed to be the logical home for such a 
program, based on its "readiness to do business" (Olson and 
Clark 1991). In 1990, Farmer Mac's authority was expanded by 
the Food and Agricultural Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-624; 104 
Stat. 3834) to include the purchase and securitization of 
guaranteed portions of FmHA guaranteed loans. The original 
secondary market (the market for conventional loans) was 
coined "Farmer Mac I" and the latter secondary market for FmHA 
guaranteed loans was dubbed "Farmer Mac II." 
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The program structure of Farmer Mac II was not as prob­
lematic as that of Farmer Mac I. Under the new program, 
Farmer Mac could buy guaranteed portions of FmHA loans direct­
ly from originators as well as issue its own guaranteed asset-
backed securities. The nature of the loans to be pooled and 
securitized--guaranteed portions of FmHA guaranteed loans--
made it unnecessary for the security to have a subordinated 
interest or for loan pools to have complex diversification 
requirements. This program, more so than Farmer Mac I, was 
designed in such a way that it could serve its intended pur­
pose . 
The question that came to mind was: Would it work? The 
answer seemed to depend on the size of the FmHA. guarantee mar­
ket and whether lenders would have an incentive to use Farmer 
Mac II. These two issues are paramount for the following 
reasons: (1) banks must originate FmHA guaranteed loans if 
there are any to be sold and (2) banks must sell a sufficient 
number of their FmHA guaranteed loans for a viable secondary 
market in these loans to exist. 
Currently, somewhat over $6.5 billion in USDA guaranteed 
loans^ remain outstanding. The volume of USDA guaranteed 
lending obligations has increased modestly over the past 
^The Federal Crop Insurance Refojrm and Department of 
Agricultural Reorganization Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-354) estab­
lished the Farm Service Agency (FSA) under the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and dissolved the Farmers Home 
Administration (FmHA). What used to be called FmHA guaranteed 
loans are now referred to simply as USDA guaranteed loans. 
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decade. However, after reaching a peak of nearly $2 billion 
in 1995, USDA guaranteed obligations in fiscal 1997 were the 
lowest since fiscal 1991 (the same year Farmer Mac II opened 
its doors for business). In fact, the USDA guaranteed Oper­
ating Loan program obligation (actual lending) of $1 billion 
for 1997 was about half of what was authorized (USDA 1998). 
One explanation for the recent decline is an improving fairm 
economy; a second rests on stricter lending rules imposed as a 
result of the passage of the Federal Agricultural Improvement 
and Reform Act of 1996 or FAIR Act (Pub. L. 104-127; 110 Stat. 
8 88). Regardless, there does appear to be a sufficient volume 
of guaranteed loans available to sustain an adequate level of 
business activity for Farmer Mac II to succeed. 
Of course. Farmer Mac's ability to penetrate this market 
depends on whether guaranteed lenders utilize the program. 
Bankers travel a myriad of paths in their pursuit of profit 
and employ numerous tools in their management of risk. For 
instance, why would a lender sell a USDA guaranteed loan with 
a healthy net interest margin to retain only a servicing fee? 
He might if he could repeat the process or if it was a loan he 
would not ordinarily originate to hold in his portfolio. On 
the other hand, he might not if his bank had sufficient li­
quidity and capital to fund his desired portfolio holdings. 
Farmer Mac II has been open for business since 1991. Its 
cumulative loan sale volume as of April 30, 1998, was $413 
million, of which over $300 million is outstanding. The loan 
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sale program includes 348 lenders spanning 42 states, with 
participants concentrated in the midwest (Farmer Mac 1997). 
The numbers provided above, although growing yearly, 
require a context. A total of 348 lenders have participated 
in Farmer Mac II; yet nationwide, there are over 6,000 banks 
that make USDA guaranteed loans. Farmer Mac II has over $3 0 0 
million in outstanding volume; however, the total outstanding 
volume of USDA guaranteed debt is greater than $6.5 billion. 
To its credit, Farmer Mac II has had some success; clearly, 
its share of this market is modest. 
In contrast, the SLM Holding Corporation, better known as 
Sallie Mae, purchased and securitized over $9 billion in 
guaranteed student loans in 1997. This represents nearly half 
of the over $20 billion in guaranteed student loans originated 
that year (SLM Holding Corporation 1997). For further compar­
ison, the Small Business Administration (SBA) secondairy market 
loan sale program for SBA guarantees buys roughly $3 billion 
of the $10 billion in new SBA guaranteed originations each 
year. An additional $1 billion per year of seasoned loans is 
purchased from the pool of almost $30 billion in SBA guaran­
teed loans outstanding (SBA 1998). Plainly, Farmer Mac has 
not achieved the level of success its close relatives have. 
Farmer Mac is aware of the reasons for its slow develop­
ment. It claims that its limited market penetration into the 
USDA guaranteed loan market (and the market for conventional 
agricultural real estate credit) is attributable to the his­
7 
torical preference of lenders to retain loans in their portfo­
lios, the real or perceived excess liquidity of many agricul­
tural lenders, the reluctance of many lenders to offer inter­
mediate-term adjustable rate and long-term fixed-rate real 
estate loans as a result of the higher profitability associ­
ated with shorter-term lending, and the lack of borrower 
demand for longer-term credit due to the lower interest rates 
offered on shorter-term debt (Farmer Mac 1996) . Farmer Mac 
also realizes that it must compete with other third parties to 
purchase USDA guaranteed loans. 
The question that this dissertation will address is this: 
What are the compelling internal and external economic forces 
that underlie a risk-averse profit maximizing commercial 
bank's decision to participate in the Farmer Mac II loan sale 
program for guaranteed portions of USDA Guaranteed Farm Loan 
Program loans? Do banks sell USDA guaranteed loans to enhance 
portfolio liquidity? To service heavy USDA guaranteed loan 
demand? To offer their USDA guaranteed loan customers better 
rates and terms? An understanding of what factors prompt 
banks to sell loans will provide insight into whether Farmer 
Mac might ever garner a larger share of the outstanding USDA 
guaranteed loan volume. Furthermore, it can be ascertained 
whether banks using the program have the characteristics that 
policy makers believed necessitated the creation of the sec-
ondairy market in the first place. 
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Dissertation Organization 
The first three chapters discuss agricultural credit 
markets. Farmer Mac II, and securitization. Chapter 1 pro­
vides an overview of the structure of the U.S. agricultural 
credit market, the characteristics and performance of its of 
commercial lending institutions, and a brief history of the 
Farm Service Agency (FSA) followed by a characterization of 
USDA lending. 
Chapter 2 describes the genesis of the Farmer Mac II loan 
sale program, explains how it works, and discusses its devel­
opment and future prospects. Chapter 3 reviews the theoreti­
cal reasons for securitization and previous empirical find­
ings. The focus is on securitization's advantages from a 
bank's perspective. 
Chapter 4 develops a simple model of banking behavior 
that suggests a number of testable hypotheses regarding sec­
ondary market participation. The model analyzes the portfolio 
allocation decision of a risk-averse profit maximizing bank 
that enjoys some degree of market power in lending. 
Chapter 5 outlines a preliminary specification of the 
research design. It begins by summarizing and formalizing the 
hypotheses originating from the model and literature. Next, 
it describes how and where the data to be used in the analyses 
were collected. Finally, it details the methods of inquiry 
that will be employed to perform the analyses. 
Chapter 6 contains a descriptive analysis of commercial 
9 
bank participation in the Farmer Mac II secondary market. The 
descriptive analysis is based on bankers' responses to a 
series of survey questions which ask the degree to which 
various factors are relevant in their decision to participate 
or not participate in Farmer Mac II. 
Chapter 7 estimates a number of logit models to test the 
hypotheses outlined in Chapter 5. Each logit model predicts 
the probability of a bank participating in Farmer Mac II based 
on a given set of characteristics. More than one model is 
fitted so that participation with respect to different types 
of USDA guaranteed loans can be studied using different ex-
planato2ry variables. 
Chapter 3 includes concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL CREDIT MARKET 
The primary concern of this paper is v/hether banks have 
the incentive to participate in the relatively new Farmer Mac 
II secondary market. Since, the incentive to participate is 
not independent of the institutional framework and economic 
environment a bank operates in, to understand Farmer Mac II, 
it is necessary in this chapter to: (1) review the structure 
and characteristics of the U.S. agricultural credit market, 
(2) discuss the characteristics and performance of the mar­
ket's private lenders, and (3) trace the history and review 
the characteristics of USDA lending. Discussion of Farmer Mac 
and the Farmer Mac II loan sale program will be postponed 
until Chapter 2. 
U.S. Agricultural Credit Market Structure and Characteristics 
Total farm business debt at year-end 1997 was estimated 
at $162.2 billion. This figure represents roughly 84 percent 
of the amount outstanding in 1984--the year total farm debt 
peaked (USDA 1998). 
The agricultural debt market is primarily regulated by 
the laws of supply and demand. Farmers require credit to fi­
11 
nance the purchase of land; construct and improve buildings; 
purchase livestock and feed; acquire and maintain equipment; 
buy seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and herbicide; and obtain 
other supplies or ser^/ices needed to maintain a viable agri­
cultural production operation. The supply of credit is pro­
vided by an array of institutions and methods. 
Historically, the external provision of farm credit 
(aside from farmers' own sources) has not been supplied by 
what is termed direct finance--that is, the direct purchase of 
debt or equity securities by che saver. Rather, farm credit, 
like small business credit, is largely provided by financial 
institutions involved in what is called indirect finance. 
These institutions--such as commercial banks, the Farm Credit 
System (FCS) , and insurance companies--intermediate the flow 
of funds between borrowers and savers and account for the 
lion's share of all funding to agriculture. 
Sometimes farmers, whether they be beginning farmers who 
have insufficient net worth or established farmers who have 
suffered a financial setback from a natural disaster or some 
other misfortune, are unable to obtain private credit. Such 
fairmers can turn to the Farm Service Agency (PSA) for assis­
tance. The FSA, a federal agency housed under the United 
States Departm.ent of Agriculture (USDA) , administers direct 
and guaranteed farm loan programs. The FSA's farm loan pro­
grams essentially replace the farm credit programs adminis­
tered by the now defunct Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). 
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The following pages discuss the agricultural credit 
market volume and its distribution among the various lending 
institutions, highlighting any relevant trends. Then, in 
turn, each institution's characteristics and condition will be 
examined. 
Total farm business debt and distribution 
Table 1.1 shows total farm business debt and the percent­
age of the total debt held by each lender. From 1979 through 
the early 1980s, total farm debt continued to increase--reach­
ing a peak in 1984 of $194 billion. The earlier trend of 
greater debt loads was reversed in the latter part of the 
1980s by the onset of the farm financial crisis. Farm borrow­
ing behavior in the early 1990s more or less mimicked that of 
the latter 1980s. However, by 1997, total farm business debt 
had come full-circle and returned to its 1980 level of roughly 
$160 billion. Indications are that total farm debt is expect­
ed to expand at a moderate pace in the near future (USDA 
1998). 
Although total debt by 1997 had returned to its 1980 
level, the percentage distribution of total debt among lenders 
experienced permanent changes. During the period under con­
sideration, commercial banks expanded their market share at 
the expense of the Farm Credit System (FCS), Farm Service 
Agency (FSA), and individuals. The FCS, life insurance compa­
nies, and "individuals and others" share of debt has largely 
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Table 1.1. Total farm business debt 
Farm Farm Life Indiv. 
Total Comm. Credit Service ins . and 
Year debt* banks- System Agency CO . others^ 
1979 $151.6 24 . 5% 29 . 9% 9 . 5% 7.4% 28 .6% 
1980 166. 8 22 . 6 31.8 10 . 5 7.2 28 . 0 
1981 182 .4 21 . 3 33 . 8 11.4 6 . 7 26 . 9 
1982 188 . 8 22 .2 34 . 0 11.3 6 . 3 26.3 
1983 191. 1 23 . 8 33 .3 11.2 6 . 1 25 . 6 
1984 193 . 8 24 .4 33 .4 12 . 0 6 . 1 24 . 1 
1985 177. 6 25 . 0 31.6 13 . a 6.3 23 .2 
1986 157 . 0 26 . 5 29.2 15 .4 6 . 6 22 .3 
1987 144 . 4 28 .5 27 . 7 16.3 6 . 5 21. 0 
1988 139 . 6 30 . 6 26 . 7 15 . 7 6 . 5 20 .5 
1989 138 . 0 32 . 6 26 .4 13 . 8 6 . 6 20 . 5 
1990 139.2 34 . 5 25 . 9 12 . 3 7 . 0 20.2 
1991 139 . 1 36 . 1 25 . 5 11. 0 6 . 9 20 . 6 
1992 142 . 0 37.2 25 . 7 9.7 6 . 3 21 .1 
1993 146 . 8 38.4 25 . 0 8 . 5 6 . 3 21 . 8 
1994 150 . 8 39.4 24 . 4 7 . 3 6 . 2 22 . 3 
1995 150 . 8 39.8 24 . 8 6.7 o . i 22 . 7 
1996 156 . 5 39.5 25 .4 6 .1 6 . 1 23 . 1 
1997 162 .2 39.7 25 . 5 5.4 6 . 1 23 .3 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook 
Report (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-68, February 1998), p.40. 
• In billions of dollars. 
" Percentage share of total for inscicution. 
^ "Individuals and others" includes trade credit and seller 
financing of real estate. 
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remained constant in the wake of the farm financial crisis. 
The same however, is not true for commercial banks and 
the FSA. Throughout the 1990s, commercial banks steadily in­
creased their market share; they currently hold two-fifths of 
each dollar lent to agriculture. At the same time, the FSA's 
share of the market has steadily eroded since 1987. 
In fact, commercial banks and the PCS have accounted for 
60 percent or more of all agricultural loans since 1990. The 
FSA during this period has seen its importance as a major 
direct lender erode--mainly due to changes in federal agricul­
tural policy. (Policy changes concerning the FSA will be 
discussed at greater length below.) 
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 break total farm business debt into 
its major components, farm real estate debt and nonreal estate 
farm debt. Each component accounts for roughly half the 
yearly total debt figure. Both real estate and nonreal estate 
credit trends resembled that of the total debt market as 
described above, and primarily for the same reasons. It is 
anticipated that nonreal estate and real estate debt will 
maintain their share of the total agricultural debt market, 
which is expected grow modestly as previously mentioned (USDA 
1998) . 
The percentage of debt held by lender is also provided in 
the tables. Notice that the distribution of debt among lend­
ers differs substantially between the real estate and nonreal 
estate debt markets. An brief explanation of each market follows. 
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Table 1.2. Real estate farm business debt 
Farm Farm Life Indiv. 
Total Comm. Credit Sevice ins . and 
Year debt" banks' System Agency CO . others' 
1979 $79 .7 9.8% 34 .3% 7. 8% 14 .2% 32 .2% 
1980 89 . 7 8 . 7 37. 0 8.3 13 . 4 31. 0 
1981 98 .8 7 . 7 40 . 8 8.2 12 . 3 29 . 7 
1982 101. 8 7.4 42 . 9 8 . 2 11. 6 28 . 8 
1983 103 .2 8 . 1 43 . 0 a. 3 11.3 28 . 5 
1984 106 . 7 9.0 43 . 7 8 . 9 11. 1 26 . 7 
1985 100 . 0 10 . 7 42 . 1 9.8 11. 3 25 . 8 
1986 90 .4 13 .2 39.4 10 . 7 11. 5 25.1 
1987 82 .4 16 . 4 37.2 11.4 11.4 23 . 5 
1988 77 . 8 18 . 5 36.5 11.5 11. 6 21. 7 
1989 76 . 0 20 . 6 35.4 10 . 3 12 . 0 21.1 
1990 74 . 7 21. 3 34 . 7 10 . 2 13 . 0 20 . 3 
1991 74 . 9 23 .2 33 . 8 9.4 12 . 7 20 . 9 
1992 75.4 24 . 9 33 . 7 8 . 5 11. 6 21. 3 
1993 76 . 0 25 . 8 32 . 8 7 . 7 11.3 22 . 0 
1994 77 . 7 27 . 1 31 . 7 7 . 0 11. 6 22 . 5 
1995 79 . 3 28 . 1 31.3 6 . 4 11. 5 22 . 7 
1996 81.7 28 . 6 31.5 5 . 7 11. 6 22 . 6 
1997 84 . 1 29 . 5 31.2 5 . 0 11. 8 22 . 5 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook 
Report. (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-64, February 1998), P.41. 
- In billions of dollars. 
^ Percentage share of total for institution. 
^ "Individuals and others" includes trade credit and seller 
financing of real estate. 
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Table 1.3. Nonreal estate farm debt 
Farm Farm Indiv. 
Total Comm. Credit Service and 
Year debt' banks'^  System Agency others^ 
1979 $71.8 40 .8% 25 .1% 11.4% 22 .7% 
1980 77.1 38 . 9 25 . 6 13 . 0 22 . 5 
1981 83 . 6 37.3 25 .4 15 .2 22 . 0 
1982 87.0 39.5 23 .6 14 . 9 22.0 
1983 87. 9 42 .2 22 .1 14 . 6 21.1 
1984 87 . 1 43 .2 20 . 8 15 . 8 20 .3 
1985 77 . 5 43 . 5 18 . 1 19 . 0 19.4 
1986 66.6 44 . 6 15.5 21. 7 18 .2 
1987 62 . 0 44 . 5 15 . 1 22 . 8 17 . 6 
1988 61.7 45 . 9 14 .2 20 . 9 19 . 0 
1989 61. 9 47.3 15 .4 17 . 5 19. 8 
1990 63 .2 49 . 5 15 .6 14 . 8 20 . 1 
1991 64 .3 51 . 1 15 . 9 12 . 8 20.2 
1992 63 . 6 51.7 16.3 11.2 20 . 8 
1993 65 . 9 53 . 0 16 . 0 9 . 5 21.6 
1994 69 . 1 53 . 1 16 .2 8 . 7 22 . 0 
1995 71.5 52 . 8 17 . 5 7 . 1 22 . 6 
1996 74 . 8 51.4 18 . 7 6 . 5 23 .3 
1997 78 .1 50 . 7 19 .3 5 . 9 24 . 1 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook 
Report (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-64, February 1998), p.42. 
- In billions of dollars. 
^ Percentage share of total for institution. 
' "Individuals and others" includes trade credit and seller 
financing of real estate. 
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Agricultural real estate debt amd distribution 
The Farm Credit System's (FCS) share of farm real estate 
debt during the period increased from one-third of the market 
in 1979 to a peak of 44 percent by 1984 (see Table 1.2). The 
increase in FCS market share was mainly attributable to the 
average-cost pricing method they used in determining loan 
rates at that time. Average-cost pricing involves averaging 
past funding costs to determine current lending rates. This 
pricing policy offered the FCS a competitive advantage over 
other lenders in the rising interest rate environment of the 
late 1970s and early-eighties. However, the FCS experienced a 
reversal of fortune when rates subsequently fell. Additional­
ly, many farm borrowers fled the FCS as its financial woes 
mounted lest they could lose their stock in failed FCS units. 
The ills suffered by the FCS due to its institutional struc­
ture and business practices prompted passage of the Agricul­
tural Credit Act of 1987. The 1987 Act reorganized the FCS as 
well as changed its business practices. Since then, the FCS 
has maintained a consistent one-third of the real estate farm 
debt. 
Commercial banking's share of total farm real estate debt 
remained under 10 percent through the mid-1980s. During this 
period, banks found it difficult to compete effectively due to 
the FCS's pricing behavior. In addition, banks were limited 
by the way they fund fixed-rate mortgages. Since banks typi­
cally issue short-term claims (deposits) that are repriced 
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more frequently than the long-term fixed-rate assets they are 
funding, any increase in interest rates can lead to liquidity, 
profitability, and solvency problems. To avoid this risk, 
many banks relied on adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) or 
simply refused to originate such loans. Since that time, 
banks have steadily continued to garner a larger market share 
and currently hold slightly less than one-third of every 
dollar of farm real estate debt. Commercial banking seems 
well positioned to retain its market share of this debt. 
The Farm Service Agency's (FSA) share of total real 
estate lending during the period under consideration generally 
remained under 10 percent. Changes in policy at the federal 
level (again, to be discussed shortly) have altered the role 
the FSA plays in financing agriculture. Barring any major 
policy reversal, the FSA is unlikely to regain any significant 
share of direct lending to the farm sector. FSA's future role 
will involve guaranteeing loans, not originating or funding 
them. 
Agricultural nonreal estate debt and distribution 
Commercial banking's share of the nonreal estate farm 
debt (shown in Table 1.3) increased steadily during the period 
from a share of two-fifths of the total in 1979 to over one-
half by 1990, where it has remained since. Meanwhile, the 
Farm Credit System (FCS) saw its market share of nonreal 
estate debt erode quickly until the late 1980s, after which it 
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recovered somewhat. Currently, commercial banks and the FCS 
account for nearly 70 percent of all funds lent for nonreal 
estate purposes. 
The combined share of these lenders in the farm nonreal 
estate credit market is probably understated somewhat because 
of how merchant/dealer supplied point-of-sale (POS) credit is 
treated by the USDA. The USDA includes all merchant/dealer 
credit under the category "Individuals and others." However, 
POS credit is often funded through line-of-credit arrangements 
with FCS lenders or commercial banks (Farm Credit Administra­
tion 1997). 
The Farm Service Agency's (FSA) share of nonreal estate 
lending during the interval can be largely explained by the 
farm financial crisis and changes in agricultural policy. 
Starting from a market share of slightly over 10 percent in 
1979, the FSA saw its share increase rapidly during the 1980s 
as financially troubled farmers turned to the "lender of last 
resort" for help. Since that time, the FSA market share of 
nonreal estate debt, like its share of real estate lending, 
has continued to whither, and will likely continue to do so 
given the new direction of federal agricultural policy. 
Before turning our attention the characteristics and 
financial condition of the lending institutions serving agri­
culture, it is worth noting that the Farm Credit System and 
commercial banking system have emerged from the wake of the 
farro financial crisis as the major institutions serving farro-
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ers' credit needs. Together, these institutions account for 
nearly two-thirds of the $160 billion or so of outstanding 
farm debt. Moreover, their importance is not likely to wane 
in the foreseeable future. As previously discussed, the Farm 
Service Agency's share of direct farm credit is a small and 
decreasing fraction of that of commercial banking's and the 
Farm Credit System's. However, it would be incorrect to 
conclude that the FSA's role in the provision of farm credit 
is inconsequential, given its "lender of last resort" func­
tion. This function alone makes the FSA a key source of 
direct funds for those farmers who do not qualify for commer­
cial credit. 
Major Private Lenders Serving Agriculture 
Having established the commercial banking industry and 
the Farm Credit System as the major sources of credit to 
farmers, we will now look at each in more detail. 
Coimnercial banking characteristics and perfonnance 
Table 1.4 reports bank lending, by size, as of June 30, 
1997, for agricultural and nonagricultural banks, respective­
ly. The Federal Reserve System (FRS) classifies a bank as 
agricultural if its ratio of farm loans to total loans exceeds 
the unweighted average of the ratio at all banks on a given 
date--17 percent as of June 30, 1997. The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) uses a more arbitrary criterion; 
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Table 1.4. Bank lending. by size. J une 3 0, 1997 
Farm 
Total Avg. loans/ Farm 
Total farm farm Total lending 
assets* Banks^ loans" loans"* loans share-
Agricultural bank lending 
<25 959 4, 203 4 .4 47 . 4 6 . 0 
25-50 1, 063 9, 166 8 . 6 41 . 7 13 . 2 
50-100 798 11, 764 14 . 7 36 . 6 16 . 9 
100-300 349 9, 628 27 . 6 30 . 7 13 . 8 
300-500 20 1, 342 67 . 1 30 . 1 1 . 9 
>500 14 1, 549 110 . 7 22 . 9 2 -2 
Total 3 , 203 37, 654 11 . 8 35 . 7 54 . 1 
b. Nonagricultural bank, lending 
<25 526 247 0 . 5 5.4 0 . 4 
25-50 1, 082 1, 096 1 . 0 4 . 6 1 . 6 
50-100 1, 535 2 , 660 1 . 7 3 . 9 3 . 8 
100-300 1, 854 5, 554 3 . 0 2 . 9 8 . 0 
300-500 350 1,835 5 .2 2.2 2 . 6 
>500 633 20,495 32.4 0 . 9 32 .4 
Total 5, 980 31,886 5 . 3 1.2 45 . 9 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook 
Report (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-68, February 1998), p.13. 
• In millions of dollars. 
^ Number of banks. 
^ In millions of dollars. 
In millions of dollars. 
- The percentage of total commercial bank agricultural loans held 
by this size group. 
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it defines an agricultural bank as any bank that holds 25% or 
more of its loan portfolio in agricultural loans (USDA 1998). 
The FRS definition applies to Table 1.4 as well as the fol­
lowing discussion. 
Both the total number of banks and the number of agricul­
tural banks decreased during the past decade, with the ratio 
of agricultural banks to all banks over the period remaining 
more or less constant at one-third. The declining number of 
banks and resultant increased concentration in the banking 
industjry is a well established trend. 
Two-thirds of all agricultural banks have assets of $50 
million or less, while fully 90 percent of all such banks have 
assets of $100 million or less. Slightly under half of all 
nonagricultural banks have assets greater than $100 million. 
Clearly, a typical agricultural bank tends to have fewer 
assets than its nonagricultural counterpart. 
Agricultural banks supply slightly over half of all bank 
lending to agriculture despite being fewer in number and 
smaller in size than nonagricultural banks. The reason is 
that farm banks hold a much larger percentage of their loan 
portfolio in agricultural loans. Looking at Table 1.4, farm 
loans averaged roughly one-third of the total loans at all 
farm banks except for the very largest, and totaled nearly 
half of all loans at farm banks with assets of less than $25 
million. 
Very large banks (assets over $500 million) account for 
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the majority of farm lending among nonagricultural banking 
institutions and over one-quarter of all commercial farm debt. 
With an average of $32 million in farm loans per bank and a 
total of $20 billion, these large depositories are important 
sources of credit to agriculture. However, farm lending 
remains a small fraction (less than 1%) of their overall loan 
portfolios. 
Selected agricultural bank performance measures during 
the period 1988-1997 are provided in Table 1.5. The rate of 
return on equity capital (ROE), a profitability ratio which 
measures net income per dollar of equity, improved over the 
period. ROE can rise if either net income per dollar of 
assets (return on assets or ROA) rises or if financial lever­
age (as measured by the asset/equity ratio) increases. The 
greater the leverage multiplier, the greater a bank's out­
standing debt relative to equity. Further examination of 
Table 1.5 reveals that over time agricultural banks' return on 
assets increased as well as their capital/assec ratio, indi­
cating that banks became more solvent in addition to becoming 
more profitable. 
Farm loan quality also improved during the period. Non-
performing loans (loans past due 90 days but still accruing 
interest, and nonaccruing loans) as a percentage of total 
loans and the provision for loan losses as a percentage of 
loans both decreased and remain low. The loss rates that 
plagued loan portfolios during of the 1980s have subsided. 
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1 . 3 
1. 3 
54 . 5% 
56 . 0 
55 . 5 
56 . 0 
57 . 0 
59.7 
62 . 5 
65 . 5 
66.5 
69 . 0 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook 
Report (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-68, February 1998), p.11. 
The loan/deposit ratio, a conventional measure of liquid­
ity, increased steadily as farmers continued to assume more 
debt. Without increasing their deposit base, additional 
borrowing, or selling loans in the secondary market, bank 
managers may be forced co slow lending to agriculture. 
One final note: It is debatable whether the current crend 
in bank consolidation and interstate banking will affect the 
funding available to agriculture in the distant future. For 
now, most small rural banks that serve agriculture are unlike­
ly to be targets of the large urban banks that are crossing 
state lines and driving the consolidation trend. In the 
immediate future, the banking landscape will likely include 
mega-banks with urban branches nationwide and smaller region­
ally anchored banks. The distant future's banking structure 
could significantly affect farm and rural lending. 
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Farm Credit Service characteristics euid condition 
As indicated earlier, the Farm Credit System (FCS) is a 
major competitor in the agricultural credit market. The Farm 
Credit System is a nationwide cooperative system of banks and 
associations providing credit to farmers, agricultural con­
cerns and related businesses. The system also includes a 
number of entities that support the efforts of the lending 
institutions (Farm Credit Administration 1997) . 
As of January 1, 1998, the FCS was comprised of six Farm 
Credit Banks (FCBs), one Bank for Cooperatives (BC) and one 
Agricultural Credit Bank (ACB). Farm Credit Banks make direct 
long-tenn real estate loans through 48 Federal Land Bank 
Associations (FLBAs) and provide loan funds to 64 Production 
Credit Associations (PCAs), 56 Agricultural Credit Associa­
tions (ACAs), and 31 Federal Land Credit Associations (FLCAs). 
A Production Credit Association delivers short- and 
intermediate-term credit to farmers and ranchers using money 
borrowed from its Farm Credit Bank. PCAs own cheir loan 
assets. Federal Land Bank Associations serve as a lending 
agent for a Farm Credit Bank. FLBAs make and service long-
teirm mortgage loans to farmers, ranchers, and rural residents 
for housing. Unlike PCAs, FLBAs do not own the loan assets 
they originate and service. Agricultural Credit Associations 
have the combined authorities of a PCA and FLBA. ACAs can 
fund loans by borrowing from a Farm Credit Bank or the Agri­
cultural Credit Bank. 
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The Bank for Cooperatives makes loans to farmer-owned 
marketing, supply, and service cooperatives; rural utilities 
(electric and telephone); and rural sewer and water system.s. 
Furthermore, it can finance agricultural exports and provide 
international banking services for farmer-owned cooperatives. 
The Agricultural Credit: Bank has che combined authorities of 
an FCB and a 3C. 
The Federal Faim Credit Banks Funding Corporation is 
owned by the System's banks. It markets the securities the 
System banks sell to raise loanable funds. The Farm Credit 
System Insurance Corporation is an independent U.S. Govern­
ment-controlled corporation that ensures the timely payment of 
principal and interest on insured notes, bonds, and other 
obligations issued on behalf of FCS banks. 
By statute, the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation 
(Farmer Mac) is an FCS entity. It has two ties to the FCS. 
Farmer Mac is examined and regulated by the Farm Credit Admin­
istration (FCA), the same independent agency in the executive 
branch of the U.S. Government responsible for regulating the 
banks, associations, and entities that make up the FCS. The 
other tie is the five FCS representatives that sit on Farmer 
Mac's Board of Directors. Strangely enough. Farmer Mac, which 
was supposed to help bankers compete with the FCS, ended up 
being an entity of the FCS. 
Table 1.6 reports FCS loan quality, operating efficiency, 
and solvency ratios. As noted earlier, FCS loan volume con­
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tinued to rise after the farm financial crisis period, al­
though its market share remained constant. Delinquent farm 
loan volume and net charge-offs have shown a marked improve-
ment, indicating chat FCS portfoli o quali ty is solidifying. 
Table 1.6. Farm Credit System financial indicators 
Net Net 
Delinq. charge int. / Nonint At-risk 
loans/ of f s/ Earning exp. / cap. / 
Year Loans Loans assets Loans Loans 
1990 6.1% 0 .0% 2.4% 1.5% 12 . 0% 
1991 5 . 4 0 .1 3 . 0 1. 5 14 . 1 
1992 4 . 6 0.0 3.4 I . 5 15 . 9 
1993 3 . 6 0 . 0 3 . 6 1. 6 17. 9 
1994 2 . 7 -0 .1 3 . 6 1.6 19 . 1 
1995 1.8 0 . 0 3 .4 1. 4 19.4 
1996 1.3 0 .1 3 . 5 1. 4 20.2 
1997 1.2 0 . 0 3.4 1.4 21. 0 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook 
Report (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-SB, February 1998), p.15. 
Net interest income (total interest income less interest 
expense) as a proportion of earning assets rebounded sharply 
from earlier levels and remains strong, while noninterest 
expenses (less merger implementation and restructuring costs) 
to total loans dropped slightly. Both ratios suggest that FCS 
operating efficiency improved during the 1990s, more so as the 
decade progressed. 
At-risk capital continues to accumulate faster than loans 
outstanding. Since at-risk capital measures all FCS resources 
(allowances for losses on acquired property and loans, sur­
plus, unprotected borrower stock, and the FCS Insurance Fund) 
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Chat can be liquidated before exposing bondholders to losses, 
the at-risk capital/assets ratio is useful for evaluating the 
relevant cushion between stockholders and bankruptcy. 
Overall, the financial condition of the FCS remains 
strong. However, it should be noted that systemwide statis­
tics may hide the differences in condition among FCS districts 
and the various entities. 
USDA Guaranteed Lending History and Characteristics 
Background 
Throughout American history, farmers have repeatedly 
called for low-cost direct loans from the government. Govern­
ment help first came in che form of the Federal Credit System 
established in 1916; however, the demand for direct credit re­
mained. When an emergency situation arose, financial assis­
tance was generally supplied by Temporary agencies created by 
the government on an ad hoc basis. The onset and the severity 
of the Great Depression heightened the need for a more perma­
nent and continuous flow of credit to farmers. As a result, 
the Farm Security Administration was established in 1937. 
Assistance to agriculture consisted of two programs: (1) farm 
production and subsistence loans, and (2) farm establishment 
loans. In 1946, a new agency, the Farmers Home Administration 
(FmHA) was created to officially succeed the Farm Security 
Administration. The FmHA was housed under the United States 
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Department of Agriculture (USDA) (USDA 1984) . 
For the next fifty years, the FmHA helped disadvantaged 
farmers and rural residents improve their lot in life through 
various and varied programs. But, further changes were on the 
horizon. As part of the Federal Crop Insurance Reform and 
Department of Agriculture Reform Act of 1994 (Pub. L. 103-
354), the FmHA was reorganized into what is now called the 
Farm Service Agency (FSA). The FSA retains the same guiding 
principle its predecessors were charged with during the de­
pression- -that is, providing a safety net to beginning and 
financially distressed established farmers. 
The Farm Service Agency (FSA) currently administers 
direct and guaranteed lending programs targeted at agricultur­
al and rural development which include the following: (1) 
operating loans, (2) farm ownership loans, (3) emergency 
loans, (4) water conservation loans, and (5) residential mort­
gages to farmers and residents of rural areas. 
FSA direct and indirect loans are subsidized in a number 
of ways. First, direct loans are priced somewhat below market 
rates since FSA rates are based on the federal government's 
cost of funds. Interest rates on guaranteed loans are negoti­
ated between the borrower and lender, but the agreed interest 
rate cannot exceed the average market interest rate the lender 
charges other customers for similar loans. The interest rate 
is subsidized in the sense that, without the USDA's guarantee, 
the borrower would either pay a higher interest rate or be 
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denied credit altogether. Second, FSA provides direct borrow­
ers with supervision and credit counseling which would be cost 
prohibitive for a private lender. Moreover, direct borrowers 
that graduate to guaranteed loans or conventional commercial 
credit take this accumulated knowledge with them. This cre­
ates a sort of credit enhancement to the lender (Barry 1995). 
USDA guareinteed loan program history 
Traditionally, FmHA credit assistance to farmers had been 
in the form of direct lending. However, in 1972, a second 
type of FmHA credit assistance was introduced-- the guarantee 
of credit supplied by commercial sources. The Rural Develop­
ment Act of 1972 authorized FmHA to guarantee loans made by 
commercial lenders for farming, housing, and rural business 
and industry, including enterprises in cities with populations 
of up to 50,000. Under the program, the FmHA guaranteed no 
more than 90 percent of any loss of principal and accrued 
interest. The guarantee on accrued interest expired 90 days 
after borrower default. Eligibility requirements and under­
writing standards for an FmHA guaranteed loan were similar to 
those then used in the FmHA's direct loan program (USDA 1988). 
Through 1984, the guaranteed loan program was relatively 
dormant--guaranteed loan obligations averaged about 8 percent 
of total FmHA farm loan activity (Jurenas 1985). This trend 
was abruptly reversed in 1985 with passage of the Food Securi­
ty Act. The 1985 Act changed the relative importance of the 
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guarantee program by replacing, dollar for dollar, reductions 
in FraHA's direct lending authorities with guaranteed loan au­
thorities . 
The increased emphasis placed on the guarantee program 
rested on the belief that a guaranteed loan provided the same 
benefit to a farmer as a direct loan of the same size, but at 
a lower cost (0MB 1984) . In other words, policy makers viewed 
the two programs as substitutes. Herr (1991) cjuestioned that 
view. He contended that direct loans are funded by sources 
outside the local area and guaranteed loans are typically 
funded by local sources. Thus, he argued, direct loans add to 
the area's credit supply while guaranteed loans must be funded 
from existing local credit supplies. 
Sullivan and Herr (1989) , examined the degree of substi-
tutability of the direct and guarantee loan programs. They 
claimed that the substitutability would rise if banks adjusted 
their credit delivery systems by increasing their loan/deposit 
ratios, carried more guaranteed loans and fewer government 
securities in their asset portfolio, and sold the guaranteed 
portion of an FmHA loan to a third party and repeated the 
process. Sullivan and Herr found that banks participating in 
FmHA's loan guarantee program had not significantly altered 
their credit delivery system in such fashion. In addition, 
studies conducted by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG 
1988) and the Government Accounting Office (GAG 1989) found 
that the growth of the USDA guaranteed loan program was pri­
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marily attributable to commercial lenders converting conven­
tional borrowers to FmHA guaranteed loans rather than helping 
graduate FmHA direct borrowers to FmHA guaranteed loans. By 
the late-eighties, the substitutibility issue was largely 
academic--the shift in policy had taken root. Guaranteed 
lending quickly gained the majority share of USDA's total 
yearly program obligations as direct lending was permanently 
scaled back (USDA 1998) . 
Current USDA guaranteed loan programs 
Farm Ownership (FO) direct and guaranteed loans are 
available for the purchase or improvement of farm real estate. 
Guaranteed loans can also be used to help owner-operators 
restructure their debts using real estate equity. Farm Owner­
ship loans are capped at $200,000 for a direct loan; guaran­
teed FO loans are capped at $3 00,000. FO terms are not to 
exceed 4 0 years. 
Operating Loans (OL) are used to finance livestock, 
equipment and other expenses incurred during operations and 
are noirmally repaid within 7 years. Operating Loans may also 
be extended for the purposes of refinancing existing indebted­
ness or to cover essential family living expenses. The limits 
for direct and guaranteed OL loans are $200,000 and $400,000, 
respectively (Farm Seirvice Agency 1998) . 
Guaranteed loan interest rates and terms are negotiated 
between the lender and the borrower. Since the government 
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assumes much of the credit risk, the agreed loan rate between 
lender and borrower is not to exceed the average interest rate 
the lender receives from its other farm customers on similar 
loans. Direct loans are priced based on the government's cost 
of funding. 
Recent developments 
The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 
1996 (Pub. L. 104-127; 110 Stat. 888) reduced appropriations 
for direct loans as well as tightened restrictions on borrow­
ers. This was a further attempt to encourage the graduation 
of borrowers from direct credit programs to commercial credit 
sources. The legislative changes affected both the direct and 
guaranteed Farm Ownership and Operating Loan programs (USDA 
1997). 
New direct Farm Ownership loans will only be extended to 
qualified beginning farmers or those with less than 10 years 
of FSA borrowing history. Apportionment for the FO program, 
the budgetary limit on the volume of new loans that can be 
issued during a fiscal year, was reduced accordingly. 
Participation in the direct Operating Loan program will 
be limited to those farmers who have been farming 5 years or 
less or have 6 or less years of FSA borrowing experience. 
Rules for refinancing existing indebtedness using direct 
Operating Loans have been changed to coincide with the new 
policy direction. Refinancing existing debt using the OL 
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program is no longer permitted unless the borrower has suf­
fered a qualifying loss due to natural disaster, is refinanc­
ing debt obtained from sources other than the FSA, or has 
refinanced direct or guaranteed FSA debt fewer than 5 times. 
The 1996 Act also authorized the FSA to increase its guarantee 
to 95 percent for commercial loans extended to borrowers 
refinancing existing OL indebtedness. 
FSA borrowers will now be allowed one and only one in­
stance of debt forgiveness, and any instance of debt forgive­
ness will disqualify the borrower from any additional FO or OL 
credit. Furtheirmore, delinquent FSA account holders will not 
qualify for direct operating loans. 
The new FSA loan rules are designed to help a new genera­
tion of farmers become established as well as send a clear 
signal to established farmers that FSA programs are a helping 
hand, not a crutch. Clearly, the FSA program changes legis­
lated in the 1996 Act have affirmed the federal agricultural 
credit policy direction of graduating farmers from public 
financing to commercially supplied credit. This policy affir­
mation further accentuates the important question of whether 
direct and guaranteed lending are genuine substitutes. More­
over, the recent changes in policy may augment the need for 
the secondary market in FSA guaranteed loans sponsored by 
Farmer Mac. 
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nSDA program obligations 
Additional insight into the FSA's importance as a provid­
er of farm credit requires a breakdown of its direct and 
guaranteed lending activities. The demand for direct OL and 
FO and guaranteed FO loans usually meets or eclipses FSA's 
annual lending authority for such loans. Guaranteed OL bor­
rowing has, in general, fallen well short of FSA authoriza­
tion. In 1997, guaranteed OL borrowing was one-half its 
annual lending authority. Currently, outstanding direct loan 
volume is roughly $10 billion and guaranteed volume is over 
$6.5 billion. The number of active direct and guaranteed loan 
program borrowers is approximately 110,000 and 40,000, respec­
tively (USDA 1998) . 
Examination of Table 1.7 reveals the decline in outstand­
ing principal of FSA farmer programs, decline in total annual 
program obligations and declining importance of direct program 
obligations vis-a-vis the guaranteed program. Note the two 
trends. Within one decade, FSA's total and yearly program 
obligations have been nearly halved. Also during this time, 
the share of direct lending to total yearly FSA obligations 
fell by one-half. Thus, direct lending volume is one-quarter 
of what it was, while guaranteed lending obligations remain at 
about the same level. 
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Table 1.7. FSA program obligations 
Total Total Direct Guaran. 
outstdg. yearly program/ program/ 
program program Yearly Yearly 
Year oblig. • oblig.^ oblig. Oblig. 
1986 $29.2 $4 .4 64 .1% 35. 9% 
1987 28 . 1 3 . 1 48 . 5 51. 5 
1988 28.2 2 . 3 45.2 54 . 8 
1989 26 . 5 2.2 46.2 53 . 8 
1990 23 . 7 2.2 42 . 0 58 . 0 
1991 22 . 0 2 . 1 30.8 69.2 
1992 20 . 5 2 . 3 31 . 0 69 . 0 
1993 18 . 8 2 . 1 32 . 9 67 . 1 
1994 18 . 0 2 . 7 32.4 67 . 6 
1995 17 . 5 2.5 22 .5 77 . 5 
1996 16 . 9 2 . 7 31.0 69 . 0 
1997 16 .3 2 . 3 32 . 1 67 . 9 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook 
Report (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-68, February 1998), p.23. 
• In billions of dollars. 
^ In billions of dollars. 
FSA loan quality 
The quality of FSA direct and guaranteed loans is report­
ed in Tables 1.8 and 1.9, respectively. Over the last decade, 
delinquencies as a share of total principal outstanding for 
FSA direct lending programs have far exceeded that of the 
guaranteed loan programs. The new direction in policy may not 
eliminate the persistently high delinquency rates of the 
direct lending program; however, by reducing the total princi­
pal outstanding, direct program losses should subside, even if 
delinquency rates remain at their current levels. 
Delinquency rates on FSA guaranteed loans are of interest 
to commercial lenders because (1) loans are not fully guaran-
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Table 1.8. FSA Direct Loan Program delinquencies 
Active cases (number) Principal outstanding 
Delinq. Delinq. 
Delinq. cases/ Delinq. loans/ 
Year Total- cases' Total Total' loans" Total 
1986 422 135 31.9% $27 . 6 $6.3 22 .8% 
1987 389 128 32 . 8 25 . 8 6 . 6 25 . 6 
1988 376 138 36 . 7 25 . 1 8.3 33 .2 
1989 346 115 33 . 1 23 .3 8 . 0 34 . 4 
1990 299 80 26 . 9 19.5 6 . 1 31.4 
1991 281 79 28 . 2 17 . 5 5 . 5 31. 5 
1992 252 74 29 . 2 15 . 5 4 . 8 30 . 9 
1993 225 56 25 . 0 13 . 8 4 . 1 29 . 9 
1994 208 48 22 . 9 12 . 6 3 .6 28.3 
1995 194 53 27 . 1 11 . 5 3 .2 27 . 8 
1996 182 42 23 . 1 10 . 6 2.4 22 . 9 
1997 170 32 18 . 8 9.8 2 . 0 20 . 7 
Source: Agriculzural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook 
Report (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-68, February 1998), p.24. 
- In thousands. 
^ In thousands. 
^ In billions of dollars. 
In billions of dollars. 
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Table 1.9. FSA Guaranteed Loan Program delinquencies 
Active cases (number) Principal outstanding 
Delinq. Delinq. 
Delinq. cases/ Delinq. loans/ 
Year Total- cases' Total Total^ loans' Total 
1986 NA- NA NA $1.7 $31.4 1. 9% 
1987 18 . 9 1.1 5 . 6% 2.4 42 . 6 1. 8 
1988 27 .5 1. 3 4.4 3.2 54 . 1 1. 7 
1989 30 . 0 1 . 6 5.3 3 .2 60 . 6 1 . 9 
1990 37.0 1 . 7 4 . 6 4 .1 58.5 1.4 
1991 40.2 1. 9 4 . 7 4.5 59 . 3 1. 3 
1992 42 .2 2.4 5 . 6 4 . 9 102 . 8 2 .1 
1993 42 .5 2 . 1 4 . 9 5 . 0 98 . 5 2 . 0 
1994 44 .1 1. 7 3 . 8 5.4 82 . 3 1 . 5 
1995 46.8 1. 8 3 . 9 5 . 9 91.3 1 . 5 
1996 48.5 2 . 3 4 . 8 6.4 112 . 5 1 . 3 
1997 49.5 2 . 5 5 . 1 6.5 124 . 5 1 . 9 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and Outlook 
Report (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-68, February 1998), p.24. 
- In thousands. 
- In thousands. 
' In billions of dollars. 
' In millions of dollars. 
^ Active cases for 1986 were not available. 
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teed, (2) a bank would incur loan liquidation costs in the 
event of default, and (3) a bank still needs to collect on the 
guarantee. The delinquency rates are broken down by program 
in Tables 1.10 and 1.11. 
Table 1.10 shows that the number of active delinquent FO 
cases has risen, but the proportion of delinquent FO cases to 
total active FO cases has not. Table 1.10 also shows a steady 
increase in the dollar amount of delinquent FO loans, but 
again, the proportion of the dollar amount of FO delinquencies 
to total FO principal outstanding has not risen. 
Table 1.11 presents the recent history of OL delinquen­
cies. Over time, the number of delinquent OL cases has in­
creased marginally as a fraction of the number of total OL 
cases. Furthermore, the dollar amount of OL delinquencies has 
inched up slightly, too. 
For the period 1991-97, the dollar amount of delinquent 
OL loans as a fraction of total OL principal outstanding is 
higher than the similar ratio for FO loans (2.0 percent vs. 
1.2 percent). Moreover, the volatility of the delinquency 
rate for OL loans appears to be higher than that of FO loans. 
The coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) for OL 
loans is .22 percent and .10 percent for FO loans. Clearly, 
in terms of delinquency rates, OL loans are riskier than FO 
loans. 
It would be revealing to put USDA guaranteed loan program 
delinquencies into context by comparing them to the delinquen-
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Table 1.10. ?SA guaranteed ?0 program delinquencies 
Year 
Active cases {number) Princical outstandina" 
Total 
Delinouent Delinouent" 
Total ?ct. Total Amount Pet. 
1991 11,277 496 4 . 4 1,520.3 18.2 1.2 
1992 13,433 611 4 . 6 H CD 00
 
25.5 1.4 
1993 14,591 580 4 . 0 2,095 . 0 26.0 1.2 
1994 16,237 486 3 . 0 2,331.3 25.1 1.1 
1995 17,941 555 3 . 1 2,592 . 6 26.3 1.0 
1996 19,139 703 3 . 7 2,803 . 6 32.3 1.2 
1997 20,252 786 3 . 9 2,984 . 9 35.1 1.2 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and 
Outlook Report (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-44, February 
1992; AIS-48, February 1993; AIS-52, February 1994; AIS 
56, February 1995; AIS-60, February 1996; AIS-64, 
February 1997; AIS-68, February 1998). 
Measured in millions of dollars. 
~ Amount delinquent includes past due payments of 
principal and accrued interest. 
41 
Table 1.11. FSA guaranteed PL program delinquencies 
Active cases (number) Principal outstanding 
Delinquent Delinquent" 
Year Total Total Pet. Total Amount Pet. 
1991 40,463 1, 556 3 . 9 2,941.2 34.7 1.2 
1992 41,536 2 , 049 4 . 9 3,059.4 69 . 8 2.3 
1993 27,561 1, 434 5.2 2,913 .7 67. 0 2.3 
1994 27,647 1, 130 4 . 1 3,060 . 9 53 . 6 1. 3 
1995 28,696 1, 128 3 . 9 3 , 320.9 62 . 5 1 . 9 
1996 29,172 1, 586  ^ 4. 3,541.1 78 .2 2.2 
1997 29,131 1, 725 5.9 3,507.9 85 . 9 2 . 5 
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance: Situation and 
Outlook Report (USDA/ERS, Pub. No. AIS-44, February 
1992; AIS-48, February 1993; AIS-52, February 1994; AIS 
56, February 1995; AlS-60, February 1996; AIS-64, 
February 1997; A13-68, February 1998) . 
Measured in millions of dollars. 
Amount delinquent includes past due payments of 
principal and accrued interest. 
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cies banks experience with respect to their loan portfolio in 
general. However, this is not possible due to differences in 
the way the two are measured. USDA delinquencies include only-
past due payments of principal and accrued interest. The FDIC 
reports on various types of noncurrent assets. However, if a 
loan is deemed noncurrent, the total dollar value of the asset 
is counted, not just past due payments of principal and ac­
crued interest. Given the caution above, nhe average yearly 
noncurrent loan to loan ratio for all insured institutions 
during the period 1992-97 was 1.6 percent (FDIC 1998). 
Sxammary 
The focus of this dissertation is to explain why a com­
mercial bank might participate in Farmer Mac II. We examined 
the structure and characteristics of the U.S. agricultural 
credit market to determine what trends exist and how the 
banking industry fits in. We also looked in more detail at 
the lending institutions serving agriculture. 
Over the past decade, commercial banks have increased 
their share of both the growing real estate and nonreal estate 
farm debt markets. In addition, the public policy shift away 
from USDA direct lending toward guaranteed lending affects 
commercial banks serving agriculture. Growing overall demand 
for farm credit combined with increased demand for USDA guar­
anteed loans may lead bankers to consider participating in 




This chapter discusses the genesis of "he Farmer Mac II 
loan sale program, how it works, and its development zo date. 
Legislative History 
In response to the farm financial crisis experienced 
during the 19S0s, the Agricultural Credit: Act of 1987 (piub. L. 
100-233; 101 Stat. 1686) was enacted on January 6, 1988. The 
main thrust of the 1987 Act was no "bail oul" the financially 
beleaguered Farm Credit System. Tv/c years of applying tempo­
rary band-aids had only postponed the inevitable. Congress 
and the Reagan administracion felt chat che increasing polici-
cal and economic risks of allowing the FCS co collapse were 
far too great; thus, the major rescue. As part of the bail 
out, in a bow to commercial banks and insurance companies, a 
new secondary market for pooling agricultural loans into 
tradable securities was created (Congressional Quarterly 
1987) . 
In particular. Title VII, Subtitle A, Section 701, of the 
1987 Act established the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corpo­
ration (Farmer Mac) to create a secondary market in farm 
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mortgage loans to enhance the ability of the Farm Credit 
System, commercial banks, and life insurance companies to 
supply credit to agriculture at fixed rates, on more favorable 
terms, and at competitive rates. The 1987 Act also authorized 
the Secretary of Agriculture under Title VII, Subtitle 3, 
Section 711, to create a secondary market for FmHA guaranteed 
loans. 
Farmer Mac is a government sponsored enterprise (GSE) 
which operates as an independent entity within the Farm Credit 
Service (FCS). Like other GSEs, it is characterized by its 
federal charter, private ownership, targeted mission, and 
access to financial markets through sales of asset-backed debt 
securities having agency status. Farmer Mac is supezrvised and 
regulated by the Office of Secondary Market Oversight of the 
Farm Credit Administration. 
An elementary understanding of Faiiroer Mac is required to 
see how Sections 701 and 711 of the 1987 Act are ultimately 
related. The genesis of Farmer Mac is the result of an insti­
tutional bailout, borrower distress, deregulation and finan­
cial innovation, and partisan political wrangling (Hiemstra et 
al. 1988). The stated legislative purpose of Farmer Mac as 
outlined in Section 701 is: 
(A) to increase the availability of long-term credit to 
farmers and ranchers at stable interest rates; 
(B) to provide greater liquidity and lending capacity in 
extending credit to farmers and ranchers; 
(C) to provide an arrangement for new lending to facili­
tate capital market investments in providing long-
45 
term agricultural funding, including funds at fixed 
rates of interest; and 
(D) to enhance the ability of individuals in small rural 
communities to obtain financing for moderate-priced 
homes, (sec. 701) 
The 1987 Act authorized Farmer Mac to guarantee the 
timely payment of principal and interest on securities backed 
by pools of commercial quality agricultural real estate and 
rural housing loans. Farmer Mac securities issued in the 
secondairy mar.ket would be similar to the Government National 
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) issues except that the loans 
underlying a Farmer Mac security would not be publicly insured 
or guaranteed (Hiemstra et al. 1988) . This initial government 
sponsored enterprise and its associated secondary market is 
currently referred to as Farmer Mac I. 
Section 711 of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 en­
abled the FmHA to permit the sale of the guaranteed portion of 
FmHA loans by means of a secondary market. The Secretary of 
Agriculture was authorized to: 
develop such procedures as are necessary for the facili­
tation, administration, and promotion of secondary market 
operation, and for determining the increase of farmers' 
access to capital at reasonable rates and terms as a 
result of secondary market operations, (sec. 711) 
Furthermore, the Secretary may: 
directly or through a market maker approved by the Secre­
tary, issue pool certificates representing ownership of 
part or all of the guaranteed portion of any loan guaran­
teed by the Secretary under his title. Such certificates 
shall be based on and backed by a pool established or 
approved by the Secretary and composed solely of the 
entire guaranteed portion of such loans, (sec. 711) 
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The 1987 Act improved the FmHA's secondary market which 
existed on an ad hoc basis. The belief was that the program 
would provide additional funds for rural banks to lend farmers 
and irural communities by allowing local participating banks to 
use the money from sales of FmHA guaranteed loans for addi­
tional agricultural lending. This new secondary market for 
FmHA loans, originally dubbed Aggie Mae by the financial 
press, was modeled after a secondary market created for Small 
Business Administration (SBA) loans. .Aggie Mae was originally 
kept separate from Farmer Mac because it was believed that 
FmHA borrowers were not likely to meet Farmer Mac underwriting 
standards, and unlike Farmer Mac, guaranteed FmHA nonreal 
estate loans would also be eligible for pooling (Hiemstra et 
al. 1988). 
The USDA subsequently contacted Farmer Mac officials in 
the fall of 1989 to discuss the possibility of joining efforts 
to establish a secondary market for FmHA guaranteed loans. 
This discussion ultimately resulted in the submission of 
proposed legislation before Congress to expand Farmer Mac's 
authority beyond the powers outlined in the 1987 Act (Olson 
and Clark 1991) . 
The secondary market for FmHA guaranteed loans was given 
a boost when the Food and Agricultural Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 
101-624; 104 Stat. 3834) authorized Farmer Mac to purchase, 
pool, and issue guaranteed securities backed by guaranteed 
portions of USDA guaranteed loans. The intent of the legisla­
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tion was to expand vitally needed credit availability for 
farmers and ranchers by providing a significant measure of 
liquidity to rural lending institutions. Reductions made in 
FmHA's direct lending programs for budgetary reasons left many 
farmers and ranchers with no alternative financing sources 
other than the guaranteed loan program. It was believed that 
increased demand for the guarantee program would exceed the 
ability of rural institutions to accommodate farmers' credit 
needs unless these institutions had access to funds outside 
their locality (USCCAN 1990). 
Farmer Mac II was given the nod for the new secondary 
market in FmHA guaranteed loans because of the "readiness to 
do business" displayed on the part of the Farmer Mac I manage­
ment team after passage of the 1987 Act (Olson and Clark 
1991). Farmer Mac II does not replace Farmer Mac I. Rather, 
it complements the original secondary market instrumentality 
created by the 1987 Act by extending its authority to purchase 
guaranteed portions of FmHA guaranteed loans and then to issue 
and guarantee securities backed by such loans. The Farmer Mac 
II program is: 
intended to provide the liquidity and economic incentives 
of an efficient secondary market, together with a simpli­
fied loan application completion procedure, that will 
give lenders new and better reasons for making these 
[FmHA guaranteed] loans (FAMC 1990, A-1) . 
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Development euid Outlook 
Lenders participating in the Farmer Mac II loan sale 
program sell guaranteed portions of eligible USDA loans di­
rectly to Farmer Mac; however, in accordance with current FSA 
guidelines, the lender maintains all responsibility for ser­
vicing the loan. The list of eligible USDA guaranteed loans 
includes Farm Ownership (FO), Operating Loans (OL), Business 
and Industry (BStl) and Community Facility (CF) loans. Lenders 
need not be a shareholder of Farmer Mac; any lender that makes 
FSA farm program or Rural Economic and Community Development 
(RECD) loans is an eligible originator. Seasoned (previously 
booked) guaranteed portions may also be sold to Farmer Mac as 
long as the loans are current and the seller has no actual 
knowledge of any impending delinquency or default and does not 
anticipate pay-off, liquidation, or delinquency within the 
next 12 months (FAMC 1990) . 
Farmer Mac maintains a continuous "buy side" in the USDA 
guaranteed loan market, thus creating a steady source of 
liquidity for lenders. Initially, Farmer Mac issued guaran­
teed securities based on individual or small pools of guaran­
teed loans. In early 1995, Farmer Mac was authorized to 
purchase the guaranteed portion of eligible loans and hold 
them in their portfolio for investment purposes (USDA 1997) . 
Farmer Mac uses discount and medium-term notes to carry 
the guaranteed loans to be securitized as well as to buy back 
the loan-backed securities it issues. Farmer Mac has evolved 
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into loan pooler, loan-backed security issuer, and final 
investor; it now performs the entire array of functions in­
volved with securitization except for originating and servic­
ing the loans (FAMC 1997) . 
Farmer Mac II faces many challenges in its attempt to 
build business volume. Table 2.1 reports the total number of 
sellers that have participated, the number of states repre­
sented, the number of loans purchased each year, and the 
cumulative number of loans purchased since Farmer Mac II's 
inception. Although its business activity increased each 
year. Farmer Mac's market penetration remains very modest. 
From Table 2.1, if the latest and most generous figures to 
Farmer Mac are considered, the cumulative total of 2,423 USDA 
guaranteed loans purchased by Farmer Mac account for only 4.9 
percent of the 49,3 83 USDA guaranteed Farm Ownership and 
Operating Loan active cases existing at year-end 1997. The 
total number of participants is also expanding, but partici­
pation numbers seem paltry when compared to the 6,000 plus 
lenders originating USDA guaranteed loans. This contrast 
would be even more striking if the participation numbers were 
adjusted downward to reflect only lenders that regularly 
participate. 
Table 2.2 provides the dollar volume of Farmer Mac II 
program activity. It shows the yearly volume of loans pur­
chased, cumulative loan volume, outstanding volume, and Fairmer 
Mac's outstanding guaranteed volume relative to FSA's out-
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Table 2.1. Farmer Mac II lender participation 
Total Total Loans Total 
sellers states purch. loans 
Year to date to date yearly to date 
1991 23 15 80 80 
1992 61 25 166 246 
1993 110 30 341 587 
1994 143 30 372 959 
1995 184 34 398 1, 357 
1996 257 38 543 1, 900 
1997 314 41 523 2 , 423 
Source: Compiled using 1991-97 FAMC Annual Reports. 
Table 2.2. Farmer Mac II loan volume 
Total Total FM II FM II 
yearly volume total market 
Year volume* purch. outstdg. share-
1991 $10 .2 $10 .2 $10.0 0.2% 
1992 23 .4 33 . 6 30.3 0 . 6% 
1993 39 . 9 73 . 5 64 . 6 1.3% 
1994 47 .4 120 . 9 91. 1 1. 7% 
1995 56 .2 177 . 1 143 .3 2.4% 
1996 92 . 6 269.7 211. 0 3 .3% 
1997 95 . 0 364.7 272 . 8 4.2% 
Source: Compiled using 1991-97 FAMC Annual Reports. 
• All dollar volumes measured in millions of dollars. 
- FM II market share is the ratio of FM II volume outstanding 
to FSA guaranteed farmer loan program volume outstanding for 
the same year. 
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standing guaranteed volume for the same year. Again, Farmer 
Mac has made positive strides in accumulating business volume 
over time; however, outstanding Farmer Mac volume remains 
under 5 percent of total FSA outstanding volume. If FSA 
guaranteed lending remains slack, the farm economy remains 
strong, and lenders are disinclined to utilize the program, 
Fairmer Mac may continue to struggle in its attempts to gener­
ate business activity. 
Despite its limited market penetration, the growth in 
Farmer Mac II program activity is encouraging--at least for 
the present. However, a number of issues exist that may make 
continued progress difficult. The issues include the follow­
ing: (1) foremost is the success of the Farmer Mac I loan sale 
program for conventional agricultural loans; (2) the histori­
cal preference of lenders to retain loans in their own portfo­
lios; (3) the actual or perceived excess liquidity of many 
agricultural lenders; (4) the reluctance of lenders to offer 
intermediate- and long-term fixed-rate real estate loans as a 
result of the higher profitability associated with short-term 
lending; (5) the lack of borrower demand for intermediate- and 
long-term loans due to the lower interest rates generally 
associated with shorter-term loans; and (6) the competition 
among third party purchasers of USDA guaranteed loans. The 
issues listed above are largely self-explanatory, with the 
exception of the success of Farmer Mac I. 
Essentially, the success and continuation of the Farmer 
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Mac II program depends foremost on the success of the Farmer 
Mac I program, regardless of whether the Farmer Mac II program 
is viable in its own right. The reason is that the Federal 
Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (FAMC) cannot continue to 
exist as an ongoing entity if Farmer Mac I does not become 
viable. Farmer Mac II's potential business activity is limit­
ed to the $6.5 billion in outstanding USDA guaranteed loans. 
Farmer Mac II's relevant market is dwarfed by the nearly $40 
billion of real estate debt that Farmer Mac officials believe 
qualifies for securitization through Farmer Mac I (FAMC 1996). 
In other words, the level of business activity necessary to 
sustain Farmer Mac as an ongoing entity will have to be gener­
ated by the Farmer Mac I program. Any further consideration 
of the prospects of Farmer Mac II must first look at the pros­
pects of the Farmer Mac I loan sale program. 
The legislation that created what is now called the 
Farmer Mac I loan sale program severely limited Farmer Mac's 
activities to shield taxpayers from potential losses. It 
could be argued that Farmer Mac I was "provided an opportunity 
to fail." Farmer Mac was not authorized to issue its own 
asset-backed securities or engage in portfolio lending--that 
is, issuing claims and using the funds to purchase loans to 
hold in its portfolio. As initially designed, the program 
relied on third parties to pool loans and issue securities 
backed by the pools, with Farmer Mac then guaranteeing the 
security. In addition. Farmer Mac's guarantee of the security 
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became effective only after the first 10 percent of losses of 
the pool's principal were absorbed by the poolers, origina­
tors, or investors. Furthermore, the loans comprising the 
pool had to be diversified across different commodities as 
well as different geographic areas. 
This program structure was problematic. 3y structuring 
Farmer Mac I to minimize taxpayer exposure, the program could 
not ser^/e its intended purpose. As designed, the business 
activity trickling into Farmer .Mac was inadequate for sus­
tained operations; with due time, continued losses would erode 
its capital base and Farmer Mac would wither and "die on che 
vine." 
In 1995, Farmer Mac approached Congress and asked for 
expanded powers. Congress responded with passage of the Farm 
Credit System Reform Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-105; 110 Stat. 
162), breathing new life into the future prospects of Farmer 
Mac, In essence, the 1995 Act raised Farmer .Mac's capital 
standards in exchange for giving Farmer Mac added authorities. 
Farmer Mac is now allov/ed to purchase qualified loans directly 
from originators and hold the loans in its portfolio or pack­
age them as securities, thus eliminating the prior agency 
problems with poolers. The 1995 Act also eliminated the 
complex loan pool diversification requirements, and did away 
with the 10 percent cash resejrve or subordinated interest 
requirement that had to be affixed to the guaranteed security. 
These legislative changes have removed the statutory 
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barriers that barred Farmer Mac I's chances for success, but 
the lending barriers facing Farmer Mac II described above must 
also be overcome if Farmer Mac is to build the volume of 
business necessary to sustain itself over the long run. For 
now. Farmer Mac is continuing to lobby for expanded powers, is 
increasing business activity, and has recently turned prof­
itable. The future requires more of the same. 
Summary 
Farmer Mac II is a relatively new, federally sponsored 
loan purchase plan authorized by the Food and Agricultural Act 
of 1990 (Pub. Li. 101-624; 104 Stat. 3834). It allows for the 
sale of the guaranteed portions of United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) guaranteed loans by commercial lenders and 
the subsequent securitization of the said guaranteed portions 
by the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac). 
Farmer Mac is a government sponsored enterprise (GSS) created 
by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 ([an amendment to the 
1971 Farm Credit Act) which operates as an independent entity 
within the Farm Credit System (FCS). Like other GSEs, it is 
characterized by its federal charter, private ownership, 
targeted mission, and access to financial markets through 
sales of asset-backed debt securities having agency status. 
Farmer Mac is supervised and regulated by the Office of Sec­
ondary Market Oversight of the Farm Credit Administration. 
Farmer Mac also oversees a secondary market for farm real 
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estate and rural housing loans called Farmer Mac I.• 
Farmer Mac II is experiencing modest growth. The aggre­
gate principal amount purchased from its inception through 
1997 is $364 million, of which $273 million remains outstand­
ing. This represents roughly 5 percent of the total USDA FO 
and OL loan program principal outstanding. Surely, there is 
room for additional growth. 
In the next chapter, the securitization process will be 
discussed in detail. Chapter 3 explains what securitization 
is and how it works, and why banks sell loans into a secondary 
market. The chapter provides the final bit of background 
needed before moving on to the task at hand--that is, explain­
ing what prompts a bank co participate in the Farmer Mac II 
loan sale program. 
-This paper will focus on issues related to the Farmer Mac II 




This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical liter­
ature on securitization. Starting with a definition of tradi­
tional financial intermediation, the discussion then introduc­
es securitization and explains the difference between the two. 
Moving on, secondary markets and the role they play in the 
securitization process is examined. A breakdown of the vari­
ous types of loan-backed securities rounds out the preliminary 
background regarding securitization. The chapter then reviews 
the reasons for securitization from a bank's vantage. The 
reasons are broadly grouped into regulatory and non-regulatory 
incentives. 
Financial Intermediation 
Financial intermediation or indirect finance is the 
primary route for moving funds from savers to borrowers in an 
economy with information and transaction costs. Intermediar­
ies issue indirect claims to savers with cash flows that vary 
with those received from borrowers. Carlstrom and Samolyk 
(1993) refer to this process as "asset transformation." They 
identify three types of asset transformation: denomination 
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transformatiorx, credit risk transformation, and maturity 
transformation. 
Denomination transformation involves issuing smaller-
denomination claims to many savers in order to fund larger-
denomination credits to borrowers. For example, it would be 
costly for a borrower to identify and organize a sufficient 
number of small savers to fund a home mortgage. Substantial 
costs would also arise if each and every saver had to directly 
monitor a number of borrowers. Information and transaction 
costs could be reduced by a financial intermediary performing 
the denomination transformation service to finance the mort­
gage. Denomination transformation also enhances a lender's 
ability to diversify their investments by allowing them to 
hold a wider variety of assets. 
Credit risk transformation involves pooling risks. 3y 
spreading their resources across many borrowers, the financial 
intermediary can issue indirect claims to savers that have a 
more predictable cash flow than any individual asset in its 
portfolio. In the event of an isolated default, the loss is 
spread across all savers so that no individual saver is ex­
posed to a high degree of risk. 
Maturity transformation occurs when financial intermedi­
aries issue shorter-term claims to savers that are used to 
fund longer-term loans to borrowers. Thus, financial interme­
diaries create liquidity. 
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Securitization vs. Traditional Financial Intermediation 
Securitization is a relatively new innovation in the 
banking industry that differs markedly from so-called tradi­
tional financial intermediation (Gumming 1987) . Traditional 
financial intermediation occurs when a bank funds its asset 
portfolio by issuing liabilities in its own name. Although 
traditional financial intermediation has become more complex 
over time, the basic nature of its credit delivery system 
remains unchanged. 
Securitization breaks with traditional financial interme­
diation. Gumming (1987) defines securitization as the "match­
ing up of borrower and saver wholly or partly by way of the 
financial markets" (p.11). For example, bonds and commercial 
paper wholly match borrowers and savers, completely replacing 
traditional financial intermediation. This type of financing 
is referred to as direct finance because the asset transforma­
tion process is absent. Asset-backed securities, in contrast, 
only partially match borrowers and savers, using a financial 
intermediary to originate a loan and the financial market to 
identify the final investor. In this latter case, the conver­
sion of bank loans into marketable securities changes a lend­
er's perception of loan quality by combining the basics of 
credit origination with the marketability of the loan in the 
capital market. 
Securitization is not disintermediation. Disintermedia-
tion, as used here, refers to the displacement of traditional 
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financial intermediation. Disintermediation emulates tradi­
tional financial intermediation by shifting the matching 
process from banks to nonbank financial institutions--such as 
insurance companies. Like banks, these institutions generally 
do not alter the form of the financial claim. For example, a 
bank retail customer may withdraw his deposit and purchase a 
whole life insurance plan from an insurance company that then 
invests the funds in a home mortgage. Although the whole life 
plan and the saving deposit are not perfect substitutes, they 
do share some common attributes. Since the insurance company 
could conceivably fund the same home mortgage that the bank 
would have, disintermediation simply involves the shifting of 
claims around among different holders. 
Securitization changes the matching process and therefore 
the form of the financial claim. Traditional financial inter­
mediation packages or bundles the key elements of a loan: loan 
origination, servicing, and funding. It also involves manag­
ing the credit, market, and funding risk that arise in match­
ing borrowers and lenders. The form of the financial claim is 
not changed. 
The matching process is altered under securitization 
because a bank separates (or unbundles) the key elements of a 
loan. The bank may originate and service the loan but not 
fund it, or originate the loan but not seirvice or fund it. 
This unbundling eventually leads to changes in the form of the 
financial claim. 
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Suppose a bank originates a loan and decides to service, 
but not fund it. Further suppose the bank sells the loan to a 
conduit (such as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. or 
"Freddie Mac") who assembles similar loans into a pool and 
then issues a loan-backed security for sale in the capital 
market. This process alters the form of the original finan­
cial claim. Securitization involves asset transformation from 
the financial institution's perspective. Note that disinter-
mediation and securitization are similar in that both displace 
traditional financial intermediation; disintermediation emu­
lating it, securitization replacing it. 
Secondary Markets 
Although many different types of transactions fall under 
securitization broadly defined, the purpose of this disserta­
tion is to study how securitization is involved in the second­
ary market. Thomas Fitch (1990) defines a secondary market as 
a market where existing loans (or other assets) are sold to 
investors, either directly or indirectly, through an interme­
diary. The focus of this dissertation is thus the indirect 
sale of loans by commercial banks to investors via a govern­
ment sponsored enterprise called Farmer Mac. A government 
sponsored enterprise (GSE) is a federally chartered credit 
institution that sponsors a secondary market by issuing bonds 
to purchase loans. 
The practice of purchasing or selling loans by the bank­
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ing industry is not a new phenomenon. Loans have been partic­
ipated or sold on a stand-alone basis for many years. Histor­
ically, loan participations or sales were specifically tai­
lored to the needs of the buyers and sellers whether or not 
the loans were initially originated for such purposes. This 
type of "traditional" loan sale does not alter the form of the 
financial claim since the loan does not undergo any type of 
asset transformation. 
In addition to participations and traditional loan sales, 
banks can sell loans into secondary markets. However, loans 
involved in this type of sale must be standardized so that the 
buyer (or conduit) can assemble similar loans into pools and 
issue a security that can be sold to investors in the capital 
market. Financial claims undergo substantial changes in 
secondary market transactions that do not occur in a tradi­
tional sale or participation. 
The practice of securitizing loans in lieu of purchasing 
and selling loans on a stand-alone basis is attributable to 
technological advances, the characteristics of certain loans, 
and government encouragement. Advances in computer technolo­
gy, specifically electronic record keeping and information ex­
change, have enabled the development and enhanced the sophis­
tication of secondary markets. 
Pavel (1986) identifies various loan characteristics that 
facilitate or hinder securitization. Since loan terms and 
structures vary significantly, not all loans are easily secur-
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itized. For example, only 22 percent of conventional mortgag­
es have been securitized, while 85 percent of FHA/VA insured 
mortgages have been. Commercial and industrial loans are 
rarely, if ever securitized. 
Like most financial assets, the riskiness of an asset-
backed security is the primary determinant of its price. As 
the riskiness of a security rises, its price must fall, thus 
increasing its associated yield. As the yield on the security 
rises for a given average yield on the underlying pool of 
loans, the benefits of securitization are reduced. Pavel 
claims that the key to the process is the ease and accuracy in 
which the portfolio of loans underlying a security can be 
evaluated. Claims with well-defined payment patterns, suffi­
cient term to maturity, and understandable and predictable 
credit characteristics--such as mortgage loans--are prime 
candidates for securitization. Added credit enhancements 
further facilitate the securitization process. Guaranteeing 
the loans to be pooled, guaranteeing the security, and over-
collateralization are popular methods for overcoming the 
difficulty in evaluating the underlying loan portfolio and 
asset-backed security. 
Another factor that affects the yield on the asset-backed 
security, aside from the factors mentioned above, is the 
liquidity of the security. If an asset-backed security is not 
easily marketable, its price would have to be adjusted to 
include a substantial liquidity premium to attract investors. 
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Here again, the benefits from securitization would be reduced. 
The liquidity aspect of Farmer Mac's asset-backed securi­
ties is especially relevant. Up to this point in time, there 
has not been a market for their loan-backed securities, and no 
assurance that such a market for their securities will ever 
develop. 
Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Sallie Mae, Farmer 
Mac, and the rest of the GSE family represent the government's 
effort to create and maintain secondary markets for loans. 
The government has, explicitly or implicitly, encouraged 
securitization by directly guaranteeing certain types of loan 
payments, by directly or indirectly guaranteeing certain types 
of loan-backed security payments, and by its more favorable 
tax and regulatory treatment of certain financial transactions 
and instruments. 
The government's effort to create and maintain secondary 
markets for loans is evident by examining the numbers. The 
first mortgage-backed security was issued in 1970 by the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). Since 
then, Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac have pooled and 
securitized roughly half--over $1.7 trillion--of all outstand­
ing single-family mortgage debt (United States Treasury 1996) . 
Types o£ Loan-Backed Securities 
The form the original financial claim eventually takes 
depends on the type of security the conduit eventually issues. 
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Once a group of loans is assembled, many different types of 
loan-backed securities can be issued and sold. Pavel (1986) 
notes three major types of securities: pass-throughs, mort­
gage-backed bonds, and pay-throughs. Though all three types 
are collateralized by an underlying pool of loans or mort­
gages, each type of security differs with regard to ownership, 
repayment, and bookkeeping. The various types of asset-backed 
securities and common examples of each are discussed below. 
Pass-through securities 
Pass-throughs were the first, and remain the least com­
plex and most popular loan-backed security. Pass-through 
securities are issued using pooled loans that are similar in 
term to maturity, interest rate, and quality. Certificates of 
ownership, representing the underlying loans held in trust, 
are sold to investors. Loan payments are collected by the 
originator and passed through to the investor. More often 
than not, the originator passes payments on to a third-party 
trustee, who then passes them on to the investor. This is 
especially trrue for GSE securities. In return, the originator 
is allowed to keep any origination fee as well as a service 
fee. A key attribute of a pass-through security is that the 
debt obligation does not appear on the balance sheet of the 
originating financial institution. Origination and service 
fee income earned by a bank without an associated balance 
sheet commitment is referred to as off-balance sheet banking. 
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An example of a popular pass-through is the Ginnie Mae. 
Ginnie Maes are collateralized with loans that are guaranteed 
by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) or insured by the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The securities' payment 
of interest and principal is guaranteed by the Government 
National Mortgage Association (GNMA). The term to maturity of 
a Ginnie Mae pass-through is uncertain. If interest rates 
fall, the principal will be repaid faster, since homeowners 
will exercise the option to refinance their mortgage; if rates 
rise, principal will be repaid more slowly, since homeowners 
will not choose to refinance. The originating bank or savings 
and loan typically retains 50 to 150 basis points before 
passing-through the payments to investors. 
Mortgage-backed bonds 
A mortgage-backed bond is a security that is collaceral-
ized by a portfolio of mortgages. The underlying loans remain 
on the issuer's balance sheet as assets and the new security 
is carried as a liability. Payments to investors are made 
from the issuer's general funds. 
Mortgage-backed bonds are usually over-collateralized for 
reasons that arise from the handling of ownership and payment. 
A mortgage-backed issuer is subject to prepayment risk because 
repayment is not directly routed to the bond holder. Recall, 
the loans remain on the issuer's balance sheet as assets. 
Since borrowers are generally allowed to repay early, there is 
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a possibility that the outstanding balance of the loans com­
prising the security could decline faster over time than the 
principal of the security itself--thus, creating a potential 
maturity gap. 
For example, suppose an institution has pooled together a 
group of 12 percent fixed-rate mortgages and uses them to back 
an 8 percent mortgage bond. A drop in interest rates--say to 
10 percent --will trigger mortgage borrowers to refinance. 
However, since payments of these types of bonds are not routed 
directly to the security holder, the institution will find 
itself with prepaid mortgage receipts it cannot use to pay off 
its bond obligation. The institution's only recourse is to 
lend that money at the new lower market rate and accept the 
lower net interest margin. Had the security been a pass-
through, the institution would have simply passed-on the 
prepayments to the security holders. In general, financial 
institutions prefer to reprice their assets and liabilities at 
the same time, thus avoiding so-called interest rate risk. 
Over-collateralization also protects investors from any 
default risk associated with the mortgages underlying the 
pooled security. Lastly, over-collateralization compensates 
for the risk arising from the possibility of the physical 
collateral depreciating. 
Mortgage-backed bonds are less attractive to financial 
institutions and more attractive to investors than pass-
through securities because mortgage-backed issuers incur the 
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burden of prepayment risk. (The opposite is true of the pass-
through.) Moreover, the mortgages underlying a mortgage-
backed security remain on the books as collateralized assets. 
Since regulators treat the bonds as debt rather than a sale of 
assets, the attractiveness of this type of security from a 
financial institution's perspective is further reduced. 
Pay-through, securities 
Pay-through securities are hybrid financial instruments 
that combine characteristics of both pass-chroughs and mort­
gage-backed bonds. Like pass-throughs, payment is routed 
directly to the investor. Like mortgage-backed bonds, owner­
ship remains with che issuer of the security. The security is 
carried as a liability on the issuer's balance sheet. 
Pay-throughs and pass-throughs give the issuer the advan­
tage of avoiding prepayment risk. To accommodate pay-through 
investors, a special type of security called a collateralized 
mortgage obligation (CMO) was introduced. The CMO issue is 
divided into several maturity classes, or tranches, with each 
tranche receiving semi-annual interest payments. The princi­
pal and any prepayments initially accrue to the class with the 
shortest maturity. After the shortest maturity class is 
retired, payments accrue to the next class, and so on. Inves­
tors concerned with the uncertainty of the term of a security 
would prefer a CMO over a pass-through. The two major issuers 
of CMOS are Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. 
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Fanner Mac's securities are referred to as "Guaranteed 
Agricultural Mortgage-Backed Securities" (AMBS). The securi­
ties evidence beneficial ownership interests in a trust fund 
consisting of one or more segregated pools of "Qualified 
Assets." Qualified assets include the following: (1) various 
types of agricultural real estate mortgage loans ("Qualified 
Loans"); (2) portions of loans guaranteed by the USDA ("Guar­
anteed Portions"); (3) Trust Fund AMBS; (4) mortgage pass-
through certificates; (5) other mortgage-backed securities 
evidencing interests in or secured by Qualified Loans or 
Guaranteed Portions, or (6) any combination thereof (FAMC 
1998). In other words, the securities ultimately represent 
ownership of the loans that the Farmer Mac I and II programs 
have the authority to purchase and securitize. Farmer Mac 
guarantees the timely payment of interest and principal of the 
securities. The pass-through structure of the security was 
mandated by the legislation that created Farmer Mac (FAMC 
1990) . 
Reasons for Securitization 
The motives behind securitization fall into two general 
theoretical categories: regulatory incentives and non-regula­
tory incentives. Legal and regulatory structures such as 
capital requirements, reserve requirements, limits on types of 
depository lending, and fixed-price deposit insurance distort 
the incentive to employ traditional financial intermediation. 
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Banks may then respond by securitizing loans. Non-regulatory 
motives, such as the ability to reduce interest rate risk, may 
also prompt loan sales. 
Regulatory incentives 
The regulatory incentives behind loan sales are explained 
by the "regulatory tax hypothesis" and the "moral hazard 
hypothesis." The regulatory tax hypothesis is discussed in 
Pennacchi (1988) and Pavel and Phillis (1987). Flannery 
(1989) and Pyle (1985) explain loan sales by applying the 
concept of moral hazard. 
The regulatory tax hypothesis is based on the idea that 
various institutional regulations such as capital constraints 
and the holding of non-interest bearing reserves impose im­
plicit and explicit costs (or "taxes") on banks. Banks re­
spond by adopting credit delivery systems that reduce the 
burden of these taxes. Regulation and deposit insurance 
affect the volume of securitization and the types of loans 
securitized. 
Pennacchi (1988) develops a model that shows why banks 
sell loans in the presence of regulatory taxes by demonstrat­
ing that the cost of holding non-interest earning reserves, 
the need to satisfy capital requirements, and the level of 
deposit insurance premiums raise the cost of deposit funds for 
a bank above what nonbank institutions must pay for funds. 
Essentially, any comparative advantage the bank has in origi­
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nating and servicing a loan is offset by the comparative 
disadvantage of funding it with deposits, after accounting for 
the regulatory tax burden. 
To lower the cost of funds, the bank sells loans rather 
than buying additional deposits to fund them. Keeping depos­
its off the balance sheet lowers the cost of funds by elimi­
nating deposit insurance premiums, avoiding the need to issue 
costly additional equity, and removing the obligation of 
holding non-interest earning reserves against deposits. The 
resultant lower marginal cost of funds increases the bank's 
loan volume and increases profitability. 
Pavel and Phillis (1987) perform an empirical analysis 
that supports Pennacchi's theoretical results. They find that 
required reserves and capital requirements are significant 
determinants of loan sales. They also suggest that regulatory 
limits on depository lending such as the "Qualified Thrift 
Lender Test," which requires thrifts to hold a minimum frac­
tion of their portfolio in the form of home mortgages, may 
constrain portfolio diversification and encourage securitiza­
tion. 
James (1987, 1988) questions the regulatory tax hypothe­
sis by noting that nonbank financial institutions, which are 
not subject to such restrictions, also sell loans. Moreover, 
James maintains that securitization remains popular in spite 
of reductions in the reserve rec[uirements set by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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The moral hazard hypothesis is predicated on the idea 
that fixed-rate deposit insurance encourages banks to change 
their behavior regarding their choice of assets. 
Flannery (1989) contends that loan sales are the result 
of the combination of loan examination procedures and capital 
adequacy regulations. According to Flannery, insured banks 
prefer low risk individual loans, but seek high portfolio risk 
in order to maximize the value of their deposit insurance put 
options. Flannery contends that bankers have a comparative 
advantage in originating loans of various default risk catego­
ries, but regulatory standards play a role in which loans a 
bank will have a comparative advantage in financing. If 
regulators apply different capital standards across banks, 
each bank may have a different optimal risky loan category. 
Many types of loans will be originated; loans with the optimal 
risk will be held, the rest will be sold. 
In particular, regulatory authorities compel banks to 
write down bad loans, but carry appreciating assets at book 
value. Under such treatment, the ability to absorb future 
losses out of bank capital is underestimated. To avoid this 
understatement, a bank sells any asset that has appreciated. 
Banks with high market-to-book capital ratios or low capital 
ratios combined with high net charge-offs should sell more 
loans than banks with the opposite attributes. 
Pyle (1985) suggests that off-balance sheet banking, of 
which loan sales are an example, is the result of the moral 
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hazard problem that arises in the presence of fixed-rate 
deposit insurance. To enhance the subsidies associated with 
fixed-rate deposit insurance, a bank can increase asset risk 
and financial leverage by selling relatively low risk loans 
while carrying riskier loans on the balance sheet. 
The moral hazard hypothesis ignores two realities, howev­
er. The first is that the all-in-cost of insured deposits may 
be less than other forms of funding. The second is that non-
depositories (institutions that do not make use of insured 
deposits) participate in the loan sale market. 
The regulatoiry tax and moral hazard hypotheses may in 
part explain why certain banks--especially large ones--sell 
loans. The main deficiency in these theories is the inability 
to explain why uninsured financial institutions that are not 
subject to similar regulations sell loans. In addition, many 
banks that operate in the same regulatory framework do not 
sell loans. Thus, there may be incentives that lie in the 
non-regulatory functioning of a bank. 
Non-regulatory incentives 
Pavel and Phillis (198 7) find empirical evidence showing 
that banks sell loans to avoid interest rate risk and to 
facilitate loan portfolio diversification. By selling a 
fixed-rate loan, a bank can pass the interest rate risk on to 
the purchaser while continuing to underwrite the credit risk 
(risk that a borrower will default). Depository institutions 
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wishing to diversify across a different set of loans than they 
originate and service might also use loan sales as a manage­
ment tool. 
James (1987, 1988) claims that banks separate the funding 
of a loan from other services associated with lending to avoid 
the underinvestment problem that arises when a bank has out­
standing risky debt, such as large uninsured certificates of 
deposit. 
Underinvestment refers to the situation where firms pass 
up new, positive net present value investments. Meyers (1977) 
has pointed out chat a firm will pass up profitable projects 
if the new investment opportunity reduces the risk of out­
standing debt claims, thereby redistributing wealth from 
stockholders to debt holders. James applies the same concept 
to the banking firm. Here, if the bank has outstanding unin­
sured CDs, it will pass over new, positive net present value 
loans in order to reduce the wealth transfer between equity 
owners and debt holders. James demonstrates that a bank using 
debt funding can sell all or part of the cash flows generated 
from a new loan--effectively issuing collateralized debt--and 
avoid the underinvestment problem. 
To demonstrate the concept, suppose a bank has risky debt 
outstanding that pays a contractually fixed rate of interest. 
Suppose further that a new loan opportunity arises which is to 
be financed using new unsecured debt. The promised payment on 
the new funding must reflect the uncertainty of the cash flow 
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of all existing assets as well as the new loan. If the bank 
has the opportunity to finance the new loan using secured 
debt, the promised payment need only reflect the uncertainty 
of the cash flow of the new loan. If the new loan is not 
relatively risky, the cost of secured debt financing will be 
lower than the cost associated with unsecured debt financing. 
Hence, by using loan sales as a substitute for secured debt, a 
bank may take on low risk loans that it would pass up if 
forced to fund using large uninsured CDs. 
James also shows that the presence of fixed-price deposit 
insurance and capital requirements exacerbate the underinvest­
ment problem and provide a further incentive to securitize. 
Fixed-price deposit insurance exacerbates the underinvestment 
problem because the rate on existing deposits will not adjust 
fully to reflect the marginal contribution of the new loan to 
the overall risk of the bank. Here, the wealth transfer 
occurs between shareholders and the deposit insurance authori­
ty. Again, the result is underinvestment in relatively risk-
less loans and overinvestment in relatively risky loans. 
Capital requirements exacerbate the underinvestment 
problem if new low risk loans must be supported by additional 
equity. Both existing uninsured depositors and the deposit 
insurance authority benefit from the banks inability to sub­
stitute a reduction in asset risk with an increase in finan­
cial risk. The bank will either underinvest by refusing the 
loan or sell the loan to avoid a redistribution of wealth. 
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Carlstrom and Samolyk (1993) develop a model in which 
loan sales occur as a response to capital constraints that 
arise when banks operate in distinct, informationally segment­
ed markets. Without access to asset-backed lending, bankers 
in markets with profitable opportunities but insufficient 
deposits to meet their funding needs will find themselves 
capital constrained. 
With asset-backed lending, banks in constrained markets 
will originate and sell unfunded profitable loans to institu­
tions in unconstrained markets. The purchasing institutions 
prefer buying individual projects as opposed to extending 
deposit claims to the capital constrained bank. Lending via 
deposit liabilities would create claims on the entire con­
strained bank's portfolio, creating monitoring difficulty and 
expenses because the two markets each institution operates in 
are segmented. 
Greenbaum and Thakor (198 7) incorporate asymmetrical 
information into their model of bank funding modes. In the 
absence of a central bank that regulates, provides deposit 
insurance and other sejrvices, and the presence of asymmetrical 
information regarding borrower's pay off distributions, banks 
will sell their higher quality assets and fund their lower 
quality assets. However, introducing a central banking au­
thority that regulates and subsidizes certain services dimin­
ishes the incentive to sell loans. Greenbaum and Thakor also 
note that the current erosion of such subsidies and the devel­
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opment of new information processing technology will allow 
banks to better exploit their competitive advantage in origi­
nating and servicing loans and lead them to sell loans regard­
less . 
Other 
In a non-theoretical discussion, Walker (1990) outlines 
several reasons some banks have decided not to sell assets. 
Some banks (1) have room in their portfolios for additional 
loans; (2) may not be able to replace the loan with a similar 
loan (or any loan) if sold; (3) are compelled to accept more 
deposits than they can profitably employ to foster relation­
ships with their customers; (4) may be able to raise funds 
across the spectrum of all maturities more cheaply than an 
asset-backed security can; and (5) do not have the competence 
required to participate in small or large scale asset sales 
because of insufficient personnel, technology, tax or legal 
support. 
Summary 
The success of any secondary market hinges in part on the 
institutional nature of the loans securitized, the securities 
issued, the participants in the process, and the process 
itself. More often than not, regulation or legislation influ­
ences the loans, securities, participants, and processes that 
are involved in securitization. In addition to the given 
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institutional framework, the viability of a secondary market 
depends on the incentive to participate. The incentive to 
participate may be enhanced or diminished by the institutional 
factors mentioned above. In this sense, the incentive to 
participate is not mutually exclusive of, for example, the 
design of the program. Additionally, incentives will be 
contingent on the economic environment presently facing the 
potential secondary market participant. 
Thus, the viability of the Fanner Mac II loan sale pro­
gram depends on its institutional framework, the compatibility 
of that framework with the inherent economic incentives, and 
on the economic environment. 
The question addressed in this dissertation is this: 
Given the existing structure and conditions of agricultural 
credit markets, recent policy changes aimed at graduating FSA 
borrowers from direct lending programs to commercial sources 
of credit, and the structure of the Farmer Mac II loan sale 
program, what are the compelling economic incentives that 
underlie a risk-averse profit-maximizing commercial bank's 
decision to participate in the Farmer Mac II loan sale pro­
gram? Is it possible to accurately predict the probability of 
a bank participating? And, if so, what are the factors useful 
in making that prediction? 
In the next chapter, a simple economic model will be 
developed that attempts to capture the essence of a risk-
averse profit-maximizing bank's portfolio allocation process. 
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The model is limited to the particular task at hand--that is, 
identifying the economic incentives to sell USDA/FSA guaran­
teed loans the into Farmer Mac II secondary market. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A MODEL OF BANK BEHAVIOR 
The purpose of the model developed in this chapter is to 
examine the conditions under which a bank would be willing to 
sell USDA guaranteed loans into the Farmer Mac II secondary 
market. The model is based on the short-run asset management 
theory of banking. Liability management is suppressed for 
reasons to be discussed shortly. 
Bank asset managers are concerned with liquidity, solven 
cy, and profitability. Banks need liquidity to satisfy depos 
it withdrawals and fund legitimate loan requests. Liquidity 
is incorporated into the model by allowing changes in deposit 
levels and loan demand to alter the bank's ability and will­
ingness to sell loans, as is consistent with the design and 
intent of the loan sale program. 
Solvency refers to the difference between the realizable 
value of bank assets and bank liabilities should the bank 
experience economic distress. The concept of solvency is not 
addressed by imposing an external institutional soundness 
constraint. Adding such a constraint would not alter the 
incentive to participate, but could limit the extent of par­
ticipation. Rather, the bank will consider the riskiness of 
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any portfolio decision as discussed below. 
Profitability is the return shareholders earn for employ­
ing their capital. Investing capital in a portfolio of loans 
with a positive probability of default makes the return on the 
portfolio uncertain. The model will force bank asset managers 
to balance the trade-off between the risk and return associat­
ed with any portfolio choice. Because risk and return are 
positively related, bank managers will have to accept addi­
tional risk for pursuing portfolios that are more profitable. 
It should be noted that the selection of a portfolio also 
implies the off-balance sheet activity of collecting service 
fees if the bank is selling loans to Farmer Mac. 
The development of the model begins with specifying the 
constraints faced by the bank. Along with the usual resource 
constraint, the loan sale program feature that allows the bank 
to sell only the guaranteed portions of USDA guaranteed loans 
will be imposed. Next, a function that defines the bank's 
preferences with respect to the trade-off betiveen risk and 
return will be introduced. Given preferences, the bank can 
pick an optimal portfolio from the various portfolios avail­
able . 
Constr'aints 
The bank faces three constraints. The first is a re­
source constraint. The second is a constraint arising from the 
structure of the Farmer Mac II loan sale program. The final 
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constraint requires that USDA loan volume be non-negative. 
Resources 
Assume a bank with the following simplified resource 
constraint: 
D^K=L^S, (1) 
where D is deposits, K is bank capital, L is the total volume 
of USDA guaranteed loans originated, and S is the volume of 
Farmer Mac securities. All variables are measured in dollars. 
The resource constraint is represented as an equality. The 
bank will always purchase assets equivalent in value to its 
resources, since it is assumed that additional investment in 
the Farmer Mac security increases interest income without 
increasing risk. 
A note concerning the Farmer Mac security is in order. 
Farmer Mac securities are somewhat ris.kiy as can be ascertained 
from the legend on the certificate representing each security. 
It reads: 
The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation hereby 
guarantees timely payment of interest and principal on 
the Farmer Mac II Guaranteed Securities in accordance 
with the terms of the security issued. The Farmer Mac II 
Guaranteed Securities are not obligations of, and are not 
guaranteed as to interest or principal by the Farm Credit 
Administration, the United States, or by any other agency 
or instrumentality of the United States (other than the 
Federal Agricultural Mortgage Cojrporation). (FAMC 1990, 
302) 
However, it is assumed in constructing the bank's objec­
tive function that Farmer Mac securities are risk-free. The 
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assumption does not conflict with the discussion and language 
above if a line of reasoning is established that shows Farmer 
Mac securities to be risk-free de facto albeit not de jure. 
Assume Farmer Mac cannot meet its obligations. This 
default would in all likelihood reverberate into other finan­
cial markets. Although Fairmer Mac bonds are not explicitly 
backed by the U.S. Treasury, investors purchase them on the 
assumption that they are implicitly guaranteed. This so-
called "agency status" attribute of Farmer Mac securities 
creates a dilemma. If Farmer Mac collapses, the federal 
government does not have any legal obligations to investors. 
However, if the federal government does not step in and back 
the claims, investor's confidence in other agency status debt, 
such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae), Farm Credit Administration, Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac), etc. could diminish. Even confi­
dence in U.S. Treasury bonds could be at risk. Casual proof 
of this reasonoming is evidenced by the bailout and overhaul 
of the Farm Credit System in the late 1980s. From the bank's 
viewpoint then. Farmer Mac securities are treated as risk-
free . 
Note that equation (1) does not represent the bank's 
balance sheet, despite its seeming similarity. The reason is 
that participation in the loan sale program allows the bank to 
generate income or fees from off-balance sheet activities in 
addition to income derived from assets held on the balance 
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sheet. Hence, the relevant constraint is the bank's resources, 
not its balance sheet. 
Deposits and bank capital, the internal resources of the 
bank, are assumed given. This assumption is consistent with 
the notion that small, geographically isolated, rural banks 
have limited access to funding sources. However, the bank can 
leverage its portfolio by participating in the loan sale 
program. Leverage, as used here, occurs when the optimal 
dollar value of loans originated, determined by the portfolio 
decision, is larger than the bank's internal resources. In 
other words, the bank is participating in the loan sale pro­
gram if the total dollar volume of loans originated (L) ex­
ceeds the internal resources (D+K) of the bank. 
Farmer Mac II program constraint 
The structure of the loan sale program limits the bank's 
behavior through the resource constraint. Farmer Mac II 
allows for the entire sale of only the guaranteed portion of a 
loan (Pub. L. 101-624; 104 Stat. 3834). The USDA's guaranteed 
loan program permits the guarantee to vary up to a maximum of 
90 percent. (Presumably, the unguaranteed portion encourages 
diligence on the part of the bank in servicing the loan.) 
This Fairmer Mac loan sale program feature, combined with 
the resource constraint and the assumption that the bank's 
internal resources are fixed, yields a restriction on how 
large loan volume can be and hence, the degree of participa­
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tion in the program. The restrictions on loan volume and 
participation are, respectively: 
0 < L ^ (O+iO , (2) 
1-g 
{D-^K) < S ^  D+K, ( 3 )  
--9 
where g is the guarantee rate on USDA guaranteed loans. 
Equation (2) requires that the total dollar volume of 
USDA loans originated be non-negative and no larger than the 
amount that corresponds to selling the full guaranteed portion 
of all loans originated. The upper dollar limit on loans 
rises as the bank's internal resources rise or the guarantee 
rate increases. 
Equation (3) allows no more than the total internal 
resources of the bank to be held in Farmer Mac securities in 
the event that loan volume is zero. The bank cannot sell 
Farmer Mac securities but can leverage its portfolio via 
participation in the loan sale program. Since the total 
dollar volume of loans is limited to the amount that corre­
sponds to selling the full guaranteed portion of all loans 
originated, participation is accordingly limited also. 
The guarantee rate will eventually be allowed to vary to 
see how the incentive to participate in the loan sale program 
changes. However, it is not modelled as a choice variable 
from the bank's perspective. Bankers logically attempt to 
guarantee loans at the maximum rate of 90 percent. 
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At this point a simple numerical is provided for illus­
tration. Assume the guarantee rate is 90 percent and the 
internal resources of the bank total $100,000. Also assume 
the bank chooses to originate and hold $100,000 worth of 
loans. The bank could then sell the 90 percent guaranteed 
portions of those loans to Farmer Mac for cash, take the 
proceeds and originate an additional $90,000 in loans. The 
total loan volume originated at this point is $190,000. The 
bank's net investment is still $100,000--the $10,000 residual 
from the sale plus $90,000 in new originations. Furthermore, 
by selling the 90 percent guaranteed portion of the additional 
$90,000 in loans, the bank could originate $81,000 more in 
loans. The bank could continue to sell the 90 percent guaran­
teed portion and originate new loans with the proceeds. There 
is a limit however. Given the 90 percent guarantee rate and 
$100,000 in initial resources, the bank is limited by the 
program to originating a maximum of $1 million worth of loans. 
Again, its net investment totals $100,000. The other $900,000 
in loans has been sold to Farmer Mac through the loan sale 
program. 
Preferences 
Given the resource and program constraints facing the 
bank, the next step is to introduce a function that defines 
the bank's preferences with respect to profit and risk. The 
bank's objective is to maximize a utility function (U) of the 
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form: 
U= -e'^ , (4) 
where tt is profits and b is a measure of risk aversion. 
The term b can be shown to be the negative of the ratio 
of the second to the first derivative of the utility function. 
This ratio is a commonly used measure of risk aversion. As b 
decreases, risk aversion decreases. The specified utility 
function also has the desirable property of decreasing abso­
lute and constant relative risk aversion. Decreasing absolute 
risk aversion implies that risk aversion decreases as profit 
increases, while constant relative risk aversion means that 
the bank will have constant risk aversion to a proportional 
loss of wealth even though the absolute loss increases as 
profit does. 
If profit is normally distributed, maximizing expected 
utility in equation (4) is equivalent to maximizing: 
1^= E{T Z )  -  {f)o\ ,  ( 5 )  
where V is the new objective function to be maximized, E(7r) is 
expected profit, and is the variance of profit. The vari­
ance of profit is used as a proxy for risk. 
Expected Profit and Variance 
The objective function in equation (5) asserts that the 
lender seeks a balance between a portfolio's expected profit 
and the variance of profit. The bank is willing to accept 
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more risk only if the additional risk is accompanied with 
higher expected profit. The arguments, expected profit and 
variance, must be expressed in terms of the bank's ability to 
manipulate them via changes in its portfolio holdings. 
Expected profit 
The bank's profit function is: 
% ^ FS + {1-d) PL ^  d[X^g{P-X)]L - C[L) , ( 6 )  
where d is the default rate, P is the gross return on USDA 
guaranteed loans, \ is the gross liquidation rate of a USDA 
guaranteed loan should default occur, F is the gross risk-free 
rate earned on the Farmer Mac security, C(L) is the total cost 
associated with originating and servicing USDA guaranteed 
loans. 
The revenue from Farmer Mac securities is the product, 
FS. The gross rate of return earned on these securities, F, 
is also the rate the bank would receive in the event of a loan 
sale. Any Farmer Mac and tjrustee fees associated with selling 
a loan must be ignored if the bank is to enjoy equal risk-free 
buying and selling rates. 
The second product in the profit function represents the 
revenue from USDA loans held in the portfolio that are repaid. 
If d, a random variable from the bank's respective, is the 
proportion of loans that will default, 1-d is the proportion 
of loans that will be repaid. Let d be distributed normally 
with mean, /i, and variance . Since d is normally distribut­
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ed and tt is a linear function of d, tt will be normally dis­
tributed as required by the objective function in equation 
(5). Note that d is the source of uncertainty in equation 
(6), all other variables therein are non-random. 
The rate of return on USDA loans, P, is a function of 
USDA loans originated, L: 
P = , (7) 
where P- is the competitive loan rate and 6 is a nonstochastic 
mark-up factor. The amount that a lender can charge a borrow­
er in excess of the competitive rate depends on local demand 
as well as the degree of local market power. Assume: 
0 > 0 , (8) 





The assumption in (9) reflects the notion that the mark-up 
factor decreases as the bank's loan volume increases. The 
relationship in (10) proxies the degree of local market power 
the bank enjoys. Specifically, equation (10) states that a 
given percentage increase in loan volume will lead to a con­
stant percentage decrease in mark-up equal to 5. A larger 5 
implies a greater degree of local market power. A further 
stipulation is that (5<1, or that a given percentage change in 
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loan volume results in a less than proportionate change in 
mark-up. 
The third term in the profit function is the return the 
bank earns on defaulted loans. The bank would receive the 
nonstochastic liquidation rate, X, plus the guarantee rate, g, 
times the difference between the loan rate and the liquidation 
rate. From the bank's perspective, the liquidation rate is 
less than the loan rate (or there would be no risk associated 
with lending). 
The total cost associated of originating and servicing 
USDA guaranteed loans is represented by: 
C(L) = cL, (11) 
where c is a constant. The total cost is a noninterest expense 
incurred in originating and servicing loans as opposed to an 
interest expense. The interest expense involved in carrying 
the loans is modelled implicitly as the bank's opportunity 
cost of not holding securities. 
Taking the expectation of both sides of the profit func­
tion and rearranging yields: 
EC k) = FS+ [l-\i{l-g) ] PL + [iX{l-g) L-C{L) . (12) 
Variance 
The variance of profit, is: 
= (1-g) ^ (P-A.) ^ . (13) 
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The Bsoik' s Problem 
Given its preferences for risk and return, the bank 
chooses the dollar volume of Farmer Mac securities and USDA 
guaranteed loans subject to its resource constraint, the loan 
sale program constraint, and an institutional nonnegativity 
constraint. 
To solve the bank's problem, use equations (1), (5), (7), 
(11), (12), and (13) to form the following objective function: 
maxV = (l-ii.(l-g)) iP^+Q) L+[ik {l-g) L+F{D-^K-L)-cL 
- ^ (14) 
- — (1-g) , 
2 
subject to: 
L < Z, (15) 
and 
L > 0, (16) 
where L is the maximum loan volume allowed by the program 
constraint as given by (2) and LaO is an institutional non-
negativity constraint. 
Solution 
Differentiating the objective function with respect to 
loan volume leads to the following first-order Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions: 
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C1^=L-L^0 , il;Q^  = 0 , il;>0 , (17) 
Qj. = (1-H (l-gr) ) (S+A.) +nA, (1-g) -F-c-h{l-g) ^a^ABL-\\f <0 , 
LQ-=0,1,^0, 
where Q is the Lagrangian, \l/ is the multiplier associated with 
the program constraint and 
If the multiplier associated with the program constraint, 
\p, is positive, the bank is originating as large a loan volume 
as the program rules will permit. The bank wishes to expand 
its loan volume to an even greater extent but is prohibited 
from doing so. 
The scenario described above would lead to the greatest 
participation in the loan sale program for any given lender. 
The conditions favorable to this type of solution would be a 
low average and variance of the default rate, a high guarantee 
rate, a low servicing cost per loan, a small degree of risk 
aversion, and a high liquidation rate. High local demand and 
a small degree of local market power do not unambiguously push 
the lender toward the characterized solution. 
A = P^+0-^, (19) 




If the program constraint is not binding (i/'=0) , then the 
optimum L is found by setting equal to zero and solving for 
L. The second order condition for a maximum follows: 
Q,. = (l-ti(l-gr) ) (1-6) (1-6) A^B) ^ L] 
dL oL 
A sufficient condition for Qr_j^ to be negative is: 
( 2 2 )  AB > [(1-6)A^S] 
The sufficient condition above requires that risk increase at 
an increasing rate as loan volume increases. 
Demand fimctions 
Setting Q:_=0 and solving for L leads to a solution of the 
following form: 
L' = L{\i, , k, g. F, c, b, P^.b) . (23) 
The optimum S can be determined from the resource constraint 
using L': 
S' = S{\L.a^ ,k.g,F,c,b,P^,b ,D,K) . (24) 
Con^arative statics 
Qualitative comparative static results can be determined 
without explicitly solving for L' or S* using the implicit 
function rule. For L*, this can be done by differentiating 
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with respect to L and the particular independent variable of 
interest. The following results are straight forward: 
= - iil-g) (-B) ] (25) 
djj. Q.. 
dL • ^ -l-bil-g) '^A3L] 
da^  
< 0 ,  ( 2 6 )  
dL' _ - [\i il-g)+b{l-g) {A^B) L] ^  /27\ 
dX Q.- ' 
dL' ^ - IviB+lhil-g) a^ABL) ] (28) 
dg 
<0, ( 2 9 )  
dF Q.. 
dL' _ -[-1] 
dc Q,. <0, ( 3 0 )  
dL' ^ -[{l-g)'^a-ABL] ,3,) 
dJb Qrr 
dL ' ^  -[ {l-\i il-g) ) -b{l-g)'^a'^ {A+B) L] (32) 
dP^  < 
dL' ^  -[-{l-\i{l-g) ) d +b{l-g)^(}^AQL] >p (33) 
d6 < 
The qualitative comparative static results for S' are identi­
cal to those for L' (equations 25-33 above) , but have the 
opposite sign. Unlike L', the optimum S is a function of 
deposits, D, and capital K. Increases in D or K will cause a 
proportionate increase in S*--that is, 
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(34) 
dS' _ . (35) 
dK 
The signs in (25), (26), (27), (28), (31), (32), and (33) 
require that 
The restriction above is reasonable if a borrower's loan 
project is competitive and the lender adds a monopoly premium 
to the loan rate. Should a borrower default, the most the 
bank could realistically recoup during liquidation would be 
the competitive loan rate, P^. 
Discussion of comparative static results 
The results of the model suggest that banks with certain 
characteristics will hold relatively more USDA loans in their 
portfolio and therefore be more likely to participate in the 
Fairmer Mac II loan sale program. A discussion of each charac­
teristic follows. 
An increase in the average, or the variance, , of 
the default rate causes the bank to reduce its USDA loan 
volume regardless of whether the bank's portfolio is lever­
aged. The default rate becomes particularly important if the 
lender leverages its portfolio by selling the guaranteed 
portion of a loan to make more loans than its initial resourc­
es would support. 
B - p^+0 (1-6) -;.>G. (36) 
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To illustrate the point, let the bank have an initial 
endowment of $100,000 in internal resources. And, for sim­
plicity, ignore interest payments, assume a guarantee rate of 
90 percent, a default rate of unity, and a liquidation rate of 
zero. If the bank chose to invest its $100,000 in USDA loans 
under this scenario, it would end up wich $90,000. If the 
bank alternatively chose to leverage its resources and made $1 
million in USDA loans, it would end up with nothing because 
the bank would have to pay-through che $900,000 it receives 
from the USDA loan guarantees to Farmer Mac. This example 
exaggerates an important facet of the loan sale program--the 
decision to participate must take inco account the risk expo­
sure to the bank's net investment. Greater participation in 
the loan sale program increases the risk exposure to che 
bank's net investment because the bank ends up holding a 
larger proportion of its portfolio in the 'onguaranceed residu­
als remaining after selling the guaranteed portion of a loan. 
An increase in the liquidation rate, increases the 
bank's incentive to originate USDA loans. Regardless of the 
default rate, if the liquidation rate was high enough co 
recoup all interest and principal due, making USDA loans would 
not be risky. To some extent, banks do reduce their exposure 
to risk by only loaning a fraction of the project's worth. 
However, many borrowers finance 90 percent of a project, the 
maximum allowed by the USDA under its guarantee program. A 
second relevant point with respect to the liquidation rate 
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should be noted. If the collateral underlying the loan pro­
ject is appreciating, the bank's exposure to risk is minimal. 
The opposite is true if the collateral is depreciating rapid­
ly, as agricultural lenders learned in the mid and late 1980s. 
An increase in the guarantee rate, g, will lead to a 
greater volume of USDA loans. The maximum guarantee rate is 
set by the USDA. However, the bank can choose to guarantee a 
loan below the maximum allowed. Evidence shows chat most 
banks guarantee loans at the maximum rate. 
A higher return on the Farmer Mac security, ?, reduces 
the volume of loans lenders would prefer to hold in cheir 
portfolio for two reasons. First, the risk-free security 
becomes more attractive because of its higher return. Second­
ly, since F is the relevant rate should the bank leverage its 
portfolio, the return from participating in the loan sale 
program is lower. 
An increase in the servicing cost per loan, c, has a 
negative effect on the volume of loans desired. The servicing 
cost per loan will be higher for banks that have insufficient 
personnel, technology, tax or legal support. These banks are 
not likely to participate in the loan sale program. 
The more risk averse a bank's management is (higher b) , 
the fewer loans the bank will make. If asset managers at the 
bank are risk-neutral, they would simply maximize expected 
return. The loan sale program would appear very attractive to 
these managers. However, decision makers that are concerned 
97 
with risk would balance any profitable opportunity offered by 
the program with any additional risk involved. 
A positive local demand shock, P_, does not lead to an 
unambiguous change in loan volume. The intuitive result that 
an increase in demand leads to higher loan volume is more 
likely the lower the average and variance of the default rate, 
the higher the guarantee rate, and the less risk averse the 
bank's management is. The reason that a demand shock does not 
unambiguously lead to higher loan volume again rests on the 
idea that originating more loans increases risk. A satisfac­
tory increase in return, given the risk, will entice the bank 
to make more loans. A risk-neutral bank would unambiguously 
increase its loan volume as ?_ rises. 
The ambiguous sign on the demand shock parameter gives 
insight into the reason that the growth of guaranteed lending 
is mostly due to the guaranteeing of existing loans already at 
commercial lenders rather than converting existing USDA direct 
loan borrowers to loan guarantees (G.AO 1989) . Lenders appear 
eager to shore up the existing loans in their portfolio, but 
reluctant to add new ones. Policy makers hoping that the new 
loan sale program will accommodate former USDA direct loan 
borrowers now looking for guaranteed loans may be disappoint­
ed. 
Greater local market power does not lead to an unambigu­
ous decrease in loan volume. Recall, greater local market 
power is evidenced by a larger 5. A larger 6 implies the 
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monopoly premium added to the competitive loan rate will 
decline faster for any given increase in loan volume. The 
intuitive result that greater local market power leads to a 
lower loan volume is more likely the lower the average and 
variance of the default rate, the higher the guarantee rate, 
and the less risk averse the bank is. A risk-neutral bank 
would unambiguously reduce its loan volume as 6 rises. 
An increase in deposits will result in less portfolio 
leverage. For any given loan volume, banks with larger depos­
it bases are less likely to participate in the loan sale 
program than are ones with smaller deposit bases. 
Finally, a larger capital position does not alter the 
loan volume the bank chooses. It does, however, increase the 
amount of risk-free Farmer Mac securities the bank will hold. 
Banks that are well capitalized will not likely participate in 
the loan sale program. 
The internal resources, deposits and capital, do not 
affect loan volume. This result is consistent with the Fisher 
separation principle. The separation principle holds that 
investment and funding decisions are divorced (Copeland and 
Weston 1988). If the bank wants to originate a loan but 
cannot fund it given its internal resources, it sells the loan 
to Farmer Mac. 
The comparative static results support some of the claims 
made regarding the new loan sale program. Lenders with limited 
resources are more likely to participate in the program. 
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Lower Farmer Mac security rates also increase the incentive to 
participate. Lenders equipped to originate and seirvice loans 
at relatively low costs per loan will also be attracted to the 
program. 
Theoretically, banks will not unambiguously undertake 
profitable opportunities offered by the program. But, if the 
profitable opportunity outweighs the additional risk involved, 
the intuitive result holds. In addition, for any degree of 
risk aversion, factors that reduce risk do lead to an in­
creased chance of participation. 
Siunmaxy 
In this chapter, a risk-averse profit maximizing bank 
chose its optimal portfolio using a mean-variance selection 
criterion. One of the assets to choose from was a risk-free 
security; the other, a risky asset characterized by a downward 
sloping demand curve. The bank could leverage its portfolio, 
not by borrowing at the risk-free rate, but rather by selling 
loans into a loan sale program. Any factor that increases the 
bank's loan volume makes it more likely that the bank will 
sell loans. Reductions in capital or deposits do not affect 
the optimal loan volume, but do increase the probability of 
participating. This is because a reduction in capital or 
deposits could reduce the internal resources of the bank below 
the optimal loan volume a bank has selected. 
Chapter 5 summarizes and formalizes the hypotheses from 
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the model just developed and from the literature discussed in 
Chapter 3. It also suggests the data that could be used to 
test the hypotheses. Next, it discusses the procedure used to 
collect the data. Finally, it discusses the methods of inqui­




The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, the 
testable hypotheses suggested by the preliminary chapters and 
the theoretical model developed in Chapter 4 will be reviewed 
and formalized. Next, the procedure used to collect the data 
used in Chapters 6 and 7 is described. Finally, this chapter 
explains how the data will be used in the descriptive analysis 
of secondary market participation in Chapter 6 and to predict 
the probability of a bank participating in Farmer Mac II in 
Chapter 7. 
Testcible Hypotheses 
Chapters 1-3 and the model developed in Chapter 4 imply a 
number of testable hypotheses. Each sub-section below formal­
izes a hypothesis and suggests a measure that might be used to 
test it. The discussion is summarized in Table 5.1. 
Loan quality 
Both the literature and the model developed in Chapter 4 
imply that loan quality affects the incentive to sell loans. 
Loan quality for the purposes of this study is fully described 
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noncurrent loans/loans negative 
net charge-offs/loans positive 
mean default rate negative 
default rate's variance negative 
recovery rate positive 
USDA guarantee rate positive 
assets per employee positive 
hours per loan negative 
hours per year negative 
risk-based capital negative 
ratio 
Return 










USDA guaranteed lending 




degree of competition none 
yield on assets positive 
cost of funding positive 
loans/deposits positive 
deposits/assets negative 
farm loans/loans positive 




by the following: loan default rate characteristics (average 
and variance of the probability of default), the recovery rate 
(percentage of principal plus interest due less foreclosure 
costs recovered in the event of default), and the USDA guar­
antee rate affixed to a loan. These factors are in fact what 
makes lending risky in the model developed in Chapter 4. The 
comparative static results presented in Chapter 4 show that, 
ceteris paribus, a decrease in the average or variance of the 
default rate, an increase in the recovery rate, or a decrease 
in the guarantee rate on USDA guaranteed loans reduce a bank's 
USDA guaranteed loan volume, and therefore its incentive to 
participate in Farmer Mac II. 
Pavel and Phi11is (1987) found that a higher net charge-
offs to loan ratio was positively related to loan sales. 
Their argument was that an increase in net charge-offs forces 
banks to sell appreciating assets in order to bring regulatory 
measures of equity in line with the "true" value of the firm. 
Presumably, the appreciation of an asset would be caused by a 
drop in interest rates. (As interest rates fall, fixed future 
cash flows have a higher present value). Net charge-offs 
should be inversely related to what is defined above as the 
recovery rate. That is, as net charge-offs rise, recovery-
rates should fall. This should be so since net charge-offs 
measure the loss to a bank in the event of default and the 
recoveary rate measures the percentage of principal and inter­
est (net of all foreclosure costs) recovered in the event of 
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default. While the two are not exact opposites, they should 
move in opposite directions. 
Two clarifications are in order. First, Pavel and 
Phillis test only one facet of loan quality. Second, their 
measure of net charge-offs is an overall loan portfolio mea­
sure. In other words, their finding is that loan portfolio 
losses cause banks to sell loans from their loan portfolio. 
The model in Chapter 4 does distinguish among various 
types of loan quality. However, it is not sophisticated 
enough to make a distinction between a bank's loan portfolio 
and a particular type of loan in the loan portfolio because 
the loan portfolio consists of a single type of loans--USDA 
guaranteed loans. The model could "loosely" be interpreted to 
show any of the following: 1) loan portfolio quality causes 
loan sales in general; 2) loan portfolio quality causes sales 
of particular loans; 3) particular loan quality causes loan 
sales in general; or 4) particular loan quality causes sales 
of particular loans. Since the focus of the study is why 
banks participate in Farmer Mac II, numbers 1 and 3 above will 
be ignored. 
Noncurrent loans to loans and net charge-offs to loans 
Using Pavel and Phillis' work and the model as a guide, a 
number of testable hypotheses arise. The first hypothesis is 
that poor overall loan portfolio quality causes the sale of 
USDA guaranteed loans into Farmer Mac II. If banks sell loans 
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for the reasons that Pavel and Phillis claim, they must sell 
them into some secondairy market. Would one of those secondary 
markets be Fairmer Mac II? A bank's noncurrent loan to loan 
ratio could be used to measure the default rate on loans and 
its net charge-offs to loans ratio could be used to measure 
its losses. 
USDA guaraintee loan default and recovery rate 
The second hypothesis is that poor USDA guaranteed loan 
quality should reduce a bank's incentive to originate USDA 
guaranteed loans and therefore reduce the probability of that 
bank participating in Farmer Mac II. The information needed 
to determine the mean and variance of the probability of USDA 
guaranteed loan default would have to come from the bank. 
Given the lowest, most likely (mode), and highest default 
rates for each bank, it is possible to calculate a mean and 
variance of the default rate for each bank using what is 
called the triangular probability distribution. This proce­
dure translates expectations about uncertain variables into 
probabilities, expressed as a percentag chance (Jolly 1980). 
The recovery rate in the event of a USDA guaranteed loan 
liquidation would also have to be obtained from the bank. 
USDA gruarantee rate 
The third hypothesis deals specifically with the guaran­
tee rate. The guarantee rate affixed to a loan affects the 
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quality of a loan only after it has defaulted and been liqui­
dated. If the guarantee rate was 100 percent, a loan would 
have no risk--any loss would be completely absorbed by the 
guarantor (the USDA in our case). However, even a 100 percent 
guarantee rate would not shield a bank from foreclosure costs. 
Some bankers indicated to this researcher that the chances of 
collecting on the guarantee were not even 100 percent. 
As the guarantee rate is lowered, for any given default 
rate and loss rate, a loan's risk increases. The usual hy­
pothesis then applies: increased loan risk reduces the likeli­
hood of participating in Farmer Mac 11. Information about the 
level of the guarantee rate banks affix to their USDA guaran­
teed loans could be obtained through a survey. 
Operating efficiency 
The model in Chapter 4 found that an increase in the cost 
of originating USDA guaranteed loans reduced the bank's guar­
antee volume, and therefore its chances of participating in 
Farmer Mac. This would be a "loan level" hypothesis. Pavel 
and Phillis (1S87) found evidence that a lower noninterest 
expense to loan ratio increased the probability of loan sales 
in general. Their finding relates to efficiency at the "bank 
level." 
The first hypothesis is that a bank that can originate 
USDA guaranteed loans more efficiently will originate more of 
those loans and therefore be more likely to participate in the 
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Farmer Mac II program. A reasonable measure of efficiency 
might be the total number of hours needed to originate a loan 
and the average number of hours spent each year servicing the 
loan. The second hypothesis to be tested is that banks with a 
higher assets per employee ratio are more likely to partici­
pate in Farmer Mac II. The former hypothesis captures the 
essence of the model's implication; the latter, Pavel and 
Phillis' finding. 
Risk-aversion 
Chapter 4 models the portfolio decision of a risk-averse 
profit maximizing bank. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the 
degree of management's risk-aversion reduces the amount of the 
risky asset (USDA guaranteed loans) the bank chooses. As the 
optimal proportion of loans in the portfolio fall, the incen­
tive to participate in Farmer Mac II falls too. One measure 
that could be used to capture management's tolerance for risk 
is the risk-based capital ratio. 
The risk-based capital ratio is total risk-based capital 
(primary capital plus secondary capital) as a percentage of 
risk-weighted assets. The risk-weighted assets measure is 
calculated by attaching risk-weights to each of a bank's 
assets as well as its off-balance sheet activities (such as 
selling loans with recourse). A lower risk-based capital 
ratio reflects a more aggressive management style. 
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Comparative advemtage 
We will say that a bank has a comparative advantage in 
originating loans if the bank enjoys a relatively higher rate 
of return on its loans and a comparative advantage in funding 
loans if it has a relatively lower cost of funds. Generally, 
a bank will engage in those activities (originating and fund­
ing) in which they have a comparative advantage. Return will 
be taken up first and funding second. 
Return 
There are really two overarching issues concerning re­
turn. The first concerns the return a bank earns on particu­
lar types of loans; the second, the return a bank earns on 
other assets in its portfolio. To clarify the point, banks 
can hold USDA guaranteed loans or invest their resources in 
other assets. Hence, both returns are relevant. 
Return on USDA guaranteed loans. The model in Chapter 4 
is constructed in such a fashion that there are two components 
to a bank's return on USDA guaranteed loans--a base rate 
(competitive rate) and a monopoly premium. An increase in the 
competitive USDA guaranteed loan rate has an ambiguous effect 
on USDA loan volume and consequently participation. Although 
a bank welcomes the additional profit from originating new 
loans, it faces additional risk from holding the new loans. 
The bank must weigh the additional profit against the addi-
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Clonal risk. If a bank, was risk neucral (i.e., b=0 in equa-
Cion 32, Chapter 4), an increase in the compeCitive loan rate 
would lead the bank to unambiguously increase its loan volume 
and probability of participating*. Of course, the risk neu­
tral case has the more appealing intuitive result. 
A change in the competitive loan rate would presumably 
occur due to a change in the demand for USDA guaranteed loans. 
So, the hypothesis is that an increase in USDA guaranteed loan 
demand has an indeterminate effect on participation. 
The second part of the return is the monopoly premium 
that arises because Che bank in ChapCer 4 had a downward 
sloping demand curve for USDA guaranceed loans. An increase 
in markec power has an ambiguous effect on loan volume and 
thus participation. As competition weakens, a bank is able to 
add a larger monopoly premium to the competitive rate. Howev­
er, since marginal revenue never falls below the competitive 
rate (due to the specification of the demand cur^-e in the 
model), a bank may not want to reduce its loan volume to 
capture the higher monopoly premium--especially if its loan 
volume is very high or the competitive loan rate is high 
relative to the monopoly premium. A risk neutral bank (i.e., 
b=0 in equation 32, Chapter 4) will unambiguously want to 
reduce its USDA loan volume.-
^This is a sufficient although not necessary condition for 
loan volume to rise as the competitive loan rate rises. 
^This is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a bank 
to reduce its loan volume as its market power increases. 
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Although there are a number of possible ways to measure 
market power, one method would be to ask banks what the degree 
of competition is among lenders for USDA guaranteed loans in 
their market area. Given this measure, the hypothesis is that 
an increase in competition among lenders (i.e., a decline in a 
bank's market power) will have an undetermined effect on 
participation. We now turn to the return on other assets in 
the portfolio. 
Return on alternative assets. The only asset besides 
UDSA guaranteed loans included in the model presented in 
Chapter 4 was the risk-free Farmer Mac security. Recall, a 
bank could hold this security {S>0) or originate more loans 
than it has deposits and capital to fund them so that S<0--
that is, the bank was participating in the Farmer Mac II 
program. The comparative static results then showed that as 
the return on this security rose, the bank would reduce its 
USDA loan holdings and increase its Farmer Mac security hold­
ings. The bank does this because its profit rises without an 
increase in risk. 
While correct as constructed, the model precludes one 
important possibility. As the return on alternative assets 
rises, a bank could continue to originate USDA guaranteed 
loans, sell them, and reinvest the proceeds from the sale into 
those alternative assets. So, although the bank has reduced 
its USDA loan holdings, it has actually increased its USDA 
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loan originations. 
The hypothesis then is that banks with higher returns on 
their portfolio as a whole will have a higher probability of 
participating in Farmer Mac II. To get that greater return, 
they might have to reduce their holdings of USDA guaranteed 
loans, but they do not have to reduce their originations. 
To sum up this section on return, it is not unambiguously 
true that a bank with a comparative advantage (i.e., higher 
retuims) in originating USDA guaranteed loans will have a 
higher likelihood of participating in Farmer Mac II. However, 
banks that have a comparative advantage in teirms of the return 
on assets held elsewhere in their portfolio are more likely to 
participate. 
Fxmding 
If a bank keeps an asset in its portfolio, it then must 
fund it. Although not explicitly modelled, common sense 
dictates that an increase in funding costs would reduce the 
incentive to hold the asset and increase the incentive to sell 
it. Therefore, the hypothesis is that a bank with higher 
funding costs will be more likely to participate in Farmer Mac 
II than a bank with lower funding costs. 
Liquidity 
Sufficient liqijidity facilitates a bank's ability to meet 
deposit withdrawals and make loans--!.e., conduct day to day 
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business. The measures of liquidity deemed important to 
participation are a bank's loan-to-deposit ratio and its 
deposit-to-asset ratio. 
Loan-to-deposit ratio 
The model presented in Chapter 4 is tailored to the 
argument regarding bank resources forwarded by the advocates 
of a secondary market for agricultural loans (USCCAN 1990) and 
the research of Herr (1991). The claim is that rural lending 
institutions are constrained in their ability to actively 
acquire new sources of funding, thus creating potential li­
quidity problems. The inference is that liquidity problems 
would arise because of heavy USDA guaranteed loan demand. To 
model this scenario, we treated the resources of the bank--
deposits and capital--as fixed, and did noc allow the bank to 
borrow funds. The bank's only way of creating liquidity was 
to either reduce its loan volume and hold more of the risk-
free security or sell loans into the Farmer Mac II secondary 
market. 
The hypothesis to be tested then is that a higher loan-
to-deposit ratio enhances the incentive to participate in the 
Farmer Mac II loan sale program. Banks with a lower loan 
deposit ratio have greater liquidity, and therefore would be 
less likely to participate. 
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Deposit-to-asset ratio 
A so-called deposit drain would also affect a bank's 
liquidity position. That is, even if a bank is not experienc­
ing heavy loan demand, its loan-to-deposit ratio could be 
rising because its deposit base is eroding. To isolate this 
effect, we could use the deposit-to-asset ratio. Banks with a 
lower deposit-to-asset ratio would then be expected to have a 
higher probability of participating in Farmer .Mac II. 
Customer accommodation 
Although customer accommodation was not modelled explic­
itly in Chapter 4, it is certainly an important aspect of 
banking. After all, banking is a service industry. The 
hypotheses respecting customer accommodation will focus on a 
bank's agricultural and USDA guaranteed lending volume and how 
participating in a secondary market benefits a bank's custom­
ers . 
Dixon, et al. (1997) found that banks holding a larger 
percentage of their loan portfolio in agricultural loans were 
more likely to originate USDA guaranteed loans, and in the 
case of OL loans, have a larger USDA guarantee volume. They 
claim that agricultural banks use guarantees as a risk-reduc­
ing tactic. Regardless, we might expect a bank's probability 
of participating in Farmer Mac II to increase as its agricul­
tural loan to loan ratio rises. 
A relatively higher USDA guaranteed lending volume may 
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reflect a greater willingness to serve the guarantee segment 
of the farm credit market. A larger USDA guaranteed loan 
volume would also create a greater pool of loans for a bank to 
sell. Thus, it will be hypothesized that greater USDA guaran­
teed lending and participation are positively related. 
Experience selling loeuis into other secondary markets 
Management experience selling loans into other secondary 
markets may increase the probability of selling loans into 
Farmer Mac II. First, managers with experience participating 
in other secondary markets may be in a better position to 
evaluate the potential advantages and disadvantages of selling 
loans than managers with no experience. Second, they would 
also likely be able to adapt more quickly to the bureaucratic 
structure of the Farmer Mac II program, given that Farmer Mac 
II is designed similar to other secondary market programs. 
Third, other secondary market experience may be indicative of 
a bank's superior personnel, technology, tax or legal support. 
Finally, other experience may be a manifestation of the bank 
characteristics and market forces that spur a bank to partic­
ipate in secondary markets. 
Size 
Pavel and Phillis (1987) found that increased bank size 
was a significant factor underlying loan sales. They maintain 
that loan sales require the level of management sophistication 
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that comes with increased bank. size. Although Walker (19 90) 
provides no evidence, he contends that a bank needs sufficient 
personnel, technology, tax, and legal support to engage in 
small or large scale asset sales. And, according to Walker, 
these characteristics are associated with larger size. 
Pavel and Phillis (1987) do mention the possibility that 
smaller banks might sell loans due to overlines; i.e., small 
banks selling portions of loans that exceed their legal lend­
ing limits. Recall, Farmer Mac II was created to provide a 
significant measure of liquidity to rural lending institu­
tions . 
The hypothesis is that size affects participation, but 
the net effect is ambiguous. The reason is two-fold. Small 
banks are more likely to be constrained by overlines, and 
therefore participate. Larger banks are more likely to have 
the attributes necessary to engage in secondary market activi­
ty. 
Data 
This section deals with issues concerning the data used 
in the descriptive and empirical analyses of Chapters 6 and 7, 
respectively. It details the procedure used to collect survey 
information and the issue of nonresponse. It also addresses 
the problems that arose in matching financial information from 




The preliminary specification of the hypotheses discussed 
above suggests various characteristics that should distinguish 
participants in the Farmer Mac II loan sale program from 
nonparticipants. Some of the data concerning these character­
istics can be found on a bank's balance sheet and income 
statement; some--such as the degree of competition for USDA 
guaranteed loans among lenders in the bank's market area--
cannot be found in a financial statement and must be collected 
by survey. A decision was made to survey a sample of banks 
and then match each bank's survey results with its financial 
statement information. The survey instrument appears in the 
Appendix. The financial statement information was collected 
from the bank's "Summary Financial Report," which is available 
to the public from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). A Summary Financial Report, which is similar to the 
Federal Reserve's "Call Report," contains a bank's consolidat­
ed balance sheet and consolidated income statement, as well as 
demographic information about the bank. 
Survey 
A survey instrument was constructed and tested on seven 
community banks in northeastern Missouri to ensure that the 
instrument's questions were clear and concise. Since none of 
the seven banks sold USDA guaranteed loans to Farmer Mac, two 
banks in South Dakota that did participate were also sent 
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sujTveys. The seven former banks were chosen because they 
originated USDA guaranteed loans and because of the researche­
r's familiarity with the banks' management and ability to 
visit the banks in person; the latter two banks were chosen 
because of their substantial volume of USDA loan sales to 
Farmer Mac and the willingness on behalf of the management to 
fill out the questionnaire and discuss the clarity and content 
of the questions. The names of the two South Dakota banks 
were supplied by Farmer Mac. The survey instrument was then 
modified based on input provided by the banks in the pre-test. 
Each survey was to be accompanied by a cover letter ad­
dressed to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the bank. The 
cover letter appears in the Appendix with the survey instiru-
ment. Six weeks after the initial wave of surveys was sent, 
nonrespondents would be sent a follow-up letter (also found in 
the Appendix) with another copy of the survey. 
The next task was to identify the institutions that 
engage in USDA guaranteed lending. A list of all institutions 
that had USDA guaranteed loans in their asset portfolio as of 
the end of 1996 was obtained from the USDA in 1997. The total 
dollar volume of USDA guaranteed loans held by the 7,696 
institutions on this list represents the available pool from 
which Farmer Mac could purchase and securitize loans through 
its Farmer Mac II loan sale program. Since the dissertation's 
main focus concerns commercial bank participation in Farmer 
Mac II, all nonbank financial institutions--such as Farm 
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Credit System lenders--were deleted from the list. At this 
point, the list included both banks that sold USDA guaranteed 
loans to Farmer Mac and those that did not. 
A list of banks known to participate in the Farmer Mac II 
loan sale program as of the end of 1996 was obtained from 
Farmer Mac in 1997. This list contained 329 institutions. 
Once again, nonbank institutions were deleted from the list, 
leaving a total of 312 commercial bank participants. 
Next, banks on the Farmer Mac list were deleted from the 
USDA list. As a result, the remaining 5,823 commercial banks 
on the USDA list represents the population of banks that hold 
USDA loans in their portfolios but do not participate in the 
Farmer Mac II loan sale program. 
The banks to be surveyed from the USDA list v;ere selected 
using a systematic sampling method. The goal in determining 
the sample size was to sample enough banks so that the number 
of banks that participate in secondary markets included in the 
sample (with some bound on the error of estimation) reflected 
the proportion of banks that participate in secondary markets 
in the population, accounting for the reality that not all 
banks surveyed would respond. 
The following equation was used to determine the number 
of banks, n, to be surveyed to estimate the proportion of 
banks that participate in secondary markets: 
n = Npq/[(N-1)D + pq], 
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where N is the population of banks on the USDA list, p is the 
proportion of banks in the population that participate in 
secondary markets, q=(l-p) is the proportion of banks that do 
not participate in secondary markets, and D=B^/4. B is the 
bound on the error of estimation (Scheaffer et al. 1986) . 
To solve for the number of banks to be sampled from the 
USDA list, n, we must have values for N, p, and B. Since N is 
known (N=5,823), all that is really needed is p and B. The 
bound on the error of estimation, B, was set at 5 percent. 
The proportion of secondary market participants in the popula­
tion, p, was obtained from an empirical analysis done by Pavel 
and Phillis (1987) . Their study used survey data for 13,763 
banks from the "Reports of Condition and Reports of Income" 
filed with the appropriate regulatory agency. In their study 
of 13,763 banks, 8,190 (60 percent) sold loans into a second­
ary market. So, given N, p, and B, the total number of banks 
to be surveyed required to estimate the proportion of second­
ary market participants is 360. 
Of course, not every bank sampled could be expected to 
respond. Assuming a response rate of 2 0 percent, 1,30 0 banks 
have to be surveyed to obtain the needed 360. Since the banks 
were to be chosen systematically, eveiry third bank was chosen 
from the USDA list. Thus, a total of 1,941 banks were sur­
veyed . 
The first bank was selected from the sampling frame by 
picking one of three numbered balls out of a hat; every third 
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bank was selected thereafter. There was no reason to believe 
that any hidden periodicities existed in the population that 
would introduce sampling error and bias the results. 
To ensure that an adequate number of observations were 
available for the empirical analysis of the banks that partic­
ipate in the Farmer Mac II loan sale program, all 312 commer­
cial banks on the Farmer Mac list were surveyed--i. e. , a 
sampling rate of 100 percent. 
The initial wave of surveys was mailed near the end of 
November 1997. Nonrespondents were sent a follow-up letter 
with another survey instrument in February 1998. Of the 312 
banks surveyed from the Farmer Mac list, a total of 94 were 
returned (a 30 percent response rate). The response rate of 
banks drawn from the USDA list was less successful; of the 
1,941 surveys mailed, only 259 were returned (a response rate 
of roughly 13 percent). 
FDIC "Sximmairy Financial Report" 
Upon receipt, each bank's survey was matched with its 
FDIC Summary Financial Report. Since some of the banks on the 
lists were branches, and since branch specific information is 
not available, branches were matched with their respective 
home office's consolidated report. If a bank had a change in 
ownership status after the lists were obtained, the new bank's 
report was used. The report content for each bank covered the 
period between December 31, 1996 and December 31, 1997. 
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Nonrespondent sample 
The banks sampled from the list provided by Farmer Mac 
are the population of loan sale program participants. The 
systematic sample of banks drawn from the USDA list was large 
enough to make inferences about the population of nonpartici-
pants. However, not all the banks on either list receiving a 
survey instrument chose to respond. As mentioned above, 3 0 
percent of the Farmer Mac II loan sale program participants 
responded, while only 13 percent of the nonparticipants sam­
pled did so. There was a possibility that the characteristics 
of the respondents in the sample differed in nature from those 
in the sample that did not respond. It was deemed necessary 
to select a number of defining bank characteristics and to 
investigate whether those characteristics differed between the 
respondents and nonrespondents in the sam.ple. 
In general, a bank can be characterized by its efficien­
cy, liquidity, profitability, soundness or solvency, and size. 
Traditionally, these characteristics are measured using finan­
cial information garnered from a bank's balance sheet, income 
statement, and demographic information. 
The following measures (and what characteristics they 
attempt to capture) were compared between the samples' respon­
dents and nonrespondents: assets per employee (efficiency); 
loan-to-deposit ratio (liquidity and aggressiveness of lend­
ing) ; net income-to-asset ratio or return on assets (profit­
ability) ; capital-to-asset ratio (soundness); risk-based 
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capital ratio (solvency); and total assets (size). The total 
farm loans-to-loans ratio between groups was also examined to 
assess a bank's degree of involvement in agricultural lending. 
Two separate sets of statistical tests were performed. 
First, the 94 Farmer Mac respondents' measures were compared 
to a systematic sample of 31 banks drawn from the 218 banks in 
the select sample of known participants that did not respond 
to the survey. Next, a systematic sample of 2 9 banks was 
generated from the 1,682 banks in the USDA sample that opted 
not to respond. No significant differences were detected in 
the means between the two groups in either set of samples at 
the a=.05 level of significance. Therefore, it was concluded 
that the nonrespondents from both the Farmer Mac and USDA sam­
ples did not differ significantly from the respondents in the 
samples with respect to the traditional measures used to 
characterize a bank. The full panel of statistics generated 
(mean, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum for each 
variable and the test statistics) for the comparison of the 
groups in the Farmer Mac sample appear in Table 5.2; the panel 
for the groups in the USDA sample are found in Table 5.3. 
Methodology 
The data collected will be used two ways. Chapter 6 
presents a descriptive analysis of secondary market participa­
tion using survey response data. The chapter examines why 
banks choose to and not to participate in secondary markets in 
Table 5.2. Farmer Mac II survey: respondents vs. nonrespondenta 
Non respondents' Respondents* Test Stat ist ic 
Variable^ Mean S • D. Mi n Max Mean S • D. Man Max Std err. t 
AGLNLN 0 333 0 . 225 0 .000 0 . 748 0 395 0 244 0 .000 0 . 852 0 047 1 . 32 
CAPASST 0 092 0 . 041 0 . 063 0 .293 0 101 0 028 0 .055 0 . 197 0 008 1 10 
ASSTEMP 2 445 0 930 1 . 250 5 . 507 5 569 0 765 1 . 167 4 . 963 0 182 0 .68 
LNDEP 0 757 0 090 0 . 534 0 . 998 0 768 0 134 0 . 387 1 .208 0 021 0 . 55 
RBCR 0 136 0. 034 0 . 094 0 . 244 0 150 0 041 0 . 088 0 . 299 0 007 1 . 85 
ROA 0 012 0 004 0 . 002 0 . 025 0 013 0 004 0 . 002 0 .033 0 001 0 . 78 
ASSETS'' 0 600 1 284 0 .023 5 . 855 0 370 1 346 0 .010 9 . 699 0 266 0 . 86 
Source: Computed using the bank's 1997 FDIC Summary Financial Report. 
' n=31. 
n=94. 
^ The variables are defined as follows: AGLKLN is total agricultural loans to loans; 
CAPASST is the capital to asset ratio; ASSTEMP is assets per employee (measured in 
millions of dollars); LNDEP is the loan to deposit ratio, RBCR ia the risk-based capital 
ratio; ROA is the return on assets; and ASSETS denotes bank assets (measured in billions 
of do!1ars). 
^ The median bank size for the nonrespondent sample was $124.2 million and $71.5 million 
for the respondents. 
Table 5.3. USDA survey list: respondents vs. nonreapondents 
Test 
Nonrespondents' Respondent s' Statisti c 
Variable^ Mean S D. Min Max Mean S D. Min Max Std . err. t 
AGLNLN 0 277 0 211 0 . 027 0 .793 0 343 0 238 0. 000 0 885 0 . 042 1 58 
CAPASST 0 099 0 033 0 . 061 0 .215 0 103 0 031 0 . 053 0 224 0. 007 0 .63 
ASSTEMP 2 444 0 827 1 . 290 4 . 800 2 505 0 713 0 . 747 4 692 0. 153 0 .40 
LNDEP 0 747 0 132 0 .455 1 . 059 0 733 0 154 0 . 207 1 296 0. 026 0 55 
RBCR 0 165 0 080 0 . 100 0 . 518 0 169 0 076 0 . 001 0 57 3 0. 016 0 .26 
ROA 0 012 0 004 0 . 001 0 . 020 0 013 0 006 0 . 007 0 053 0. 001 1 28 
ASSETS'* 2 430 12 534 0 .014 67 . 597 1 470 12 030 0 . 005 186 021 2 . 445 0 .39 
Source: Computed using the bank's 1997 FDIC Summary Financial Report. 
' n=29. 
' n=259. 
' See Table 5.2 for a definition of the variables. 
* The median bank size for the noniespondent sample was $84.9 million and 
$56.3 million for the respondents. 
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general as well as Farmer Mac II in particular. Chapter 7 
sutnmarizes the results obtained from fitting a number of logit 
models to a mixture of survey and Summary Financial Report 
data. The logit models predict the probability of a bank 
participating in Farmer Mac II and identify what bank and 
market characteristics are important in influencing that 
probability. 
The participation decision process: what factors are relevant? 
The simplest way to ascertain why a bank participates or 
does not participate in Farmer Mac II is to ask the bank's 
management. In other words, what factors do they deem rele­
vant? But before doing that, it may be insightful to ask them 
why they do or do not participate in secondary markets in 
general. Their responses are the essence of Chapter 6. 
General secondary market activity 
Recall, it was posited that banks may participate in 
Farmer Mac II if they have experience participating in other 
secondary markets. Managers with experience participating in 
other secondary markets may be in a better position to evalu­
ate the potential advantages and disadvantages of selling 
loans than managers with no experience. Moreover, they may 
also be able to adapt quicker to the bureaucratic structure of 
the Farmer Mac II program, given that Farmer Mac II is de­
signed similarly to other secondary market programs. 
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Understanding why banks use other secondary markets may 
provide insight into whether a bank might sell loans into 
Farmer Mac II. For instance, suppose a bank does not sell any 
loans into any secondary market. If selling loans is not part 
of management policy, it is highly unlikely that the bank 
would sell loans to Farmer Mac (at least at this time). But, 
what if a bank that did not sell loans into a secondary market 
did sell loans to an affiliate or correspondent bank? In this 
case, the bank may be a potential Farmer Mac II participant 
because management policy is not set against loan sales, the 
bank just does not engage in secondary mar.ket activity. 
Why a bank sells loans into a secondairy market also sheds 
light on its management decision process. Suppose a bank 
views loan sales into a secondary market as a way to avoid 
interest rate risk. One could then assume that that bank 
might sell off its long-term fixed-rate loans. So a better 
understanding of bank managers' rationale for using secondary-
markets is in order. 
To do this, bankers that do not participate in secondary 
markets will be asked a panel of questions regarding the 
degree to which certain factors are relevant in their decision 
to not participate. Similarly, secondary market participants 
will be asked a separate array of questions about the degree 
to which certain factors are relevant in their decision to 
sell. The actual questions posed to nonparticipants appear on 
page 2 of the survey in Appendix; those put to participants 
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are found on page 3 of the survey. 
To rank the factor's degree of importance, a five-point 
Likert scale technique is used. A higher score implies the 
factor is more relevant to a bank's decision to participate or 
not participate. 
A note about the questions asked is in order. The origin 
of the questions is based on the literature on loan sales, 
common sense, and suggestions received from che bankers in the 
preliminary survey. The questions are designed to "paint a 
descriptive picture" of various factors driving a bank's 
decision process. 
After summarizing the responses from participants and 
nonparticipants, selected financial information will be com­
pared across the two groups to see if the factors that are 
deemed relevant are consistent with actual balance sheet and 
income statement data. In particular, the financial informa­
tion selected will include measures of liquidity, soundness, 
and profitability. For example, if nonparticipants report 
that sufficient liquidity makes loan sales unnecessary, and 
participants report that they sell loans into secondary mar­
kets to enhance liquidity, there should be a difference in the 
loan-to-deposit ratios between the two groups. 
Farmer Mac II secondary market activity 
Ultimately, the purpose of this work is to find out why 
banks participate in the Farmer Mac II loan sale program. So, 
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we will ask them. The design here is identical to the one 
described above for secondary market participation in general. 
Many of the questions are similar in nature to the cfuestions 
asked regarding participation and nonparticipation in any 
secondary market. Added to these will be questions aimed at 
issues involving USDA guaranteed lending activity and the 
Farmer Mac II secondary market program itself. The questions 
addressed to nonparticipants appear on page 8 of the survey; 
those put to the participants are found on page 9. 
No selection of financial information will compared 
across Farmer Mac II participants and nonparticipants. A more 
sophisticated analysis will be performed in Chapter 7 using a 
logit model to predict the probability of a bank participating 
and find what characteristics explain participation. We now 
turn to the procedure to be used to accomplish this task. 
Logit regression analysis 
This section describes several statistical techniques 
that can be employed to predict the probability of a bank 
participating in Farmer Mac II. The section ends with a 
discussion of logit regression analysis, the method selected 
for this study. 
Model selection 
We are interested in the probability of a bank partici­
pating in Farmer Mac II, as well as identifying the variables 
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useful in making Che prediction. Although not attempted in 
this work, an extension of the study would involve predicting 
the volume of Farmer Mac II secondary market activity. 
A variety of multivariate statistical techniques can be 
used to predict a binary dependent variable using a set of 
independent variables. Multiple regression analysis (linear 
probability model) and discriminant analysis are two related 
techniques that quickly come to mind. However, these tech­
niques pose difficulties when the dependent variable has only 
two values, as in our case--participate or not. 
When the dependent variable takes on only two values, the 
assumptions necessary for hypothesis testing in regression 
analysis are violated (Maddala 1988). For example, it is 
unreasonable to assume that the distribution of errors is 
normal. Another difficulty with multiple regression analysis 
identified by Maddala is that the predicted values cannot be 
interpreted as probabilities because they are not constrained 
to the [0,1] interval. 
Linear discriminant analysis does allow for the direct 
prediction of group membership. However, the assumption of 
multivariate normality of the independent variables, as well 
as equal variance-covariance matrices in the two groups, are 
required for the prediction rule to be optimal. 
An alternative approach to using multiple regression or 
linear discriminant analysis is to use a logit or probit 
model. These models transform the original model using a 
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cumulative probability function that ensures that all pre­
dictions lie in the [0,1] interval. Essentially, logit and 
probit models are constrained versions of the linear probabil­
ity model. 
These models assume the existence of a "latent" (unob­
served) continuous variable which is specified as the usual 
regression model. However, the latent variable can be only 
obseirved as a dichotomous variable. The difference between 
the logit and probit models arises from the assumptions made 
about the error term. The logit model assumes the error term 
has a logistic distribution; the probit model assumes the 
error term has a normal distribution. From a practical point 
of view, there is not much difference. The results are usual­
ly very similar (Greene 1993). 
Both techniques require use of the maximum-likelihood 
method to estimate the parameters of the model. This method 
involves selecting the coefficients that make our observed 
results "most" likely. Since the models are nonlinear, an 
iterative algorithm is necessary to estimate the parameters. 
The logit model was selected for the purposes of this 
dissertation, in part because it does not need to be modified 
when using unequal sampling rates. The estimated coefficients 
are not affected by the unequal sampling rates of the Farmer 
Mac II participants and nonparticipants; however, the constant 
terro is affected. The constant term must be increased by log 
P2 - log Pi, where p^ is the proportion of observations chosen 
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from participating banks and p, is the sampling rate of non-
participants (Maddala 1983). 
The basic logit model 
A logit model is based on the cumulative logistic proba­
bility function and is specified as 
P, = 1/ d+e'") , 
where P. is the probability that bank i will participate in 
Farmer Mac II, e is the base of the natural logarithm, and z 
is the log-odds ratio. The log-odds ratio is a linear func­
tion of the explanatory variables and is given by 
z = log[P./(l-P.) = B. + 
where the are the j characteristics of bank i. 
The intuition underlying the logit model is relatively 
simple. Suppose a bank faces two choices: participate or do 
not participate. The observed behavioral response of the bank 
(the dependent variable) is dichotomous. A bank that partici­
pates is assigned a value of one; those that do not partici­
pate are assigned a value of zero. The model assumes that a 
bank's decision depends on institutional characteristics and 
market realities. 
Given the attributes and participation status for each 
bank in the sample, the problem is to estimate an equation 
which predicts the likelihood that a bank with given charac­
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teristics will participate in Farmer Mac. The predicted 
dependent variable from the regression equation is simply the 
logarithm of the probability that a bank will participate in 
Farmer Mac. 
The model is then tested against the sample. If the 
characteristics selected as the explanatory variables are 
correct, the model should discriminate betv/een those banks 
that sell loans to Farmer Mac and those that do not. In other 
words, the model should have a relatively low false-negative 
rate (bank is predicted not to participate but in fact does) 
and a relatively low false-positive rate (bank is predicted to 
participate but in fact does not). 
Several logit models will be constructed to predict the 
probability that a bank will participate in the Farmer Mac II 
loan sale program. The models differ according to how partic­
ipation in Farmer Mac II is defined as well as the hypothe­
sized reasons that explain participation. Namely, we want to 
predict whether a bank will sell any type of USDA guaranteed 
loans to Farmer Mac, sell newly originated USDA guaranteed 
Farm Ownership (FO) loans, sell newly originated USDA guaran­
teed Operating Loans (OL), sell "seasoned" USDA guaranteed FO 
loans, and sell "seasoned" USDA guaranteed OL loans. For each 
regression, we also wish to identify the variables useful in 
making each prediction. 
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Summary 
This chapter reviewed and formalized the hypotheses to be 
tested using a logistic regression analysis in Chapter 7. It 
also explained how and where the data to be used in the analy­
sis were obtained. Finally, it discussed the two methodolo­
gies that will be used in Chapters 6 and 7--descriptive sta­




SECONDARY MARKET PARTICIPATION: 
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter includes a descriptive analysis of why banks 
participate and do not participate in secondary markets in 
general as well as the Farmer Mac II secondary market. The 
material for this chapter was obtained by asking bankers to 
what degree certain factors were relevant to their decision to 
sell or not sell loans into a secondary market. The first 
section will provide a description of why banks participate in 
any secondary market. The second section addresses why banks 
participate in Farmer Mac II. 
General Secondary Market Activity 
Before questioning bankers specifically about the reasons 
they do and do not participate in the Farmer Mac II loan sale 
program, information was gathered related to why they partici­
pate in any secondary market--including, but not limited to: 
Freddie Mac, Sallie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Ginnie Mae. 
First, bankers that did not engage in any secondary 
market activity were asked to indicate the degree (using a 5-
point Likert scale) to which various factors were relevant in 
their decision to not sell any type of loans in a secondary 
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market. (The actual questions posed appear on page 2 of the 
survey found in the Appendix.) A higher rating implies the 
factor is more relevant to the bank. Similarly, banks that 
had secondary market experience were asked a separate panel of 
questions (page 3 of the survey) regarding the relevance of 
various factors regarding their decision to sell loans. The 
responses for banks reporting no secondary market activity are 
summarized in Table 6.1; the responses of those reporting 
activity are presented in Table 6.2. In discussing the 5-
point Likert scale responses, the question asked on the survey 
question appears in bold underline followed by the mean re­
sponse (m) and standard deviation (s) in parentheses. Refer­
ence to the scoring is labeled in ascending order of rele-
vance--that is, l="not relevant," 2="less relevant," 3="rele-
x'-ant, " 4 = "more relevant," and 5 = "very relevant." 
After reporting the responses from sellers and nonsell-
ers, selected financial information will be compared across 
the two groups to see if the Likert scale responses are con­
sistent with balance sheet and income statem.ent data. In 
particular, the financial information selected will include 
measures of liquidity, soundness, and profitability. For 
example, if nonsellers report that sufficient liquidity makes 
loan sales unnecessary, and sellers report that they sell 
loans to enhance liquidity, there should be a difference in 
the loan-to-deposit ratios between the two groups. 
Table 6.1. Reasons for not participating in any secondary market^ 
not relevant very relevant Std. 
1 2 3 4 5 Total' Mean dev. 
Loan sales are not part of 34 18 26 46 61 185 3 44 1 48 
management strategy (18) (10) (14) (25) (33) (100) 
Prefer to hold and retain entire 4 4 10 54 98 170 4 40 0 88 
net interest margin (2) (2) (6) (32) (58) (100) 
Bank has sufficient liquidity to 6 5 30 52 80 173 4 13 1 02 
fund desired loan portfolio (4) (3) (17) (30) (46) (100) 
Bank is sufficiently capitalized 5 2 12 61 93 173 4 36 0 89 
to support desired loan portfolio (3) (1) (7) (35) (54) (100) 
Insufficient loan demand makes 36 26 36 30 46 174 3 14 1 4B 
loan sales unnecessary (21) (15) (21) (17) (26) (100) 
Underwriting stds. do not conform 61 27 31 18 11 148 2 26 1 31 
to those of secondary markets <41) (18) (21) (12) (7) (100) 
Bank already sells loans to 84 16 17 1 ] 18 146 2 06 1 45 
affiliates/correspondent banks (58) (11) (12) (8) (13) (100) 
' The top number is the frequency, the number below is the percent of total responses. 
^ Due to rounding, percent of total responses may not equal 100. 
Table 6.2. Reasons for participating in secondary markets^ 
not relevant very relevant Std. 
1 2 3 4 5 Total' Mean dev. 
Management strategy to sell 18 13 12 33 52 128 3 67 1 47 
all loans of this type (14) (10) (9) (26) (41) (100) 
Loan sales reduce interest 5 14 31 57 53 160 3 88 1 06 
rate risk (3) (9) (19) (36) (33) (100) 
Loan sales enhance portfolio 13 28 33 58 26 158 3 34 1 19 
liquidity (8) (18) (21) (37) (17) (100) 
Loan sales allow bank to 21 27 38 48 26 160 3 19 1 27 
satisfy heavy loan demand (13) (17) (24) (30) (16) (100) 
Loan sales reduce need to 19 39 45 38 18 159 2 96 1 20 
attract retail deposits (12) (25) (28) (24) (11) (100) 
Loan sales reduce need to 25 35 38 42 19 159 2 95 1 26 
purchase funds (16) (22) (24) (26) (12) (100) 
Loan sales offset declining 53 51 34 15 6 159 2 17 1 11 
deposit base (33) (32) (21) (9) (4) (100) 
Loan sales offset insufficient 59 43 25 23 30 160 2 25 1 26 
capital to support portfolio (37) (27) (16) (14) (6) (100) 
Loan sales offset insufficient 54 46 28 23 9 160 2 28 1 .23 
capital to support Ig. borrowers (34) (29) (18) (14) (6) (100) 
Loan sales enhance return 15 24 36 59 25 159 3 34 1 .20 
on assets (9) (15) (23) (37) (16) (100) 
Loan sales allow funds to be re­ 23 30 44 46 14 157 2 98 1 .20 
invested in loans of same type (15) (19) (28) (29) (9) (100) 
' The top number is the frequency, the number below is the percent of total responses. 
^ Due to rounding, the percent of total responses may not equal 100. 
Table 6.2. (continued) 
not relevant very relevant Std. 
1 2 3 4 5 Total Mean dev. 
Loan sales allow funds to be re­ 26 39 46 39 9 159 2 78 1 .16 
invested elsewhere in portfolio (16) (25) (29) (25) (6) (100) 
Loan sales allow an origination 14 24 30 47 45 160 3 53 1. 28 
bank wouldn't make otherwise (9) (15) (19) (29) (28) (100) 
Loan sales allow better rates 2 1 1 23 59 65 160 4 10 0 . 96 
for borrowers (1) (7) (14) (37) (41) (100) 
Loan sales allow better terms 3 10 24 59 64 160 4 07 0 . 98 
for borrowers (2) (6) (15) (37) (40) (100) 
Loan sales reduce loan 48 68 31 10 1 158 2 03 0 . 90 
monitoring costs (30) (43) (20) (6) (1) (100) 
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Respondents reporting no secondary market activity 
In this section banks were asked to rank (using a 5-point 
scale) how relevant each of the following factors is in their 
decision to not sell any type of loans into a secondary mar­
ket. A higher rating implies the factor is more relevant. 
Loan sales are not part of our management stratecrv (m=3.44, 
s=1.48). The nature of this question was to ascertain the 
degree to which selling loans into secondary markets figured 
into management's strategy. As reported in Table 6.1, most 
(the mode) of the banks (61/185) responding cited management 
strategy as a "very relevant" reason for not participating in 
secondary markets. At this time, these banks would not be 
considered potential participants in Farmer Mac II. We say at 
this time because management is "free" to adopt different 
policies as time passes and circumstances change. 
Nearly 20 percent of the banks indicated that management 
policy was "not relevant" in their decision to not sell loans 
into a secondary market. Evidently, their reasons for not 
selling lie elsewhere. 
Prefer to hold and retain entire net interest margin (m=4.40, 
s=0.88). This question builds on the previous one. That is, 
if loan sales are not a part of management strategy, is hold­
ing the loans in their portfolio preferable? Without ques­
tion, on average, these banks claimed that they preferred to 
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hold loans in their portfolio and retain the entire net inter­
est margin (the difference between the yield on the loan and 
the cost of funding the loan) rather than sell them into a 
secondary market. Looking at Table 6.1, nearly 60 percent of 
the banks responding rated this reason for not selling a "5" 
("veiry relevant"). Any bank that indicates that retaining 
loans for their portfolio is "very relevant" is not likely to 
participate in Farmer Mac II. 
Generally speaking, this group of banks could be called 
"portfolio lenders." That is, they service and fund the loans 
they originate--i.e., they originate loans for their portfo­
lio. Originating a loan and keeping it on the books reflects 
a very traditional approach to banking. Portfolio lending 
also avoids the so-called reinvestment problem, which will be 
discussed in more detail below when the questions addressed to 
secondary market participants are considered. 
Our bank has sufficient liquidity to fund desired loan portfo­
lio (m=4.13, s=1.02). Sufficient liquidity facilitates a 
bank's ability to fund deposit withdrawals and make loans--
i.e., conduct day to day business. The banks in this group 
appear to have adequate liquidity. From Table 6.1, it can be 
seen that nearly 50 percent of the banks score sufficient 
liquidity "very relevant" in their decision to not participate 
in secondary markets. 
The group's ample liquidity could be the result of weak 
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loan demand or a robust deposit base. Regardless of the 
reason, banks reporting sufficient liquidity levels are not 
likely to have much incentive to participate in a secondary 
market, unless there are other compelling incentives present. 
Our bank is sufficiently caipitalized, to support desired loetn 
portfolio (m=4.36, s=0.89). Regulatory authorities require 
banks to meet specific capital guidelines with respect to the 
bank's portfolio as well as its individual assets. For in­
stance, a bank must maintain a primary capital-to-asset ratio 
of at least 4 percent. In addition, lending to any particular 
borrower is limited to 25 percent of a bank's total capital. 
Historically, capital standards have been used as a measure of 
financial soundness because of capital's role as a buffer 
between a bank's assets and its liabilities. Banks have an 
incentive to participate in secondary markets if their capital 
levels are not sufficient to support their desired loan port­
folio. From Table 6.1, it is evident that these banks taken 
as a group feel that they have sufficient capital to support 
their desired portfolio. Slightly over one-half (54 percent) 
report that sufficient liquidity is "very relevant" in their 
decision not to participate in a secondary market. 
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Insufficient loan demand at our bank relative to desired 
portfolio holdings make loan sales tinnecessarv (m=3.14, 
s=1.48). Insufficient loan demand is a plausible reason for 
not participating in secondary markets. An examination of 
Table 6.1 reveals that the responses to this question were 
distributed almost uniformly across the entire Likert scale. 
These results suggest that some bankers might use secondary-
markets if loan demand was stronger, while others would not, 
regardless of loan demand. What is not reported in the Table 
is that about one-quarter (15/61) of the banks that indicated 
that management policy was "very relevant" in their decision 
not to sell, also reported that weak loan demand was "not 
relevant." These 15 banks simply do not sell loans as a 
matter of policy. No such contrast existed for the 3 6 banks 
that repox'ted that management policy was "not relevant" in 
their decision not to sell. Some said weak loan demand was 
"very relevant" but just as many claimed that weak loan demand 
was "not relevant." 
Underwriting standards for our bank's loans do not conform to 
those of secondary markets (m=2.26, s=1.31). Secondary mar­
kets require a certain degree of standardization with regard 
to the loans being securitized. For instance, the loan under­
writing standards or the documentation used by the bank may 
not be compatible with that of any secondary market. In this 
case, the bank would not be able to sell loans even if it 
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wanted to. Table 6.1 shows that most banks (41 percent) 
indicate that underwriting conformity is "not relevant." 
Many banks design their underwriting requirements and 
documentation to be compatible with those of various secondary 
markets so that their loans are conforming. The issue of 
conforming loan underwriting standards is irrelevant in the 
case of the Farmer Mac II loan sale program--Farmer Mac will 
buy any guaranteed portion of a USDA guaranteed loan. If the 
bank has originated a USDA guarantee, it automatically con­
forms unless it matures in less than 12 months or is not 
current. (Of course, a USDA guaranteed loan must conform to 
USDA guidelines.) 
We already sell to our affiliates or correspondent banks 
(m=2.06, 3=1.45). Banks that do not engage in secondary-
market activity may be selling loans to affiliates or corre­
spondent banks. But, as can be seen in Table 6.1, well over 
one-half (58 percent) of the banks indicated that loan sales 
to affiliates or correspondents was "not relevant" in their 
decision to not participate. This implies that these banks do 
not sell any loans out of their portfolio--to anyone. This 
puts to rest the notion that a majority of banks might be 
selling-off loans, but just not into secondary markets. It 
appears that if, on average, a bank does not participate in 
secondary markets, it probably does not sell loans to an 
affiliate or correspondent bank either. 
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Sxunmary 
The survey respondents that reported no secondary market 
activity have, as a group, somewhat weak loan demand, and 
sufficient deposit and capital resources to fund their desired 
portfolios. They indicate a preference for holding the loans 
they originate. Generally speaking, loan sales are not a 
significant part of management strategy. However, it is worth 
noting that a bank's management strategy is probably not 
independent of the current environment the bank operates in. 
That is, if the conditions above changed such that the incen­
tives to participate in secondary markets were increased, 
these bank managers may in fact adapt their policies to the 
new environment. 
Obviously, the banks considered above do not participate 
in the Farmer Mac II loan sale program. Next, responses to 
the panel of questions addressed to banks that do engage in 
secondary market activity will be analyzed. This group of 159 
banks includes both Farmer Mac II program participants and 
nonparticipants. 
Respondents reporting secondary market activity 
Many of the questions put to this group were similar in 
nature to the cfuestions put to the nonsellers, only reversed. 
For example, where nonsellers were asked if insufficient 
demand was relevant in their decision to not sell, sellers 
were asked if heavy loan demand was relevant in their decision 
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to sell. Other questions were designed to acquire information 
unique to secondary market participants--such as, What do you 
do with the proceeds of a sale? The results to this panel of 
questions appear in Table 6.2. The questions asked are found 
on page 3 of the survey in the Appendix. 
Part o f  TnaTiacT«*'m«=»Tit strateav to sell all loans of this type 
(m=3.67, 3=1.45). All banks in this group participate in sec­
ondary markets; this question attempts to reveal whether some 
banks sell certain types of loans as a matter of policy. For 
instance, a bank may sell all its long-term fixed-rate mort­
gage loans in order to avoid interest rate risk. Banks that 
adopt such a policy might then also sell their long-term 
fixed-rate USDA guaranteed Farm Ownership loans to Farmer Mac. 
From Table 6.2, 41 percent (the mode) of these banks responded 
that selling all loans of a certain type was "very relevant" 
in their decision to sell loans. 
The types of loans that were singled out included guaran­
teed student loans. Small Business Administration (SBA) guar­
anteed loans. Farm Service Agency (FSA) guaranteed loans, and 
long-term fixed-rate mortgage loans. These loans have the 
characteristics that facilitate securitization--especially a 
guarantee in the case of the first three types mentioned. A 
bank selling all originations of a particular type of loan may 
be combining the various advantages a secondary market has to 
offer: improved ability to accommodate customers, better 
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interest risk rate management, enhanced liquidity, and higher 
profitability. 
Loan sales reduce interest rate risk (m=3.88, s=1.06). As 
suggested by the responses to the preceding question, banks 
often sell long-term fixed-rate loans as a matter of policy. 
Funding longer-term fixed-rate assets with shorter-term lia­
bilities creates so-called interest rate risk. The risk 
arises whenever the liabilities funding an asset are re-priced 
at different time intervals than the asset is re-priced. Re­
pricing short-term deposits that are funding a long-term 
fixed-rate mortgage in an environment of rising interest rates 
will reduce the bank's income as well as erode its capital 
position. Of course, the bank could simply offer only adjust­
able rate mortgages (ARMs); however, some customers may prefer 
a fixed-rate mortgage and take their business elsewhere if not 
given the opportunity to obtain a fixed-rate loan. Pass-
through loan sales eliminate the interest rate risk problem 
for the loan seller. 
Looking at Table 6.2, nearly 90 percent of banks rank the 
prospect of reduced interest rate risk as "relevant" or higher 
in their decision to participate in secondary markets. Their 
answers are consistent with what the theoretical and empirical 
literature assert. 
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Loctn sales enhctnce our portfolio liquidity (m=3.34, s=1.19). 
In general, banks reported that the added liquidity a second­
ary market offers is relevant to their decision to sell. This 
should not be surprising, since providing liquidity is a 
primary function of these markets. Recall, liquidity is 
needed to conduct the day to day business of the bank--that 
is, fxxnding deposit withdrawals and making loans. If banks 
report that they use secondary markets to enhance liquidity, 
it makes sense to look at questions pertaining to factors that 
affect liquidity--namely, deposits and loans. 
Loan sales allow bank to satisfy heavy loan demand (in=3.19, 
s=1.27). Satisfying heavy loan demand complicates liquidity 
management. To meet added loan demand, a bank can attract 
additional deposits, borrow funds, reallocate its asset port­
folio (say, hold less secondary reserve assets such as govern­
ment securities), or sell loans. The method a bank chooses 
will be the one that fits the needs and situation of the bank 
the best. 
From Table 6.2, the pattern of responses generated by 
this question was similar to that of the question concerning 
liquidity. The average response indicates that heavy loan 
demand is a relevant reason for using secondary markets. 
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Loan sales reduce need to attract retail deposits to fund 
desired lo^ln portfolio (in=2.96, s=1.20). Traditionally, 
deposits have been the primary source of funds used by banks 
to fund their portfolios. However, the increasing popularity 
of active liability management (borrowing) and loan sales has 
lessened the reliance on deposits as a source of funds. In 
part, the popularity of borrowing and loan sales has arisen in 
response to difficulty in attracting deposits. Looking at 
Table 6.2, bankers on average rated the reduced need to at­
tract new deposits as "relevant" in their decision to sell 
loans into a secondary market. The responses around "rele­
vant" are normally distributed (i.e., shaped like a bell). 
Apparently, some banks do not have a sufficient deposit 
base to fund their desired portfolio, whereas others are well-
supplied. The banks that need funding view loan sales as a 
way to avoid issuing deposits. If a bank indicates that using 
secondary markets to reduce the need to attract deposits is 
"not relevant," it probably has ample deposits on hand, and 
therefore sells loans for other reasons. 
Loan sales reduce need to purchase funds (m=2.95, 3=1.26). 
From the bank's point of view, if it has ample deposits, it 
need not acquire deposits, purchase funds (borrow), shuffle 
its asset portfolio, or sell loans; banks lacking funds can 
choose among these alternatives. Since selling loans replaces 
the need to borrow or raise deposits, banks that report the 
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reduced need to raise deposits by selling loans as important 
should indicate the same for the need to purchase funds. 
What is apparent from Table 6.2 is that the average and 
distribution of the responses to the borrowing question are 
similar to those of the preceding deposit question. Some 
banks (16 percent) indicate the reduced need to purchase funds 
as "very relevant," and some (12 percent) cite it as "not 
relevant." Most (72 percent) fall in between. What is not 
reported in the table is that the banks that rank the reduced 
need to purchase loans as more relevant are the same banks 
that claim a reduced need co attract retail deposits as more 
relevant. The same holds true for the banks that rank the 
reduced need to purchase funds as less relevant. It is clear 
then that some of the sellers are using loan sale programs to 
offset funding shortages. Banks flush with deposits that sell 
loans must be selling them for other reasons. 
Loan sales offset declining deposit base at our bank relative 
to demand for funds (in=2.17, s=l.ll) . Declining deposit bases 
have received a great deal of attention lately. Historically, 
banks have funded their loan portfolios using deposits. A 
deposit drain for a given demand for funds is tantamount to an 
increased demand for funds for a given deposit base. By and 
large, banks did not indicate that a declining deposit base 
relative to the demand for funds was very significant in their 
decision to sell loans, as is apparent in Table 6.2. In fact. 
150 
the mode response (53/159 or 33 percent) was "not relevant." 
How come some banks reported that a reduced need to 
attract deposits is an important reason underlying their 
decision to participate in secondary markets, but that a de­
clining deposit base is not? One explanation is that current 
deposit levels at many banks are adequate, but for some banks, 
adding deposits might be difficult. 
Loan sales offset insufficient capital resources on hand at 
our bank to ftind desired loan portfolio {m-2.25, s=1.26) and 
Loan sales offset insufficient capital resources on hand at 
our bank to fund large individual borrowers (m=2.28, s=1.23). 
Inadequate capital has been cited in the literature as a 
reason for secondary market participation. Recall, the group 
of nonsellers indicated that sufficient capitalization--either 
to support a bank's portfolio or large loans to individual 
borrowers--made loan sales unnecessary (see Table 6.1) . 
Table 6.2 reports the responses for those banks that do 
sell loans. Overall, these banks indicate that capital levels 
are not an issue in their decision to sell loans. These 
results do not contradict previous empirical findings. Rath­
er, it appears that most banks are currently well capitalized. 
Loan sales enhance our return on assets (m=3.34, s=1.20). A 
basic advantage of selling loans into the secondary market 
touted by the literature is that loan sales increase a bank's 
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return on assets (ROA). The idea is that a bank can earn fee 
income from servicing an asset that it does not hold--thus, 
increasing ROA. From Table 6.2, the average score of 3.34/5 
means that increased ROA is a relevant factor for the banks 
taken as a group. 
Of course, it could be the case that profits actually 
fall after a sale, although the bank's ROA rises. For in­
stance, if a bank sells a SlOO loan with a net interest margin 
of 4% and retains a service fee of 2%, its ROA has risen but 
its net income will fall. If the ban.k can replace that loan 
with another or an asset that earns more than 2%, then both 
its ROA and net income will rise. This simple scenario is 
revealing--that is, selling loans is dependent on what banks 
do with the proceeds from a sale. Enhancing ROA is not a 
sufficient incentive for participation in a secondary market; 
a bank must also be able to replace the sold loan wiuh another 
asset whose return makes up for the difference between the net 
interest margin on the loan before the sale and the service 
fee on the loan after the sale so that its profits do not 
slip. This condition may well explain why many banks chat do 
not sell loans prefer to hold their loans and retain the 
entire net interest margin. 
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Locin sales allow us to invest proceeds from sale into loans of 
similar type (in=2.98, s=1.20). As mentioned above, selling 
loans creates a reinvestment problem. One option available to 
a bank that sells loans is to use the proceeds to repeat the 
process--that is, originate more loans of the same type. The 
other would be to invest the proceeds elsewhere in the port­
folio . 
From Table 6.2, the group's average response is "rele­
vant." However, the more extreme responses "very relevant" 
(14/157 or 9 percent) and "not relevant" (23/157 or 15 per­
cent) merit further discussion. Banks responding "very rele­
vant" may be using loan sales to ser\''ice heavy loan demand for 
a particular type of loan. On the other hand, banks that re­
sponded "not relevant" cannot be using secondary markets to 
satisfy heavy loan demand. Rather, they must be selling loans 
for a different reason. 
Loeua sales allow us to invest proceeds from sale elsewhere in 
portfolio (m=2.78, s=1.16). This question addresses the 
portfolio diversification argument made in the literature, 
which is that banks that sell loans are able to fund a differ­
ent portfolio of assets than they originate. The average 
response across all banks (reported above) suggests that 
diversification is not as compelling a reason to sell loans as 
some of the other factors. Rather, diversification may be a 
result of loan sales, as opposed to the cause of it. 
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Loan sales allow our bank to originate a loan it ordinarily 
would not if forced to hold the loan in portfolio (m=3.53, 
3=1.28). This incentive to sell loans cannot be captured di­
rectly by looking at financial statements. Yet, by looking at 
Table 6.2, nearly 30 percent of the banks (45/160) report this 
ability as "highly relevant" in their decision to sell. The 
high average score for the group (3.53) indicates that banks 
knowingly take advantage of the ability to originate loans 
they normally would not, if they had to keep chem in their 
portfolio. 
Loan sales allow better rates to our borrowers (m=4.10, 
3=0.96) ouid Loan sales allow better terms to our borrowers 
(m=4.07, 3=0.98). The distribution of responses found in 
Table 6.2 to both questions shows that banks use secondary 
markets as a way to pass on better rates and terms to their 
customers. In fact, of all the incentives discussed so far, 
banks on average rated these two reasons as the most relevant 
reason for secondary market participation. 
The portion of the sample reporting no loan sales may not 
be taking advantage of the improved ability to satisfy borrow­
ers' needs offered by participating in secondary markets; 
these banks may only be originating the types of loans they 
are willing to hold at the rates and terms they decree. This 
lack of flexibility could manifest itself in a loss of busi­
ness . 
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Loan sales reduce loan monitoring costs {m=2.03; s=0.90). 
Although it has been suggested in the literature that loan 
sales reduce loan monitoring costs, the statistics above tell 
a different story. If loans could be sold outright without 
recourse, monitoring costs would disappear. However, if the 
bank continues to service the loan, it is doubtful that moni­
toring costs would change much. One banker noted that selling 
loans actually increased monitoring costs. 
Svunmary 
Banks that report activity in secondary markets, as a 
whole, have sufficient capital to fund their large borrowers 
and desired portfolios. Some report ample deposits, while 
others are experiencing a deposit drain. Banks cite heavy 
loan demand as relevant to their loan sale decision. Borrower 
accommodation also figures prominently. Finally, these banks 
take advantage of the flexibility in liquidity and risk man­
agement as well as improved profitability that selling loans 
into a secondary market offers. 
Comparison between sellers and non-sellers 
The Likert scale responses to the cfuestions put to the 
nonsellers and the responses to those asked of secondary 
market participants suggest that differences between the two 
groups may exist that can be identified and tested using 
financial data drawn from the banks' balance sheets and income 
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statements. In particular, the Likert scale responses suggest 
that differences exist between groups with respect to liquidi­
ty, soundness, and profitability. 
The financial information selected for the comparison 
include the following: the loan-to-deposit ratio, the deposit-
to-asset ratio, the yield on earning assets, the cost of 
funding assets, the return on assets, the capital-to-asset 
ratio, and the risk-based capital ratio. Table 6.3 provides 
summary statistics for each of these variables, as well as the 
results of the means tests. 
Loan-to-deposit ratio 
The Likert scale responses imply that the loan-to-deposit 
ratio between groups differs. Banks indicating no secondary 
market activity should have a lower loan-to-deposit ratio 
because they have weaker loan demand relative to their deposit 
base. The financial data presented in Table 6.3 seem to bear 
this out. There is a significant difference in means between 
the groups at the q;=.01 level. Nonsellers have more room in 
their portfolio for additional loans than sellers do. 
Deposit-to-asset ratio 
The deposit-to-asset ratio was used to ascertain whether 
sellers used relatively less deposits to fund their asset 
portfolio than nonsellers. The data presented in Table 6.3 
support the Likert responses; the deposit-to-asset ratio is 
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Table 5.3. Secondary market participation: 






dev. Std. err. t 
LNDEP 0 .7210 0.1597 0 . 7693 0.1320 1 .595E-02 3 085'" 
DEPASST 0 .8512 0.0631 0 . 8386 0.0660 6 975E-03 1. 803' 
YIELD 0 .0837 0 . 0075 0 . 0857 0.0080 8 370E-04 2 315" 
CO FA 0 . 0384 0.0042 0 . 0398 0.0045 4 713E-04 3 . OOl'" 
ROA C .0132 0.0060 0 . 0130 0.0043 5 550E-04 0 . 329 
CAPASST 0 . 1067 0.0323 0 . 0963 0.0262 3 140E-03 3 . 326'" 
RBCR 0 .1773 0.0753 0 . 1462 0.0541 6 950E-03 4 . 472'" 
Source: Computed using bank's 1997 FDIC Summary Financial Report. 
• n=156. 
" n=192. 
' The vaiafales are defined as follows: LNDBP is the loan-to-
deposit ratio, DEPASST is the deposit-to-asset ratio, YIELD is 
the yield on earning assets, COFA is the cost of funding assets, 
ROA is the return on assts, CAPASST is the capital-to-assec 
ratio, and RBCR is the risk-based capital ratio. 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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significantly lower for sellers than nonsellers at the .1 
level. Nonsellers fund a larger proportion of their assets 
with deposits than sellers do. 
Yield, funding costs, and ROA 
The Likert scale responses also suggest that there may be 
differences between the two groups' yield on earning assets 
and their cost of funding assets, but no difference between 
groups in their return on assets (ROA). If sellers enjoy 
higher yields, they would then have a comparative advantage in 
originating loans; however, if at the same time they have 
higher funding costs, they would have a comparative disadvan­
tage in funding the loans. Nonsellers of course would face 
the opposite set of circumstances; these banks would have a 
comparacive advantage in funding loans and a comparative 
disadvantage in originating them. But, on balance, if each 
group exploits its strong suit, the return on assets is not 
likely to differ between groups. 
The data and tests presented in Table 6.3 affirm this. 
Banks that sell loans in secondary markets have significantly 
higher yields (a=.05 level) and funding costs (a=.01 level), 
but no different ROAs than the group reporting no participa­
tion. Again, these results suggest that banks exploit the 
activities in which they have a comparative advantage. 
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Capital-to-asset ratio 
The capital-to-asset ratio is a measure of financial 
leverage. Historically, it has been used as a measure of 
risk. A lower ratio means that there is a smaller buffer 
between the value of a bank's assets and its liabilities. A 
lower ratio therefore implies a more aggressive management 
style. As seen in Table 6.3, the capital-to-asset ratio does 
differ between groups at the a=.01 level of significance. 
This suggests that sellers have a higher degree of financial 
leverage than banks that do not participate in secondary 
markets. A lower risk-based capital ratio, to be discussed 
next, would also imply a more aggressive management style. 
Risk-based capital ratio 
The risk-based capital ratio is more encompassing than 
the simple capital-to-asset ratio in the sense that it consid­
ers the types of assets held and the off-balance sheet activ­
ities a bank engages in. For any given capital-to-asset 
ratio, a bank would have a lower risk-based capital-to-asset 
ratio if a larger proportion of its portfolio was held in 
riskier assets (say, more loans and less government securi­
ties) . Sellers do in fact have a statistically significant 
(q:=.01 level) lower risk-based capital ratio, as can be seen 
in Table 6.3. 
A word of caution is in order. It could be the case that 
nonsellers have higher risk-based capital ratios (on average) 
159 
because they have weaker loan demand. That is, they might be 
holding relatively fewer loans in their portfolio by circum­
stance, not by choice. 
Summary 
As was stated before, the Likert scale data generated 
from the survey instrument appear consistent with the theoret­
ical and empirical literature. Moreover, the selected balance 
sheet and income statement items reinforce the survey results. 
The factors that banks cite as relevant in their decision to 
sell and not to sell loans are in fact reflected in differ­
ences between the means using measures obtained from their 
financial statements. 
In the next section, the focus narrows to the reasons why 
banks choose to participate in the Farmer Mac II program. 
Fanner Mac II Secondary Market Activity 
Table 6.4 summarizes the factors nonparticipants cite as 
important in their decision to not sell loans into Farmer Mac 
II; Table 6.5 reports the reasons participants indicate as 
relevant in their decision to sell. 
Respondents reporting no participation in Farmer Mac II 
Two hundred fifty-nine banks indicated no USDA guaranteed 
loan sales to Farmer Mac II. The banks reporting no partici­
pation in any secondary market will also be responding to this 
Table 6.4. Reasons for not participating in Farmer Mac II program^ 
not relevant very relevant Std. 
1 2 3 4 5 Total" Mean dev. 
Loan sales are not part of 53 46 45 47 65 256 3 09 1 49 
management strategy (21) (18) (18) (18) (25) (100) 
USDA loan sales are not part 42 36 38 52 79 247 3 35 1 48 
of management strategy (17) (15) (15) (21) (32) (100) 
Prefer to hold USDA loans and 20 13 32 74 106 245 3 96 1 23 
retain entire net interest margin (8) (5) (13) (30) (43) (100) 
Bank has sufficient liquidity to 17 15 30 84 100 246 3 95 1 18 
fund USDA loans (7) (6) (12) (34) (41) (100) 
Bank is sufficiently capitalized 16 12 26 81 111 246 4 05 1 15 
to fund USDA loans (7) (5) (11) (33) (45) (100) 
Insufficient loan demand makes 56 36 48 52 56 248 3 06 1 47 
loan sales unnecessary (23) (15) (19) (21) (23) (100) 
Insufficient USDA loan demand 38 32 45 55 75 245 3 40 1 43 
makes loan sales unnecessary (16) (13) (18) (22) (31) (100) 
Bank sells USDA loans to 176 26 20 8 9 239 1 53 1 03 
affiliates/correspondent banks (74) (11) (8) (3) (4) (100) 
Not familiar with Farmer Mac 11 1 87 9 6 6 16 2 24 1 46 1 15 
loan sale program (84) (4) (3) (3) (7) (100) 
Too much paperwork with 70 38 79 27 16 230 2 .48 1 .23 
Farmer Mac 11 program (30) (17) (34) (12) (7) (100) 
' Top number is the frequency, number in parentheses is percent of total responses. 
2 Due to rounding, the percent of total responses may not equal 100. 
Table 6.5. Reasons for participating in Farmer Mac 11^ 
not relevant very relevant Std. 
1 2 3 4 b Total'' Mean dev. 
Management strategy to sel1 lb 10 14 12 14 6b 2 . 97 1.47 
all USDA loans {2i) (lb) (22) (19) (22) (100) 
Loan sales reduce interest 2 b 8 26 27 6H 4 . 04 1 . 03 
rate risk (3) (7) (12) (38) (40) (100) 
Loan sales enhance portfolio 6 7 14 26 1 b 6fi 3 . bb 1.19 
liquidity (y) (10) (21) (30) (22) (100) 
Loan sales allow bank Lo sal isly 12 21 14 1 3 U bU 2 . 78 1 . 27 
heavy USDA loan demand <ia) (31 ) (21) (19) (12) (100) 
Loan sales reduce need Lo 7 12 19 17 13 6U 3 . 22 1 . 26 
attract retail depoaiLs (10) (IB) (28) (2b) (19) (100) 
Loan sales reduce need to y 12 16 20 1 1 b8 3 . 16 1 . 27 
purchase funds (13) (18) (24) (29) (16) (100) 
Loan aalea offset declining 2b 23 y 7 4 68 2.13 1.19 
deposit base (37) (34) (13) (10) (6) (100) 
Loan bales offset insulf icieni 21 20 14 7 b 6 7 2.31 1 .23 
capital to support. porL f o] i o (31 ) (30) (21) (10) (8) (100) 
Loan sales offset jntiuff icieni 20 21 1 b 7 4 0 7 2.29 1.18 
capital to support l(j. boriowera (30) (31) (22) (iO) (6) (100) 
' The top number is the frequency, the number below is the percent of total responaes. 
Due to rounding, the percent of total lesponses may not sum to 100. 
Table 6.5. (continued) 
Loan sales enhance return 
on assets 
Loan sales allow funds to be re 
invested in more USDA loans 
Loan sales allow tunds to be re­
invested elsewhere in portlolio 
Loan sales allow USDA origination 
bank wouldn't make otherwise 
Loan sales allow better rates on 
USDA loans for borrowers 
Loan sales allow better terms on 
USDA loans for borrowers 
not relevant very relevant Std. 
1 2 3 4 b Total Mean dev. 
0 7 11 32 17 67 3.90 0 . 91 
(0) ( 1 0 )  (16) (48) (2b) (100) 
9 1 3  23 13 9 6 7 3.01 1 .21 
(13) (19) (34) (19) (13) (100) 
9 12 2b 16 6 6B 2 . 99 1.14 
(13) (18) (37) (24) (9) (100) 
1 1 7  17 20 13 60 3 . 23 1 . 32 
(16) (10) (2b) (29) (19) (100) 
1 2  6 22 3 7 68 4 . 36 0.87 
(2) (3) (9) (32) (b4) (100) 
2 2 10 20 34 68 4.19 1 .00 
(3) (3) (lb) (29) (bO) (100) 
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panel of questions, so it should be expected that many banks 
are found not to make use of secondary markets as a matter of 
management policy here too. These results should also reflect 
the relatively weak loan demand at many nonparticipating 
banks, the adequate deposit and capital resources at hand, and 
the propensity for nonparticipating banks to hold onto the 
loans they originate. The only relative differences in the 
responses to this line of questioning should occur due to the 
addition of banks in this group that participate in secondary 
markets in general, but not the Farmer Mac II secondary market 
in particular. The results, presented in Table 5.4, were 
compiled from the responses to page 3 of the sur-/ey found in 
the .A.ppendix. 
Loan sales of any type are not a part of management strategy 
(m=3.09, s=1.49) . .^^s expected, a great many banks reported 
they do not participate in the Farm.er Mac II program because 
loan sales of any kind are not part of management strategy 
(Table 6.4). However, since this group of respondents now 
includes banks that do sell loans, the frequency of "less 
relevant" (46/256 or 18 percent) and "not relevant" (53/256 or 
21 percent) responses increased markedly. These banks are of 
particular interest since they do participate in secondary 
markets, albeit not Farmer Mac II. 
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USDA loan sales are not part of our management strategy 
(m=3.35, s=1.48). Banks were asked how important management 
policy figured in their decision to not sell USDA loans to see 
if a bank's loan sales strategy differed across different 
types of loans. Looking at Table 6.4, it appears that many 
banks have a management strategy that allows for certain types 
of secondary market participation, but not others. To see 
this, notice that 65 of 256 banks (25 percent) responded that 
loan sales [of any type] are not part of management strategy 
was "very relevant" in their decision not to sell loans. When 
asked how relevant management strategy was in their decision 
not to participate in Farmer Mac II, 79 of 247 banks (32 
percent) responded "very relevant." In other words, banks 
appear to have a loan sale strategy that differs across loans. 
Moreover, the many responses reported in Table 6.4 for this 
question between "not relevant" and "very relevant" implies 
that management directive does not "rule-in" or "rule-out" 
participation in secondary markets for a particular type of 
loan (such as USDA loans). 
Prefer to hold USDA loans in portfolio and keep entire inter­
est rate spread (m=:3.96, s=1.23) • From Table 6.4, the mode 
response to this question was "very relevant." From the 
responses of banks that did not participate in any secondary-
market we know that they preferred an originate and earn the 
net interest margin strategy (see Table 6.1) . Now we find 
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that, on average, banks that do not participate in Farmer Mac 
II also prefer to originate USDA loans for their own portfolio 
and keep the interest rate spread. 
Our bank has sufficient liquidity to fxmd USDA loans (ni=3.95, 
3=1.18). One reason advanced by advocates of a secondary 
market for USDA guaranteed loans was that banks need such a 
program for liquidity puirposes. However, inspection of Table 
6.4 reveals that, at least for the average bank in this group, 
adequate liquidity is not an issue. Again, the mode response 
(41 percent of the banks) indicated that sufficient liquidity 
to fund USDA loans was "very relevant" in their decision not 
to participate in Farmer Mac II. 
Sufficient liquidity to fund USDA guaranteed loans could 
be the result of weak overall loan demand, weak USDA guaran­
teed loan demand, or an ample deposit base. Regardless, banks 
that have (or perceive themselves to have) adequate liquidity 
are not likely candidates to participate in a secondary mar­
ket, unless their participation is based on factors other than 
liquidity needs. 
Our bank 1q sufficiently capitalized to fund USDA loans 
(in=4.05, s=1.15). On average, banks indicate that sufficient 
capital on hand to fund USDA loans is a large part of the 
reason they do not participate in the Farmer Mac II loan sale 
program. Again, looking at Table 6.4, the mode response was 
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"very relevant" (111/246 or 45 percent). 
Recall, the proponents of secondary markets for agricul­
tural loans maintained that small isolated rural banks might 
find it difficult to raise the capital needed to support their 
portfolio or large individual borrowers. Although this claim 
does not seem to apply to nonparticipancs of Farmer Mac II, it 
may apply to those banks that do participate. The reason is 
that if the responses to this question are adjusted for the 
banks with no secondary market activity whatsoever, the re­
maining responses affiirm earlier findings--that is, loan 
sellers tend be less well capitalized than their counterparts. 
Insufficient overall loan demand at our bank relative to 
desired portfolio holdings make loan sales vmnecessarv 
(m^3.06, s=1.47). This question was the same question ad­
dressed to the group of banks that do not participate in any 
secondary market. Looking at Table 6.4, the responses to this 
question are quite similar to those reported in Table 6.1 for 
the same question. Recall, some of the nonparticipants in any 
secondary market group reported weak loan demand being "very 
relevant" in their decision to not sell loans, but just as 
many others reported that weak loan demand was "not relevant." 
Most fell somewhere in between the two extremes. 
Table 6.4 reflects the same pattern of responses for 
Farmer Mac nonparticipants because most of the banks that do 
not participate in Farmer Mac II do not participate in any 
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secondary market. Those banks that report weak loan demand as 
an important reason for not participating might participate if 
loan demand strengthened; those that report that weak loan 
demand is not relevant are in effect saying that they would 
not participate even if loan demand was stronger. 
Insufficient USDA loan demand at our bamk relative to desired 
portfolio holdings make loan sales unnecassary (m=3.40, 
s=1.43). Comparing the results of this question with the 
previous one suggests that loan demand may be a very important 
factor in a bank's decision to sell loans. From Table 6.4, 
most banks (75/245 or 31 percent) ranked the relevance a "5" 
(i.e., "very relevant"). This implies that, all else equal, 
if USDA loan demand was to increase, participation in the 
Farmer Mac II program would increase too. 
A note on the reinvestment problem a bank faces if it 
sells loans and how the issue relates to loan demand is in 
order. If a bank sells loans, it would earn a modest servic­
ing fee and be faced with a reinvestment problem (i.e., what 
to do with the proceeds from the sale). Weak USDA loan demand 
would make recycling the proceeds from the sale into more USDA 
loans difficult, whereas, weak overall demand would make it 
hard to even reinvest the funds elsewhere in the loan portfo­
lio. So, weak overall loan demand or weak demand for USDA 
guaranteed loans weakens the incentives for a bank to partici­
pate in Farmer Mac II. 
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We already sell USDA loans to our affiliates or correspondent 
banks (m=1.53, s=1.03) . This question was designed to find 
out if banks that were not selling their USDA guaranteed loans 
to Farmer Mac were selling them to some other third party. 
Inspection of Table 6.4 shows that nearly three-quarters of 
the respondents (176/239) indicated that vie already sell loans 
to our affiliates or correspondent banks was "not relevant" to 
their decision to not sell loans into Farmer Mac II. 
This is good news and not so good news for Farmer Mac. 
On one hand, most banks that sell their USDA guarantees sell 
them into Farmer Mac II. We know this because we know what 
banks sell into Farmer Mac II, and we know from the sample of 
banks that do not participate in Farmer Mac II that, by and 
large, they do not sell loans to their affiliates or to corre­
spondent banks. On the other hand, if a great many banks were 
selling USDA loans to other buyers, the banks would represent 
potential business that could be competed for. In other 
words, although Farmer Mac enjoys the lion's share of the 
buyers' market in USDA loans, at this juncture it might be 
more advantageous for Farmer Mac to have a smaller share of a 
larger market. 
TJr>^ •FaTnil-ia-r with Fanner Mac II program (in=1.46, s=1.15) and 
Too much paperwork with Farmer Mac II (m=2.48, s=1.23). The 
final two questions put to depositories that do not partici­
pate in the Farmer Mac II loan sale program concerned their 
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views of Farmer Mac. Most of the banks appeared to have some 
degree of familiarity with Farmer Mac II. On average, banks 
did not cite a lack of familiarity with the program as a 
reason for not participating in it. This finding should not 
be very surprising, given that the sample was drawn from banks 
holding USDA guaranteed loans and the fact that Farmer Mac 
sponsors a secondary market for USDA guarantees. This is to 
say that most have heard of Farmer Mac II, not that the banks 
are cognizant of the particular nuts and bolts of the program. 
Banks seemed quite divided over whether the Farmer Mac II 
loan sale program involved too much paper shuffling. From 
Table 6.4, some thought it did and cited this as a strong 
reason for not participating, yet, many claimed that it was 
not important in their decision process. Many of the latter 
banks were banks that had secondary market selling experience. 
They would probably not be as overwhelmed by Farmer Mac's 
guidelines as those banks with no selling experience. 
Summary 
The descriptive results for the banks that do not sell 
USDA loans to Farmer Mac (Table 6.4) were similar in nature to 
the results that were tabulated for banks not participating in 
any secondary market (Table 6.1). Again, this should not be 
surprising--most banks that do not participate in Farmer Mac 
II do not participate in any secondary market. However, 
approximately 70 banks that do not participate in Farmer Mac 
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II do sell loans into other secondary markets. This fact did 
give rise to some differences. 
Many banks claimed that USDA (or any other) loan sales 
are not an integral part of management policy. Insufficient 
overall and USDA loan demand, and adequate capital levels are 
consistent with the decision to originate and hold the loans 
in portfolio--that is, engage in conventional banking practic­
es. Finally, it appears that banks that do not participate in 
Farmer Mac II do not sell loans to buyers other than Farmer 
Mac. 
In the next section, banks that participate in the Farmer 
Mac II loan sale program will be asked what factors underlie 
their decision to sell USDA guarantees to Farmer Mac. 
Respondents reporting participation in Farmer Mac II 
The results discussed here are summarized in Table 6.5. 
They were generated from questions appearing on page 9 of the 
survey instrument found in the Appendix. Questions put to 
this group were similar in nature to those asked banks that 
reported secondary market activity--with the major difference 
involving the importance of USDA guaranteed lending character­
istics. Since this group is a primarily a subset of banks 
that sell loans in general, the responses should be in harmony 
with those reported earlier in Table 6.2. It is worth noting 
that, for a handful of banks. Farmer Mac II was the only 
secondary market they participated in. Some of the signifi­
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cant differences delineated between the group of sellers and 
nonsellers before (reported in Table 6.3) may disappear when 
banks that participate in Farmer Mac II are compared to those 
that do not. The underlying reason is attributable to the 
fact that the group of banks not participating in Farmer Mac 
II now includes banks that have secondary market experience, 
thus clouding the distinction between sellers and nonsellers 
that existed before. In other words, any differences discov­
ered between Farmer Mac II participants and nonparticipants is 
likely to be based on factors pertaining to USDA lending. 
Part of management strategy to sell all USDA loans (m=2.97, 
3=1.47). The answers to this question were uniformly distrib­
uted across the whole 5-point Likert scale. For some banks, 
selling all USDA guaranteed loans is a set policy; for others, 
the decision to sell is evidently made on a case by case 
basis. 
Loan sales reduce interest rate risk (m=4.04, s=1.03). For 
Farmer Mac II participants, the decision to sell USDA loans 
hinges on the reduction in interest rate risk that accompanies 
participation. The greatest reduction in interest rate risk 
would come from selling long-teirm fixed-rate FO loans. Farroer 
Mac was, in part, created to increase the amount of medium-
and long-term fixed-rate credit available to farmers. So, the 
program may be fulfilling one of its intended purposes. 
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Loan sales enhance portfolio licmiditv (m=3.55, s=1.19). On 
average, enhanced portfolio liquidity figured prominently in 
Farmer Mac II participants' decisions to sell USDA loans. 
Without question, the use of Farmer Mac II (or any other) 
secondary market enhances liquidity. This attribute of Farmer 
Mac II was stressed by advocates of the loan sale program. 
Recall that heavy loan demand or a declining deposit base 
could put pressure on a bank to improve its liquidity posi­
tion. Next, we will look at loan demand and funding factors. 
T.oan aales allow our bank to satisfy heavy loan demand for 
USDA locuis (m=2.78, s=1.27). Surprisingly, on average, par­
ticipants in Farmer Mac II do not report that heavy USDA loan 
demand is "relevant" (i.e., a score of "3") in their decision 
to sell USDA loans. Recall, Farmer Mac II nonparticipants 
overwhelmingly reported that weak USDA loan demand was "very 
relevant" (see Table 6.4). Evidently, the presence of heavy 
loan demand is not a necessary condition for loan sales to 
occur. One possible explanation for this observation--borrow­
er accommodation--will be dealt with in more detail below. 
One of the compelling reasons for establishing a second­
ary market in USDA guaranteed loans rested on the notion that 
there would be an increased demand for USDA guaranteed loans 
as a result of the policy shift away from USDA direct lending. 
In other words, the implication of the policy shift was that 
farmers who had previously received direct loans from the USDA 
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would now show up at their local banks to apply for USDA 
guaranteed loans. Local banks, facing an increased demand for 
credit without an associated increase in available local 
funding, would need a secondary market to be able to satisfy 
the farmers' credit needs. From the survey results (see 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5), many banks do not currently seem to be 
experiencing heavy demand for USDA loans. However, changing 
conditions in the farm economy could quickly swamp banks with 
borrowers whose only access to credit would be the USDA guar­
anteed loan program. 
Loan sales reduce the need to attract retail deposits to fund 
desired loan portfolio (m=3.22, s=1.26). From a bank's van­
tage point, it can fund new loans using existing deposits and 
reducing other assets, increasing deposits, purchasing funds, 
or selling the loans. Selling the loans eliminates the need 
for the funding to appear on a bank's balance sheet. Recall 
that earlier, loan sellers, on average, were found to have 
lower deposit-to-asset ratios and higher costs of funding 
assets than nonsellers, implying that some sellers might be 
having difficulty raising new deposits. Some sellers, howev­
er, appeared to have ample deposits (see Table 6.2) . 
For Farmer Mac II participants, the pattern of responses 
appears to be the same (Table 6.5). Some participants indi­
cate that selling USDA loans circumvents the need to issue 
deposits; others do not rank this reason as important. 
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Loan sales reduce the need to purchase funds to fund desired 
loan portfolio (m=3.16, s=1.27). The responses to this ques­
tion by Farmer Mac II participants were similar to their 
responses to the preceding question. What is not reported in 
Table 6.5 is that the banks that reported that selling loans 
reduced the need for attracting deposits were the same banks 
that indicated that loan sales reduced the need to purchase 
funds. For these banks then, it is obvious that they sell 
loans to Farmer Mac as a way of avoiding the need to fund the 
loans using deposits or borrowed funds. In large part, this 
is exactly what the Farmer Mac II program was created and 
designed for. 
Loan sales offset declining deposit base at our bank relative 
to demand for funds (in=2.13, s=1.19). On average. Farmer Mac 
II participants do not cite a declining deposit base as impor­
tant to their decision to sell. The mode response (25/68 or 
37 percent), found in Table 6.5, was "not relevant." Although 
so-called deposit drain does not afflict this group, adding to 
the deposit base may be problematic. 
Loan sales offset insufficient capital to f\md desired loan 
portfolio (m=2.31, s=1.23) and ...ftmd large individual bor­
rowers (m=2.29, s=1.18). These two questions generated nearly 
identical responses. Farmer Mac II participants, as a group, 
do not rate insufficient capital to support their portfolio or 
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large borrowers as "relevant" in their decision to sell their 
USDA guaranteed loans. 
Loan sales enhance return on assets (m=3.90, s=0.91). In­
creased ROA is often touted as a major benefit derived from 
secondary market participation. Banks that participate in 
Farmer Mac II largely agree. The average response across 
participants indicates that increased ROA is important in 
their decision to sell USDA guarantees to Farmer Mac. 
Loan sales allow our bank to invest Tsroceeds from sale into 
more OSDA loams (m=3.01, s=1.21). Participation in a second­
ary market allows a bank to sell loans and then turn around 
and originate more loans of the same type. From Table 6.5, a 
number of banks report this ability as a reason they partici­
pate. However, the same number also indicate that originating 
more USDA guaranteed loans with the proceeds from a sale is 
not a strong reason they participate in Farmer Mac II. 
The responses to this question are important from a 
policy standpoint. An original argument put forward for the 
creation of the loan sale program was that banks would need 
added liquidity to meet the demand created by the policy 
transition from direct credit supplied by the USDA to USDA 
guaranteed lending provided by commercial sources. Certainly, 
reinvesting the proceeds from a sale into more USDA guarantees 
is consistent with the intent of the legislation. 
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But, can it be said that not plowing the funds from a 
sale back into additional USDA guaranteed originations vio­
lates the purpose of the program? No. It could well be that 
the Farmer Mac II loan sale program allows a bank to serve a 
USDA guarantee borrower that it ordinarily would pass over. 
As a rule, some banks might not originate USDA guaranteed 
loans that could not be sold. In this sense, the program is 
just as beneficial. 
Loem sales allow o\ir bemk to invest the proceeds from sale 
elsewhere in portfolio (m=2.99, s=1.14). Farmer Mac partici­
pants as a group do not indicate that selling their USDA 
guaranteed loans to invest the funds elsewhere in their port­
folio is of major relevance in their decision to sell loans. 
The investment of funds from the sale of USDA guarantees 
elsewhere in a bank's portfolio may be more a result of a sale 
than a cause of it. 
Loan sales allow our bank to originate a USDA loan it ordi­
narily would not if forced to hold the loctn in portfolio 
(ia=3.23, s=1.32); ,..allow for better rates to our borrowers 
on USDA loans (ia=4.36, s=0.87); and ...allow for better terms 
to our borrowers on USDA locuas (m=4.19, s=1.00). This group 
of questions is designed to see if borrower accommodation is a 
reason for participating in Farmer Mac II. From Table 6.5, 
most banks ranked the ability to extend USDA borrowers better 
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rates and terms as "very relevant" in the decision to partici 
pate. In fact, on average, better rates and terms ranked 
higher on average than any of the other factors reported in 
Table 6.5. In addition to better rates and terms. Farmer Mac 
II participants indicate that they can originate and sell a 
USDA guaranteed loan they ordinarily would not originate if 
Farmer Mac did not exist. 
These three reasons for participating in Farmer Mac II 
suggest that the Farmer Mac II loan sale program does in fact 
enhance the efficiency of the agricultural credit market. By 
allowing a bank to make loans that they would normally under-
invest in and passing on better rates and terms to borrowers 
than would ordinarily be available, the existence of Farmer 
Mac II benefits USDA lenders and borrowers alike. 
Summary 
The factors that banks consider relevant in their deci­
sion to participate in the Farmer Mac II loan sale program 
include the following: enhanced liquidity, increased ROA, 
reduced interest rate risk, added capacity to meet heavy USDA 
loan demand, and the ability to serve their customers better. 
It should not be concluded that the banks that do not 
participate in Farmer Mac II are unaware of the benefits 
associated with selling loans that accrue to the participants 
Rather, the market realities confronting nonparticipants--
especially with respect to USDA lending--make selling their 
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USDA loans into Fanner Mac II unnecessary. As circumstances 
change, so too could their participation status. 
Summary 
This chapter provided a descriptive analysis of secondary 
market participation in general, and Farmer Mac II in particu­
lar. The next step is to see if we can predict whether a bank 
will participate in the Farmer Mac II secondary market, as 
well as identify what variables are useful in making that 
prediction. 
In Chapter 7, a logit analysis will be used to test the 
hypotheses outlined in Chapter 5. This analysis adds to the 
descriptive analysis in Chapter 6. We will attempt to predict 
whether a bank will participate and identify which factors are 
statistically significant. The logit analysis considers the 
explanatory variables as a group so that it is possible to 
isolate the effect of one factor by controlling for the ef­




LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 
A number of logic models will be constaructed to estimate 
the probabilicy of a bank participating in Farmer Mac II and 
test the hypotheses concerning participation outlined in 
Chapter 5. In total, five models are fitted. Each model 
differs in terms of how participation is defined and the 
explanatory variables included. Participation differs accord 
ing to whether a bank sells any USDA guaranteed loans to 
Farmer Mac, sells newly originated USDA guaranteed Farm Owner 
ship (FO) loans, sells newly originated USDA guaranteed Oper­
ating Loans (OL) , or sells USDA "seasoned" FO loans, or sells 
"seasoned" OL loans. The software package used to run the 
logit regressions was SPSS version 7.5 (1996). 
Sale o£ any USDA Guaranteed Loans into Farmer Mac II 
The first logit run predicts the probability of a bank 
selling any type of USDA guaranteed loans into Fairmer Mac II. 
The types of USDA guaranteed loans that a bank may have avail 
able for sale include newly originated Fajrm Ownership and 
Operating Loans, and "seasoned" Farm Ownership and Operating 
Loans. A loan is considered "seasoned" if it has been 
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"booked" for a year or more. 
The logit model to be estimated is: 
SALNFM = b, + b,NCLNLN + b^NCOLN + bjASSTEMP + b^RBCR 
+ b.DEMAND + b^COMP + b,GLV + bgAGBANK 
+ b^LNDEP + b,oDEPASST + b.^YLD + b,-COFA 
-r b-.jSALNSM + b,,ASSETS + u. . 
Dependent and explcinatory varicibles 
SALNFM: The dependent variable, SALNFM, is a dichotomous 
variable taking on a value of one if the bank sells any type 
of USDA guaranteed loans into Farmer Mac II, and zero other­
wise. Whether a bank participated in Farmer Mac II was deter­
mined from the survey results. 
NCLNLN: NCLNLN is the banks' noncurrent loans to loans 
ratio. The noncurrent loans to loans ratio is all loans and 
leases 90 days or more past due plus loans in nonaccrual 
status as a percentage of gross loans and leases. This vari­
able was computed using information taken from each bank's 
1997 FDIC Summary Financial Report. 
NCLNLN measures the riskiness of a bank's loan portfolio 
taken as a whole; that is, NCLNLN includes noncurrent USDA 
guaranteed loans plus any other noncurrent loans. Test of the 
hypothesis is that a bank with riskier loans will be less apt 
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to participate in Farmer Mac II, not that banks with riskier 
USDA guaranteed loans will be less likely to participate. The 
latter effect would be a separate hypothesis and will be 
addressed after the explanatory variables in the model are 
discussed. 
NCOLN: Net charge-offs to loans, NCOLN, considers the 
recovery rate across a bank's entire portfolio. NCOLN is 
gross loan and lease financing receivable charge-offs less 
gross recoveries, as a percentage of total loans and lease 
financing receivables. NCOLN was computed from data obtained 
from each bank's 1997 FDIC Summary Financial Report. The idea 
IS that a higher recovery rate should be associated with lower 
net charge-offs. The hypothesis is that higher net charge-
offs in the portfolio compel a bank to sell appreciating loans 
elsewhere in the portfolio to replenish their capital base. 
The NCOLN variable represents the loss rate for a bank's 
whole portfolio, not just its charge-offs due to USDA de­
faults. The hypothesis is that higher charge-offs are in­
versely related to participation in Farmer Mac II, not the 
"narrower" hypothesis that higher USDA guaranteed loan charge-
offs are negatively related to participation. Charge-offs on 
USDA guaranteed loans are taken up after the explanatory 
variables included in the model are described. 
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USDA cruarantee rate: The theoretical model derived in 
Chapter 4 included the USDA guarantee rate. Recall, the 
guarantee rate is the proportion of the difference between the 
total principal and interest owed on a loan and the value 
received upon liquidation should the borrower default. A 
higher guarantee rate affixed to a bank's USDA guaranteed 
loans should increase the probability of loan sales to Farmer 
Mac II. This variable was omitted from the empirical model 
because there was no variability in the guarantee rate across 
banks; banks responding to the survey almost universally 
reported guaranteeing their USDA loans at 90 percent. Note 
however, that the guarantee rate is important to banks in the 
sense that they invariably seek the maximum rate of 90 percent 
allowed by the USDA. 
ASSTEMP: The next explanatory variable, assets per 
employee or ASSTEMP, is a measure of a bank's cost efficiency. 
This measure was also computed using each bank's FDIC report. 
A higher ratio implies a bank is more efficient in managing 
its assets, and therefore more likely to sell loans. 
RBCR: The risk-based capital ratio, RBCR, attempts to 
capture management's tolerance for risk. The risk-based 
capital ratio is total risk-based capital (primary capital 
plus secondary capital) as a percentage of risk-weighted 
assets. RBCR was taken directly from the FDIC Summary Finan­
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cial Reports. The risk-weighted assets measure is calculated 
by attaching risk-v/eights to each of a bank's assets as well 
as its off-balance sheet activities (such as selling loans 
with recourse). A lower RBCR reflects a more aggressive 
management style. Participation should be associated with 
lower risk-based capital ratios. 
DEMAND: DEMAND is a composite variable created by adding 
the Likert scale responses for USDA guaranteed Farm Ownership 
and Operating Loan demand from the survey (see page 5 of the 
survey in the Appendix). Banks were asked to rank the current 
demand for both types of loans relative to historical levels 
using a 5-point scale. The maximum value for DEMAND is a 
score of "10", indicating very strong demand; the minimum, a 
score of "2", implying very weak demand. Whether increased 
demand leads to a higher chance of participation is theoreti­
cally ambiguous. From a bank's vantage, servicing higher 
demand increases both profit and risk; if the extra return 
warrants the additional risk, the extra demand will be met. 
Recall, DEMAND attempts to capture the effect of changes in 
the competitive USDA loan rate, and therefore represents a 
bank's ability to reinvest the proceeds from a sale back into 
more USDA guaranteed loans. 
COMP: The COMP variable was constructed in the same 
fashion as DEMAND. Banks were asked to rank the degree of 
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competition in their relevant market area for USDA guaranteed 
FO and OL loans (see page 5 of the survey in the Appendix) . 
The two 5-point Likert scale responses were then combined to 
form COMP. Like DEMAND, the sign on COMP is ambiguous, albeit 
for a different reason. When demand increases, a bank can 
extend more credit at the same interest rate. The issue then, 
is whether the added return is sufficient to offset the added 
risk. 
As competition weakens, a bank is able to add a larger 
monopoly premium to the competitive rate. However, since the 
minimum marginal revenue ever earned on a loan is the competi­
tive rate (due to the specification of the demand curve) , a 
bank may not want to reduce its loan volume to capture the 
higher monopoly premium--especially if its loan volume is 
already very high or the competitive loan rate is high rela­
tive to the monopoly premium. So, the sign on COMP is theo­
retically ambiguous. 
GLV: An increase in the size of a bank's USDA guaranteed 
loan volume, GLV, is expected to increase the probability of 
participation. GLV was obtained from the survey instrument 
(see page 5 of the survey) . A larger guaranteed loan volume 
would create a greater pool of loans for a bank to sell from. 
GLV also indicates a bank's willingness to originate USDA 
guaranteed loans. 
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AGBANK: AGBANK is a dummy variable that takes on a value 
of one if the bank is classified as an agricultural bank (an 
agricultural loans to loans ratio of 17 percent or more), and 
zero otherwise. A bank's agricultural loans to loans ratio 
was computed by adding together the dollar volume of "Farm­
land" loans and "Farm loans" from the FDIC Summary Financial 
Reports and then dividing by the bank's total loan volume. 
The FDIC defines the category "Farmland" as loans secured by 
farmland and the category "Farm loans" as loans to finance 
agricultural production and other loans to farmers. In an 
attempt to accommodate its farro customers and foster goodwill, 
an agricultural bank might be more likely to use Farmer Mac 
II. Recall, Dixon, et al. (1997) found that higher propor­
tions of farm loan volume in the portfolio increased a bank's 
use of USDA guarantees, and in the case of OL loans, increased 
USDA guaranteed loan volume. 
LNDEP: The loan-to-deposit ratio, LNDEP, is a measure of 
a bank's ability to fund loans using deposits. This measure 
was computed using the same FDIC bank reports as described 
above. The higher this measure, the more "loaned-up" a bank 
is--that is, the less room a bank would have to fxind more 
loans from its deposit base. Banks with higher loan-to-depos­
it ratios should be more likely to sell loans into Farmer Mac 
II. 
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DEPASST: The deposit-to-asset ratio, DEPASST, measures 
the proportion of a bank's assets that are financed using 
deposits. DEPASST was computed using the FDIC reports. If a 
bank is experiencing so-called deposit drain, it should have a 
lower deposit-to-asset ratio, and be more likely to sell 
loans. 
YLD: As previously noted, loan sales involve a reinvest­
ment problem for a bank. The yield on earning assets, YLD, 
would be the rate a bank earns after selling loans to Farmer 
Mac and then allocating the proceeds across its portfolio. 
YLD was taken directly from the "Performance Ratios" section 
of the FDIC Summary Financial Reports. A higher YLD will be 
associated with participation if a bank uses secondary markets 
in order to exploit its comparative advantage in originating 
loans. The yield a bank would earn by reinvesting the pro­
ceeds from a sale is measured by the DEMAND and COMP variables 
explained above. 
COFA: The cost of funding assets, COFA, should be posi­
tively related with participation in Fairmer Mac II. COFA was 
obtained the same way as YLD. A higher cost of funding assets 
means that a bank has a comparative disadvantage in funding 
the loans it originates, and therefore may be more apt to sell 
loans. 
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SALNSM: SALNSM is a dummy variable that controls for 
other experience selling loans into a secondary' market. It 
takes on a value of one if management has any experience, and 
zero otherwise. Whether a bank was classified as having other 
experience was deteirmined from the survey instrument. Banks 
were asked if they had experience in secondary markets, and if 
so, which secondary market. If a bank responded that its 
secondary market experience was limited to Farmer Mac II, then 
SALNSM=0. 
If management has other experience selling loans into a 
secondary market, they may be more likely to sell loans to 
Farmer Mac for a number of reasons. First, managers with 
experience participating in other secondary markets may be in 
a better position to evaluate the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of selling loans than managers with no experi­
ence. Second, they may also be able to adapt quicker to the 
bureaucratic structure of the Farmer Mac II program, given 
that Farmer Mac II is similar to other secondary market pro­
grams. Third, other secondary market experience may be indic­
ative of a bank's superior personnel, technology, tax or legal 
support. Finally, other experience may be a manifestation of 
the bank characteristics and market forces that spur a bank to 
participate in secondary markets. 
ASSETS: The variable ASSETS controls for bank size. 
ASSETS is the total dollar volume of a bank's assets measured 
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in millions of dollars. The data for ASSETS came directly 
from each bank's FDIC report. 
Pavel and Phillis (1987) found that increased bank size 
was a significant factor underlying loan sales; however, the 
proponents of Farmer Mac claimed that the program would be of 
greatest benefit to small rural banks and their borrowers. 
The a priori sign on ASSETS is indeterminate. 
Variables omitted from the model 
A number of hypotheses outlined in Chapter 5 will not be 
tested because of a failure to collect sufficient or accurate 
data. These hypotheses involve USDA loan quality and a bank's 
efficiency regarding the origination and servicing of USDA 
guaranteed loans. A brief discussion of each follows. 
The model developed in Chapter 4 indicated that banks 
that experienced a lower expected default rate and variance of 
the default rate on their USDA guarantees would be more likely 
to participate in Farmer Mac II. An attempt was made to 
collect this data from the survey via a series of questions 
(see page 7 of the suarvey in the Appendix) that could be used 
to construct a triangular distribution. Given the lowest, 
most likely (mode), and highest default rates for each bank, 
it would have been possible to calculate a mean and variance 
of the default rate on USDA guaranteed loans for each bank. 
The survey responses were so incomplete that it was decided 
that the information collected was of no use. 
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In hindsight, a different method for collecting informa­
tion on each bank's USDA guaranteed loan default rate experi­
ence would have been to find the national averages (available 
from USDA data) and then ask each bank whether its default 
rates were higher or lower rate than the national averages. A 
dummy variable could then have been incorporated into the 
regression model to capture the effect of default rates on 
loan sales. This method would provide less quantitative 
information than a mean and variance, but it would likely 
produce more responses. 
An attempt to collect information on how much a bank 
recovered in the event of default (recovery rate) was not 
successful. Banks were asked to indicate che percentage of 
principal and interest due (net of all foreclosure costs) -hat 
was recovered in the event of a USDA guaranteed loan default. 
Roughly one-third of the banks failed to provide a number. 
One plausible explanation for the dismal response rate is that 
the liquidation of a loan is handled by another department in 
the bank or sub-contracted out to a specialist. Some banks 
indicated such cases. We cannot say for certain, but this may 
be true for some of the other banks that did not respond. 
The measures to be used to assess a bank's efficiency in 
originating and seirvicing loans included the number of hours 
needed to originate a USDA guaranteed loan and the average 
number of hours required by year to service it. The poor 
response rate for these variables may have been in part due to 
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the ambiguous way in which the questions were worded. Many 
banks apparently reported the total number of hours per year 
spent originating and servicing their USDA guaranteed loans. 
Others reported the information on a per loan basis. This 
problem was not revealed during the pre-test of the survey. A 
second problem was that these particular questions seemed to 
pique some bankers sense of frustration with the bureaucracy. 
Common responses included "days," "weeks," and "too many." 
Needless to say, coding these responses into useful data is 
impossible. Finally, a number of banks reported that the 
origination process was out-sourced to a specialist. 
Logit model results: SALNFH 
The descriptive statistics of the variables included in 
the model for the sample appear in Table 7.1. The logit model 
results appear in Table 7.2. Goodness of fit is considered 
first, followed by a discussion of the explanatory variables. 
Goodness of fit 
The measures used to assess the goodness of fit include 
the likelihood ratio test, the Madalla R^, and the Cragg-Uhler 
. These statistics appear in Table 7.2. A classification 
table that compares the predictions of the model to the ob­
served outcomes is presented in Table 7.3. Figure 7.1 depicts 
the obseirved groups and predicted probabilities. 
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Table 7.1. Description of sample for SALNFM logit model 
Monpar t ic ipancs  (SALNFMsO) '  Parc ic ipancs  (SALNFM=1)"  
Var iable" '  Mean S  .0. Min Max Mean s .D.  Min Max 
NCLNLN 0  oil 0 016 0  .  000 0 .  141 0 .012 0 .  013 Q 000 0  .  077 
NCOLN 0  002 0  005 -0  .008 0  .  042 0 .002 Q 004 -0  004 0  .  026 
ASSTEMP 2  488 0  724 0  .  747 4  .  692 2  .530 0 .  754 1  167 4  .  963 
RBCR 0  165 0  066 0  .098 0  .  573 0  .  147 0  038 0  038 0  .299 
DEMAND 5 456 1  796 2  .000 10 .  000 s .  549 1  4 92  2  000 10 .000 
COMP 5  317 T_ 967 2  .000 10 .  000 5  .609 1  8S3 2 .  000 10 .000 
GLV 1  603 1  992 0  .000 12 .  500 3  .496 3 475 0 .  300 18 .000 
AGBANK 0  696 0  461 0  .000 1. 000 0  .781 0 417 0  000 1 .  000 
LNDEP 0  733 0  150 0  .207 1 .  296 0  .  767 0 .  130 0  337 1  .  098 
DEPASST 0  848 0  063 0  .525 0  .  937 0  .346 0  062 0  591 1 .  COO 
YLD 0  084 Q 008 0  .  067 0 .  118 0 .  087 0  008 c 071 0 .122 
COFA 0  039 0  004 0  .  027 0  .  050 0  .040 0  004 0  029 0  .  054 
3ALNSM 0 338 0  474 0  .  000 1 .  000 0 .707 0  458 0  000 1  .000 
ASSETS 1 596 12 571 0 .005 186.  000 0 .375 1_ 423  0  010 9  .699 
'  n=237.  
-  n=82.  
•• SAI iMTH i s  Che d ichoComous  dependent  var iable  which  takes  on  a  
va lue  of  1  i f  a  bank se l l s  any type  of  USDA guaranteed  loan  to  
Farmer  Mac II ,  and 0  o therwise ;  NCLNLir  i s  non-current  loans  to  
loans ;  NCOLN i s  ne t  charge-offs  to  loans ;  ASSTEMP i s  asse ts  per  
employee  measured  in  mi l l ions  of  dol lars ;  RBCR i s  the  r i sk-based 
capi ta l  ra t io ;  DEMAND i s  a  composi te  var iable  for  USDA guaranteed  
loan  demand;  COMP i s  a  composi te  var iable  for  compet i t ion  among 
USDA guaranteed  lenders ;  GLV i s  the  bank 's  USDA guaranteed  loan  
volume measured  in  mi l l ions  of  dol lars ;  AGBAMK i s  a  dummy var ­
iable  tha t  takes  on a  va lue  of  1  i f  the  bank has  17  percent  or  
more  of  i t s  loan  por t fo l io  in  agr icul tura l  loans ,  and 0  o ther ­
wise ;  IiNDEP i s  the  loan- to-deposi t  ra t io ;  DEFASST i s  the  depos i t -
to-asse t  ra t io ;  YLD i s  the  y ie ld  on earning asse ts ;  COFA i s  the  
cos t  of  funding earning asse ts ;  SALNSM i s  a  dummy var iable  tha t  
takes  on  a  va lue  of  1  i f  the  bank has  o ther  secondary  market  
exper ience ,  and 0  o therwise ;  and ASSETS i s  bank asse ts  measured  in  
b i l l ions  of  dol lars .  
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Table 7.2. SALNFM logit model results* 
Est .  S td .  Elas t .  
Var iable^  coeff .  e r ror  t - ra t io  a t  means '  
NCLNLN -3 .1749 11 .6379 -0  .273 -0  .0322 
NCOLN -31 .6599 38 .2924 -0  .  827 -C .  0642 
ASSTEMP 0 .5421 0 .2990 1  .813 
* 
1 .3074 
RBCR -3 .2442 4 .2567 -0  .762 -0  .5029 
DEMAND 0 .3801 0 .  1095 3  .471 
*itir 
2 .  1046 
COMP -0 .0997 0 .  0901 -1  .  107 -0  .5152 
GLV 0 .1518 0  .  0575 2  .640 
• * * 
0 .3062 
AGBANK 0 .6763 0 .3986 1  .697 
ir 
- -
LNDEP -1 .5587 1  .6491 -0  .  945 -1  .  1211 
DEPASST -2 .9166 3  .2474 -0  .  898 -2  .3852 
YLD 64 .4562 25 .  7403 2  .  504 
* * 
5 .2757 
CO FA -37  .6899 44 .3385 -0  .  850 -1  .4187 
SALNSM 1 .4083 0  .3311 4  .253 - -
ASSETS -7 .3E-05 7  .  9E-05 -0  .  924 -0  .0903 
CONSTANT' '  -7 .3859 
LOG LIKELIHOOD ( res t r ic ted)  = -181.815 
LOG LIKELIHOOD (unres t r ic ted)  = -141.998 
L I K E L I H O O D  R A T I O  T E S T  =  7 9 . 6 3 4  w i t h  1 4  d . f .  
MADDALA R-SQUARE = .221 
CRAGG-UHLER R-SQUARE = .325 
^ SALNFM=1 i f  bank se l l s  any USDA guaranteed  loans  in to  
Farmer  Mac I I  and SALNFM=0 o therwise .  
^ See  Table  7 .1  for  a  descr ip t ion  of  the  var iables .  
^ P rob=.0223 i f  AGBANK=0,  Prob=.0428 i f  AGBANK=1;  and  
Prob=.0192 i f  SALNSM=0,  Prob=.0741 i f  SALNSM=1.  
Adjus ted  by In  (p2)- In  (p i )  =  In(  .  0407)- In  ( .  2628)  
=  -1 .8652 due  to  d i f ferent  sampl ing  ra tes  of  the  
par t ic ipants  and nonpar t ic ipants .  
*  S igni f icant  a t  the  .1  level .  
**  S igni f icant  a t  the  .05  level .  
*** S igni f icant  a t  the  .01  level .  
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Table 7.3. SALNFM classification table* 
Predicted 
Observed 
0 1 Total 
0 237 0 237 
1 79 3 32 
Total 316 3 319 
overall 15.2A^ 










0 1  
0  1  
0  0  
0  0  
0  0  1  
0  0  0  1  1  
0  0  0  1  1  1  
0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
















HAT:  . 2 0  . 30 .40 . 50 . 6 0  .70 .  8 0  . 90 1 .  0  
Group: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Predicted probability is of membership for SALNFM=1. 
Each symbol represents 3 cases. 
Figure 7.1, Observed groups and predicted probabilities: SALNFM 
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A likelihood ratio test was performed using the log 
likelihood of the restricted model (model with all slopes 
equal to zero) and the maximized value of the log likelihood 
function (unrestricted model) . The model (chi-square)--
which tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the 
estimated model, except the constant, are zero--is 79.634 with 
14 degrees of freedom {df) . Since x^i^.aos with 14 df is 31.32, 
we can conclude that the model taken as a whole has explan­
atory power. 
The Maddala and Cragg-Uhler are statistics that 
attempt to quantify the proportion of explained "variation" in 
the logistic regression model. They are similar in intent to 
the R^ in a linear regression model, although the variation in 
a logit model must be defined differently. The maximum like­
lihood estimator (MLE) is not chosen in order to maximize a 
fitting criterion based on the prediction of the dependent 
variable, as it is in the classical regression (which maximiz­
es R^). Rather, it is chosen to maximize the joint density of 
the observed dependent variables. 
The Maddala R^ for the model is .221; the Cragg-Uhler R-, 
.325. The Cragg-Uhler R^ is calculated fay dividing the 
Maddala R^ by the upper bound of the Maddala R^ (which is less 
than 1). The Cragg-Uhler statistic, unlike the Maddala R', 
can achieve a maximum of 1 (Maddala 1988). 
The classification table presented in Table 7.3 compares 
observed and predicted group membership. Banks with a pre-
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dieted probability of 0.5 or greater are classified as partic­
ipants, whereas banks with a predicted probability of less 
than 0.5 are classified as nonparticipants. Although the 
model classification power is good in the sense of correctly 
classifying nonparticipants (237/237 or 100 percent), the 
model's ability to classify participants is weak (3/82 or 3.7 
percent). In other words, the model has a zero false-positive 
rate (bank is predicted to participate but in fact does not) 
and a 96.3 percent false-negative rate (bank is predicted to 
not participate but in fact does). 
However, it is important not to place too much emphasis 
on this measure of goodness of fit. A naive model, which 
predicts that a bank will not participate if the proportion of 
banks in the sample that do not participate (p) is greater 
than one-half, will always predict p of the observations 
correctly. Because the proportion of nonparticipants in the 
sample (adjusting for the difference in sampling rates) is 
94.8 percent, the naive model will have an overall prediction 
rate of 94.8 percent. Notice that the naive model (which is 
the model with all slopes restricted to zero), generates more 
correct predictions than the estimated model, even though the 
estimated model exhibits statistical explanatory power. This 
oddity is not a flaw in the estimated model; rather, it is due 
to the goodness of fit measure (Greene 1993). 
The obser-ved groups and predicted probabilities are 
depicted in Figure 7.1. This figure illustrates that the 
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predicted probabilities for the Farmer Mac II participants 
(symbolized by "l"s) tend to be higher than those of the 
nonparticipants (symbolized by "0"s)--i.e., the model can 
somewhat distinguish between groups. 
Explanatory varicLbles 
The estimated coefficients and their standard errors are 
presented in Table 7.2. The indicated level of significance 
is based on a two-tailed test. 
The elasticities of the variables evaluated at the sample 
means of the regressors are also presented. By evaluating all 
changes at the sample means of the regressors, we are essen­
tially measuring the change in the probability of participa­
tion for a bank that is "average in every way." According to 
this model, the average bank has a 3.5 percent probability of 
participating in Farmer Mac II. Elasticities are useful in 
that they are unitless measures, and can therefore be compared 
across the independent variables. For example, one can com­
pare how much the predicted probability of participation will 
change due to a 1 percent change in YLD with how much it will 
change given a 1 percent change in COFA. To put the elastici­
ty into perspective, the probability of participating given a 
one standard deviation change in the sample regressor, calcu­
lated at its mean will also be reported. Given that the 
distribution of the independent variable is approximately 
bell-shaped, the "empirical rule" tells us that approximately 
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68 percent of the observations for the variable fall in the 
interval . 
Of course, reporting the elasticities for the dummy 
variables, AGBANK and SALNSM, would not be meaningful since 
these variables are not continuous. For these variables, the 
probability of participating is reported for each value of the 
binary variable (calculated at the sample means). 
NCLNLN. Noncurrent loans to loans, NCLNLN, has the cor­
rect sign, but the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient 
is different from zero cannot be rejected at any reasonable 
level of significance. Again, this variable includes the 
value of all a bank's noncurrent loans, not just its USDA 
guaranteed loans. We cannot conclude that poor overall port­
folio performance leads to participation in Farmer Mac II. 
Another hypothesis test would have been to see whether 
the riskiness of USDA guaranteed loans was related to partici­
pation. As mentioned previously, inadequate data prevented 
such a test. 
NCOLN. Theoretically, higher net charge-offs to loans, 
NCOLN, should increase participation. The estimated coeffi­
cient for NCOLN is negative, but statistically insignificant. 
Pavel and Phillis (1987) found that net charge-offs had a 
significant positive effect on loan sales in general. One 
plausible reason that their finding is not replicated here is 
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that a bank selling its appreciating loans to restore its 
capital base because of higher net charge-offs is more likely 
to sell various types of loans rather than sell just one kind 
(such as USDA guaranteed loans). Thus, the finding here does 
not necessarily invalidate their finding. 
The other hypothesis regarding charge-offs, one that 
could not be tested because of poor data, was that higher net 
charge-offs on a particular type of loan reduces loan sales of 
that type of loan. If a particular type of loan in a bank's 
portfolio begins to experience high net charge-offs, the bank 
is likely to curtail its origination of those types of loans, 
and therefore be less apt to participate in a secondary market 
for those loans. Since this effect cannot be isolated using a 
measure that reflects net charge-offs across a bank's entire 
portfolio, we cannot conclude from this model specification 
that there is no discemable effect on participation due to 
higher net charge-offs on USDA guaranteed loans. 
ASSTEMP. The measure of bank efficiency, assets per em­
ployee or ASSTEMP, has a significant positive effect on the 
probability of participating in Farmer Mac II at the q;= . 1 
level of significance. The more efficient a bank is in manag­
ing its assets, the more loans it can service per employee. 
The elasticity of ASSTEMP calculated at the sample means of 
the regressors is 1.31. That implies that a 1 percent in­
crease in the dollar volume of assets per employee (measured 
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in millions of dollars per employee) will increase the proba­
bility of participating in Farmer Mac II by 1.31 percent. Put 
another way, if the average bank's ASSTEMP increased by one 
standard deviation, its probability of participating would 
rise by 3 8.5 percent. 
Caution is in order when interpreting the elasticities. 
A one percent increase in ASSTEMP is only .025 million dollars 
per employee. But a one standard deviation increase is .727 
million dollars per employee, which is nearly a 30 percent 
increase in the variable. The point is that the interpreta­
tion using the standard deviation combines the magnitude of 
the effect of a change in a variable along with a sense of 
what a change means relative to the distribution of the vari­
able. (Recall, roughly 68 percent of all observations fall 
within ±1 standard deviation of the mean.) Also keep in mind 
that an increase in the probability of participating of 38.5 
percent would increase the average bank's probability of 
participating from 3.5 percent to 4.8 percent or 1.3 percent­
age points. 
RBCR. Although the expected sign on risk-based capital 
ratio, RBCR, is correct, the estimated coefficient is not 
statistically significant. Recall that in the means tests 
between secondary market participants and nonparticipants (see 
Table 6.3), participants were found to have significantly 
lower risk-based capital ratios. Since the group of Farmer 
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Mac II nonparticipants includes banks that do participate in 
secondary markets, this characteristic may not be as differen­
tiating as before. We cannot conclude that management aggres­
siveness, as measured by RBCR, leads to participation in 
Farmer Mac II. 
DEMAND. DEMAND, a composite variable constructed by 
combining the Likert scale responses for USDA guaranteed Farm 
Ownership and Operating Loan demand, is positive and signifi­
cantly different from zero at the a=.001 level. This is 
consistent with the notion that loan sales is a volume busi­
ness. The elasticity of DEMAND is 2.1. This means that a one 
standard deviation increase in the average bank's DEMAND would 
increase the probability of participating by 63.0 percent or 
5.7 percentage points. 
The usual issue arises when interpreting Likert scale 
data. That is, whether interpreting an ordinal measure as 
though it is interval data is appropriate. For example. What 
does it mean to rank the demand for loans a "3" vs. a "4"? 
And, How can one bank's response be compared to another's? In 
a sense, the Likert scale responses were standardized by the 
phrasing of the survey question. Banks did not merely rank 
the strength of demand (which would make interbank comparisons 
difficult), but rather ranked it relative to the bank's own 
historical demand (which makes comparisons more valid). 
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COMP. COMP, the degree of competition for borrowers 
among USDA guaranteed lenders, does not have a statistically 
significant influence on participation in Farmer Mac II. 
Although the theoretical sign on COMP is ambiguous, the esti­
mated coefficient had a negative sign. This would imply that 
greater competition among banks reduces the chances of partic­
ipation. 
GLV. The size of a bank's USDA guaranneed loan volume, 
GLV, has a positive, statistically significant effect on the 
probability of participation at the Qr=.01 level of signifi­
cance. This makes sense for two reasons. First, banks that 
have more USDA guaranteed loans on the bocks have a larger 
pool of loans to sell into Farmer Mac II from. Secondly, 
banks may adopt more sophisticated management techniques if 
the volume and importance of a particular asset in the portfo­
lio warrants it. 
The elasticity of GLV is roughly one-third (.31), which 
means that a 1 percent increase in the average bank's USDA 
guaranteed loan volume (measured in millions of dollars) would 
increase its probability of participating by .31 percent. 
Looked at alternatively, a one standard deviation increase in 
the average bank's GLV will increase the probability of par­
ticipating by 34.8 percent or 1.2 percentage points. 
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AGBANK. The coefficient on AGBANK is positive and sta­
tistically significant at the a=.l level. A bank is classi­
fied as an agricultural bank if its agricultural loans to 
loans ratio is at least 17 percent. This result indicates 
that being an agricultural bank increases the probability of 
participation in Farmer Mac II. 
Since calculating an elasticity does not make sense for a 
binary variable, the probability of participating was calcu­
lated for each value of AGBANK {0 and 1) at the means of the 
regressors. The probability of participating in Fanner Mac II 
if AGBANK=0 is .022, and .043 if AGBANK=1. Being an agricul­
tural bank nearly doubles the probability of participating for 
the average bank. 
LNDEP and DEPASST. These two explanatory variables 
measure bank liquidity. The coefficient on LNDEP (loan-to-
deposit ratio) had the opposite sign of what was expected but 
was not statistically significant. The deposit-to-asset 
ratio, DEPASST, had the expected sign but was not statisti­
cally significantly either. Again, the implication is that a 
higher loan-to-deposit ratio and a lower deposit-to-asset 
ratio may distinguish a secondary market participant in gener­
al from a nonparticipant, but it does not distinguish a par­
ticipant in Farmer Mac II from a nonparticipant, controlling 
for the other variables in the model. 
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YLD. The effect of the yield on earning assets (YLD) on 
the probability of participating in Farmer Mac II is positive 
and statistically significant at the a=.05 level of signifi­
cance. Banks that enjoy a higher yield on their earning 
assets have a comparative advantage in originating loans and 
therefore less of a reinvestment problem should they sell 
loans into a secondary market. Yield is relevant to the bank 
when it sells a loan to Farmer Mac II and reinvests the funds 
in its portfolio. 
YLD's elasticity is 5.28. A 1 percent increase in a 
bank's yield on earning assets will increase the probability 
of participation by 5.28 percent. Moreover, YLD has a higher 
elasticity than that of all the other independent variables 
with continuous measurements, and therefore has the greatest 
effect on the probability of participation among them for a 
given percentage change in the variable. A one standard 
deviation increase in yield amounts to a 9.1 percent increase 
in YLD, and v;ould increase the probability of the average bank 
participating by 48.1 percent or 1.7 percentage points. 
COFA. The coefficient on the cost of funding assets, 
COFA, did not have the expected sign nor was it statistically 
significant. This variable was intended to see if banks that 
had a comparative advantage in funding loans were less likely 
to participate. Banks that participate in secondary markets 
in general had higher finding costs than those that do not. 
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but we cannot conclude that the banks that participate in 
Farmer Mac II have higher funding costs, all else equal. 
SALNSM. A bank that sells loans into other secondary 
markets is more likely to participate in Farmer Mac II. The 
coefficient on the dummy variable SALNSM (which takes on a 
value of 1 if a bank participates in other secondary markets, 
and 0 otherwise) was positive and statistically significant at 
the a=.01 level of significance. This result implies chat a 
bank that participates in one secondary market is apt to 
participate in others too. 
Again, since SALNSM is a binary variable, calculating an 
elasticity is not meaningful. The probability of partici­
pating in Farmer Mac II if the average bank participates in 
other secondary markets is 7.41 percent and 1.92 percent if 
that bank does not participate in other secondary markets. 
SALNSM seems to capture, controlling for all other ef­
fects, the propensity of bank managers to use more than one 
secondary market. However, there were banks that used other 
secondary markets but not Farmer Mac II, and a small number of 
banks that used only Farmer Mac II. 
ASSETS. The ASSETS variable was included to control for 
bank size. Its coefficient was negative and not statistically 
significant. Pavel and Phillis (1987) found that size had a 
large impact on being a loan seller. However, to repeat--what 
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is true about participating in secondary markets in general is 
not necessarily true for a particular secondary market. 
Sounmary 
The most significant factors in explaining participation 
in the Farmer Mac II loan sale program are the variables that 
relate to agricultural lending in general (AGBANK) and USDA 
guaranteed lending in particular (DEMAND and GLV) . This 
should not be surprising given that Farmer Mac II is a second­
ary market for USDA guaranteed farm loans. The bank charac­
teristics not directly related to agricultural lending that 
have an impact on the probability of participation include the 
efficiency measure (ASSTEMP) and the yield on earning assets 
(YLD) . Whether a bank has experience selling loans into other 
secondary markets (SALNSM) is the most telling of all the 
explanatory variables in the model. 
The variables that failed to distinguish between Farmer 
Mac II participants and nonparticipants tended to be financial 
ratios not directly related to a bank's USDA lending charac­
teristics. So, although (say) a higher loan-to-deposit ratio 
may be associated with selling loans in general, it may not be 
associated with selling particular types of loans, controlling 
for other variables. Furthermore, the NCOLN and NCLNLN vari­
ables tested hypotheses that deal with overall loan portfolio 
risk and participation in Farmer Mac II, rather than the more 
"narrow" hypotheses of testing whether USDA guaranteed loan 
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risk affects participation. 
In the next section, participation in Farmer Mac II will 
be redefined to include only those banks that sell new origin­
ations of USDA guaranteed Farm Ownership loans. A new logit 
model will be fitted using different independent variables. 
Sale of Newly Originated USDA Guaranteed Farm Ownership (FO) 
Loans to Fanner Mac II 
In addition to redefining what it means to be classified 
as a participant in Farmer Mac II, the logit model to be 
estimated here has slightly different explanatory variables. 
The logit model to be estimated is: 
SFOFM = bn + b,NCLNLN + b.NCOLN + bjASSTEMP + b^RBCR 
+ b=FOD + b^FOC + b^GLV + bsAGBANK + b.FLFMLN 
+ b,oUSrDEP -r b.,DEPASST + b,2YLD + b,3C0FA 
+ b,,SALNSM + b,;ASSETS 4. u,. 
Dependent and independent variables 
SFOFM: If a bank sells newly originated (booked less 
than 12 months) USDA guaranteed Farm Ownership (FO) loans into 
Farmer Mac II, then SF0FM=1. Otheirwise, SFOFM=0. Of the 
total 311 banks included in this analysis, 41 participate in 
Farmer Mac II as defined. The total number of banks in this 
analysis is lower than the total of 319 banks in the previous 
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analysis because not all banks that indicated that they sold 
USDA guaranteed loans to Farmer Mac II reported the particular 
types of USDA loans they sold. These banks were dropped from 
the analysis and the sampling rates were adjusted accordingly. 
FOP: FOD is the demand for USDA guaranteed Farm Operat­
ing (FO) loans. Data on this variable was obtained from the 
survey instrument (page 5 of the survey found in the Appen­
dix) . Banks were asked to rank the demand for FO loans rela­
tive to historical levels using a 5 point Likert scale. A 
higher rating implies stronger demand for FO loans. 
Theoretically, the sign on FOD is ambiguous. An increase 
in demand means that a bank can extend additional credit at 
the same interest rate, but whether it will depends on whether 
the additional profit from making the loan is worth the addi­
tional risk involved in keeping all or part of it on the books 
(from a bank's vantage). Recall, DEMAND had a statistically 
significant positive effect on participation in Farmer Mac II 
when sales of any USDA guaranteed loan type were considered. 
DEMAND was found to be one of the stronger determinants of 
participation in that model. 
FOC: FOC attempts to measure the degree of lender compe­
tition for USDA guaranteed FO loans. Like FOD, it comes from 
the sur-vey, and is constructed similarly. A higher rating on 
the 5 point Likert scale implies that local competition rel­
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ative to historical levels is greater. 
Theoretically, FOC could not be "signed" for reasons 
discussed earlier. The bottom line is that hov/ a bank re­
sponds to changes in the degree of competition depends on how 
many USDA guaranteed loans it already has in its portfolio 
(i.e., where it is on its demand curve). In the prior estima­
tion, the coefficient on COMP was negative but not statisti­
cally significantly different from zero at customary levels of 
significance. 
FLFMLN: FLFMLN, the farmland loans to total agricultural 
loans (farmland loans plus farm loans) ratio was added as an 
explanatory variable to measure the extent to which a bank 
extends farm ownership credit relative to its total amount of 
agricultural loans. This ratio was calculated from each 
bank's FDIC Summairy Financial report. Each report classifies 
agricultural assets as "farmland loans" (loans secured by 
farmland) or "farm loans" (loans to finance agricultural 
production and other loans to farmers). 
A bank may be classified as agricultural (AGBANK=1) but 
may not lend for farm ovmership purposes. Lower levels of 
FLFMLN should increase the probability of participation. A 
lower FLFMLN may be symptomacic of a bank's aversion to origi­
nating and holding longer-teirm loans in their portfolio due to 
interest rate risk. By selling into a secondary market, a 
bank can originate loans without keeping them on the books. 
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The independent variables noncurrent loans to loans, 
NCLNLN; net charge-offs to loans, NCOLN; assets per employee, 
ASSTEMP; risk-based capital ratio, RBCR; USDA guaranteed loan 
volume, GLV; the classification dummy for an agricultural 
bank, AGBANK; loan-to-deposit ratio, LNDEP; deposit-to-asset 
ratio, DEPASST; yield on earning assets, YLD; the cost of 
funding assets, COFA; the binary variable for other secondary 
market experience, SALNSM; and bank size, ASSETS; are all 
defined and expected to have the same effect on participation 
as outlined earlier. 
Logit regression results: SFOFM 
The descriptive statistics of the variables xncluded in 
the model for the sample appear in Table 7.4. The regression 
results appear in Table 7.5. The overall model has explanato­
ry power, as well as seven of the independent variables. 
According to this model, the average bank has a 10.9 percent 
probability of selling newly originated USDA guaranteed FO 
loans into Farmer Mac II. The results of this logit regres­
sion are discussed in detail below. 
Goodness of fit 
The likelihood ratio test, Madalla R^, and Cragg-Uhler 
measures are presented in Table 7.5. The classification table 
of observed and predicted outcomes appears in Table 7.6. 
Figure 7.2 depicts the observed groups and predicted probabilities. 
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Table 7.4. Description of sample for SFOFM logit model 
Nonpar t i c ipan t s  (SFOFM=0)*  Pa rc ic ipancs  {SF0FM=1)"  
Var iab le""  Mean  S  •  D .  Min  Max Mean  S .D.  Min  Max 
NCLNLN 0  oil 0  .  015  0  .000  0  .  141  0  013  0  .015  0  .000  0  .  077  
NCOLN 0  002  0 .  005  -C .008  0  .042  0  002  0  .005  -0  .  004  0  .026  
ASSTEMP 2  499  0  704  0  .750  4  .690  2  555  0  .  917  1  .  167  4 . 963  
RBCR 0 164  0  .  063  0 . 098  0 .  573  3  143  0  .  040  0 . 088  0 . 299  
FOD 2  646  0  955  1  .000  5  .  000  3 317  0 . 789  X .  000  5  .000  
FOC 2  686  1 . 033  1  .000  5  .000  2  732  0 .  923  X . 000  
= 
. 000  
GLV X 739  2  .  100  0  .  000  12  .  500  3  536  3  .  141  0 .  500  14  .000  
AGBANK 0  712  0  .  454  0  .000  X .  000  0  781  0 . 419  0 . 000  1 . 000  
FLFMLN 0 375  0  .  193  0  .  000  0  .970  0  318  0 .  174  0 . 000  0 . 810  
LNDEP 0  735  0  .  147  0 .  207  1  .296  0  806  0 .  133  0  .480  1  .098  
DEPASST 0  849  0  .  063  0  .  525  0 . 995  0  837  0  .065  0 . 591  0 .  920  
YLD 0 084  0  .  008  0  .067  0  .  118  0 089  0  .  009  0 . 076  0 . 122  
COFA 0 039  0 .  004  0 . 027  0 . 050  0 040  0 . 005  o . 029  0 . 054  
SALNSM 0 369  0 . 483  0 .  000  X . 000  0 781  0 . 419  0 .  000  X . 000  
ASSETS 1 453  11 .  774  0 .  005  186  .000  0 346  X .  329  0 . 010  3  .  547  
"  n=270 .  
•  n=41 .  
'  SFOFM i s  the  d icho tomous  dependen t  va r iab le  which  t akes  on  a  
va lue  o f  1  i f  a  bank  se l l s  LTSDA guaran teed  FO loans  in to  Farmer  
Mac  I I ,  and  0  o therwise ;  MCLNIiN i s  noncur ren t  loans  to  loans ;  
NCOIiN i s  ne t  charge-of f s  to  loans ;  ASSTEMP i s  asse t s  per  employee  
measured  in  mi l l ions  of  do l la r s ;  RBCR i s  the  r i sk -based  cap i ta l  
r a t io ;  FOD i s  a  sca la r  va r iab le  fo r  USDA guaran teed  FO loan  
demand;  FOC i s  a  sca la r  var iab le  fo r  compet i t ion  among LTSDA 
guaran teed  FO l enders ;  GLV i s  the  bank ' s  USDA guaran teed  loan  
vo lume measured  in  mi l l ions  of  do l la r s ;  A6BA11K i s  a  dummy va r ­
i ab le  tha t  t akes  on  a  va lue  of  1  i f  the  bank  has  17  pe rcen t  o r  
more  o f  i t s  loan  por t fo l io  in  agr icu l tu ra l  loans ,  and  0  o ther ­
wise ;  FI iFMLN i s  fa rmland  loans  to  fa rm loans ;  LUDEP i s  the  loan- to -
depos i t  r a t io ;  DEPASST i s  the  depos i t - to -asse t  r a t io ;  YLD i s  the  
y ie ld  on  ea rn ing  asse t s ;  COFA i s  the  cos t  o f  fund ing  ea rn ing  
asse t s ;  SALNSM i s  a  dummy va r iab le  tha t  t akes  on  a  va lue  of  1  i f  
the  bank  has  o ther  secondary  marke t  exper ience ,  and  0  o therwise ;  
and  ASSETS i s  bank  asse t s  measured  in  b i l l ions  of  do l la r s .  
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Table 7.5. SFOFM logit model results' 
Est .  S td .  E las t .  
Var iab le"  coef f .  e r ro r  t - ra t io  a t  means  
NCLNLN 1  .  0062  14  .  7071  0  .  068  0  .  0100  
NCOLN -31  .  1102  49  .  9516  -0  .  623  -0  .0588  
ASSTEMP 0  .6843  0  .3466  1  .  974  
* * 
1  .5284  
RBCR -2  .1132  5  .  8341  -0  -362  -0  .  3035  
FOD 0  .7838  0  .2507  3  .  126  
* * * 
1  .  9098  
FOC -0  .4611  0  .2420  -1  .  905  
* 
-1  .  0819  
GLV 0  .  1976  0  .0766  2  .  580  
* * « 
0  .  3478  
AGBANK 0  .6546  0  .5524  1  .  185  - -
FLFMLN -2  .2281  1  .3063  -1  .706  
* 
-0  .  9203  
LNDEP 1  .3334  2  .  1938  0  .608  0  .  8844  
DEPASST -6  .0967  4  .  0769  -1  .495  -4  .6048  
YLD 82  .5524  32  .  8845  2  .510  
• * 
6  .2388  
CO FA -68  .7025  58  .  9961  -1  .  165  -0  .  0239  
SALNSM 1  .  5284  0  .  4732  3  .230  
* * * 
- -
ASSETS -2  .  4E-04  2  .  OE-04  -1  .  175  -0  .  0274  
CONSTANT' '  
-7  .  5687  
LOG LIKELIHOOD ( res t r i c ted)  =  -121 .245  
LOG LIKELIHOOD (unres t r i c ted)  =  -86 .604  
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST =  69 .283  wi th  15  d . f .  
MADDALA R-SQUARE =  .200  
CRAGG-UHLER R-SQUARE =  .369  
•  SF0FM=1 i f  bank  se l l s  USDA guaran teed  FO loans  in to  
Farmer  Mac  I I  and  SFOFM=0 o therwise .  
^  See  Tab le  7 .4  fo r  a  desc r ip t ion  of  the  var iab les .  
'  Prob=.0708  i f  AGBANK=0,  P rob=.1278  i f  AGBANK=1;  and  
Prob=.0601  i f  SALNSM=0,  P rob=.2277  i f  SALNSM=1.  
*  Adjus ted  by  In (p2) - In (p i )= ln( .0451) - In ( .2852)  
=  -1 .8443  due  to  d i f fe ren t  sampl ing  ra tes  of  the  
pa r t i c ipan t s  and  nonpar t i c ipan t s .  
*  S ign i f i can t  a t  the  .1  l eve l .  
**  S ign i f i can t  a t  the  .05  l eve l .  
***  S ign i f i can t  a t  the  .01  l eve l .  
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Table 7.6. SFOFM classification table" 
Predicted 
Observed 
0 1 Total 
0 270 0 270 
1 39 2 41 
Total 309 2 311 
overall 87.45% 
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Figure 7.2. Observed groups and predicted probabilities: SFOFM 
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The likelihood ratio test is used to test whether all of 
the coefficients in the model are equal to zero (except the 
intercept. The model is 69.283 with 15 degrees of freedom 
idf) . Since X'i=.;as with 15 df is 32.8, we can conclude chat 
the model taken as a whole has explanatory power--i.e., we can 
reject the hypothesis that the restrictions do not apply. The 
values for the log likelihood functions can be found in Table 
7.5. 
The Maddala for the model is .200 ; che Cragg-Uhler R' 
is .369. Again, these measures are calculated using the 
maximums of the likelihood functions from the restricted and 
unrestricted model. Thus, they are not completely analogous 
to R' in a classical regression model. 
Table 7.6 compares obser'/ed and predicted group member­
ship. Banks with a predicted probability of 0.5 or greater 
are classified as participants in Farmer Mac II (SFOFM HAT=1). 
Banks with a predicted probability of less than 0.5 are class­
ified as nonparticipants (SFOFM HAT=0). Banks are also class­
ified according to their observed status. A bank that has a 
probability of participating equal to 25 percent and does not 
participate would be counted in the upper left hand cell of 
Table 7.6. A bank that was not predicted to participate but 
does would appear in the lower left hand cell. This would be 
a so-called false-negative--that is, the model predicted that 
the bank does not participate in Farmer Mac II, but the bank 
really does. 
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The model correctly classifies all nonparticipants 
(21Q/210 or 100 percent); the model's ability to classify 
participants, however, is weak (2/41 or 4.9 percent). The 
overall prediction rate is 87.5 percent (272 of 311). Clear­
ly, the model is better at predicting which banks do not 
participate in Farmer Mac II than it is at predicting partici­
pation, using this goodness of fit measure. 
The same pitfall applies here as before in placing too 
much emphasis on the classification table as a measure of 
goodness of fit. The model has explanatory power in the sense 
that participants have higher probabilities of participating 
than nonparticipants, but the small percentage of participants 
combined with the arbitrary classification rule used (SFOFM 
HAT=1 if Prob>.5) obscures this power when presented in a 
classification table. 
Figure 7.2 shows the observed groups and predicted proba­
bilities. This figure is a more useful depiction of the 
model's explanatory power than the classification table be­
cause it provides the predicted probabilities of participat­
ing. In other words, we can see chat as a group, the observed 
participants have higher predicted probabilities than the 
observed nonparticipants. 
Explanatory variables 
The coefficients on NCLNLN, NCOLN, RBCR, AGBANK, LNDEP, 
COFA, and ASSETS are all statistically insignificant. The 
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sign on NCLNLN and COFA are the opposite of what was expected. 
We cannot conclude that these variables have a significant 
effect on the probability of a bank selling USDA Farm Owner­
ship loans into Farmer Mac II. 
ASSTEMP. Assets per employee, ASSTEMP, has a positive 
statistically significant effect on participation at the a=.05 
level of significance. Once more, efficiency is an important 
determinant of participation. The elasticity calculated at 
the regressor means is 1.5. A one standard deviation in ASST­
EMP will increase the average bank's probability of participa­
tion by 44.7 percent. Again, this sounds like a large change. 
However, the average bank's probability of participating is 
only 10.9 percent before the one standard deviation increase 
in ASSTEMP and 15.7 percent after the increase, which amounts 
to a 5.2 percentage point increase. 
GLV. USDA guaranteed loan volume, GLV, is also signif­
icant (Qr=.01 level) and has the expected sign. Its elasticity 
is .35, indicating that higher USDA guaranteed loan volume 
increases the probability of participating by a less than 
proportionate amount of the increase in GLV. If GLV were to 
rise by one standard deviation, the average bank's probability 
of participating in Farmer Mac II would increase by 3 5 percent 
or 3.8 percentage points. 
218 
POD. USDA Farm Ownership (FO) loan demand, FOD, influ­
ences whether a bank sells FO loans into Farmer Mac II. Its 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 
a=.01 level of significance. FOD's elasticity is 1.91. A one 
standard deviation increase in the average bank's FOD will 
increase its probability of selling loans into Farmer Mac II 
by 65.2 percent or 7.1 percentage points. Evidently, given 
the chance to increase its profits by servicing additional 
borrowers, a bank will accept the marginal risk. 
FOC. The degree of competition among lenders for USDA 
guaranteed FO borrowers, FOC, has a statistically significant 
negative impact on the probability of participation. FOC's 
elasticity and effect on the probability of participation due 
to a one standard deviation increase is -1.1 and -40.9 per­
cent, respectively. That translates into a decrease of 4.6 
percentage points in the probability of the average bank 
selling FO loans into Farmer Mac II if FOC increases by one 
standard deviation. 
One possible explanation for the sign on FOC is that 
banks with little competition make FO loans that they do not 
want to hold to foster goodwill, and then sell them into 
Fairmer Mac II. A bank with m.any competitors may refer an FO 
borrower to a bank that originates FO loans for its portfolio 
(or sells them). A second plausible reason for the unexpected 
sign is that greater competition lowers the interest rate a 
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bank can charge on the loan, thus reducing one benefit of par­
ticipating. The benefit of participating in this case would 
be the spread a bank receives after the sale. The spread is 
the difference between a loan's interest rate and the rate 
that must be passed on to Farmer Mac (called the "net yield") . 
Competition that reduced loan rates would shrink the spread 
left over after a sale (called the "management premium") and 
thus reduce the incentive to participate. 
FLFMLN. The proportion of "Farmland" loans to total 
agricultural loans, FLFMLN, has a negative sign and is signif­
icant at the a=.01 level of significance. This result is con­
sistent with the hypothesis that participating in secondary 
markets allows a bank to originate loans that it does not want 
to hold in its portfolio. Its elasticity is -0.9. A one 
standard deviation increase in FLFMLN reduces the average 
bank's probability of participating by nearly 48 percent or 
5.2 percentage points. 
DEPASST. DEPASST was significant at the less customary 
q;=.15 level of significance. Its sign is negative, as expect­
ed. This finding suggests that using secondary markets is a 
substitute for the more traditional way of funding loans by 
issuing deposits, at least in the case of selling USDA guaran­
teed FO loans into Farmer Mac II. 
In terms of the elasticities of the continuous explanato­
220 
ry variables, DEPASST has the strongest effect on participa­
tion, except for YLD. A 1 percent decrease in the deposit-to-
asset ratio increases the probability of selling USDA guaran­
teed FO loans to Farmer Mac by 4.6 percent. If the average 
bank was to experience a one standard deviation increase in 
its deposit-to-asset ratio, its probability of selling loans 
into Farmer Mac II would decrease by 34 percent or 3.7 per­
centage points. 
YLD. YLD again has a positive, significant effect on the 
probability of participation. And again, it has the strongest 
influence among the continuously measured regressors in terms 
of elasticity. A I percent increase in YLD increases the 
probability of participating by 6.2 percent. If the average 
bank's YLD increases by one standard deviation, the probabili­
ty of it participating increases by 57 percent or 6.2 percent­
age points. The incentive to participate is enhanced consid­
erably if a bank can reinvest the proceeds from a loan sale 
into other high yielding assets in their portfolio. 
SALNSM. Experience participating in other secondaary mar­
kets (SALNSM) has a significant positive effect on a bank's 
probability of participating in Farmer Mac II. The probabili­
ty of the average bank participating if it does not have 
experience selling loans into other secondary markets is just 
.06 compared to .23 if the bank does have such experience. 
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Other experience increases a manager's assuredness about 
participating in new secondary markets as well as allows him 
to conform to the nuts and bolts of the Farmer Mac II program 
more easily. Other experience may also be indirectly captur­
ing the management sophistication required to engage in sec­
ondary markets. 
Smnmary 
This model attempts to explain why banks sell USDA guar­
anteed Farm Ownership loans into Farmer Mac II. Seven explan­
atory variables have statistically significant effects. They 
are: assets per employee, ASSTEMP; FO loan demand, FOD; compe­
tition among lenders for FO loans, FOC; USDA guaranteed loan 
volume, GLV; farm ownership loans as a fraction of total 
agricultural lending, FLFMLN; yield on earning assets, YLD; 
and whether a bank has experience selling loans into other 
secondary markets, SALNSM. Of the statistically significant 
continuous explanatory variables, yield has the greatest 
impact on participation. Overall, whether the bank sells 
loans into other secondary markets is the most telling vari­
able . 
In the next section a model will be estimated to see if a 
different set of explanatory variables can distinguish between 
banks that sell USDA guaranteed Operating Loans (OL) to Farmer 
Mac and those that do not. 
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Sale of Newly Originated USDA Guaranteed Operating Loans (OL) 
into Fanner Mac IX 
In this section, a model is fit that predicts the proba­
bility that a bank will sell USDA guaranteed Operating Loans 
into Farmer Mac II. This entails redefining the binary depen­
dant variable and modifying the list of explanatory variables. 
The new independent variables are specific to agricultural 
lending as well as USDA guaranteed OL lending. 
The logit model to be estimated is: 
SOLFM = bo + b,_NCLNLN + b.NCOLN + b^ASSTEMP + b,RBCR 
+ bgOLD + b^OLC + b,GLV + bgAGBANK + bgOLFMLN 
+ b.oLNDEP + b,iDEPASST + b.^YLD + b.jCOFA 
+ b,,SALNSM + b-sASSETS + u,. 
Dependent and independent variables 
SOLFM: If a bank sells newly originated (booked less 
than 12 months) USDA guaranteed Operating Loans (OL) into 
Farmer Mac II, then SOLFM=l. Otherwise, SOLFM=0. Of the 
total 311 banks included in this analysis, 2 5 participate in 
Farmer Mac II as defined above. The total number of banks in 
this analysis is again 311. 
OLD: OLD is the demand for USDA guaranteed Operating 
Loans (OL). Data on this variable was obtained from the 
survey instrument (see page 5 of the survey found in the 
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Appendix). Banks were asked to rank borrower demand for OL 
loans relative to historical levels using a 5 point Likert 
scale. A higher rating implies stronger demand for OL loans. 
This variable is similar to FOD, which was used in the prior 
model. 
Theoretically, the sign on OLD is ambiguous. An increase 
in demand allows a bank to extend additional credit at the 
same interest rate or originate the same amount of loans at a 
higher interest rate. As the bank makes more loans, however, 
its portfolio risk rises. The bank will decide whether to 
service the additional demand by weighing the additional risk 
against the additional return. DEMAND had a statistically 
significant positive effect on participation in Farmer Mac II 
when the sale of any USDA guaranteed loan type (SALNFM) was 
considered and FOD had a significant positive effect on sales 
of USDA guaranteed FO loans (SFOFM). 
PLC: OLC measures the degree of competition among lend­
ers for USDA guaranteed FO loans. Like FOC, it comes from the 
survey, is constructed similarly, and is designed to proxy 
local lender competition. A score of "1" would reflect very 
weak competition. Higher scores imply that local competition 
relative to historical levels is greater. 
The theoretical sign on OLC is indetejrminate. In the 
estimation of the logit model with SALNFM as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on COMP was negative but statis­
224 
tically insignificant. However, FOC was found to have a 
significantly negative effect with respect to selling USDA 
guaranteed FO loans to Farmer Mac. 
OLFMLN: OLFMLN, the farm loans (loans to finance agri­
cultural production and other loans to farmers) to agricultur­
al loans (farmland loans plus farm loans) ratio was added as 
an explanatory variable to measure the extent to which a bank 
extends farm operating credit relative to its total agricul­
tural lending. A bank may be classified as an agricultural 
bank (AGBANK=1) but may not lend for farm operation purposes. 
Higher levels of OLFMLN should increase the probability of 
participation. 
Dixon et al. (1997) show that a greater proportion of 
fairm loans in the portfolio increases the use of USDA loan 
guarantees and in the case of OL loans, a larger USDA guaran­
tee volume. However, it is not clear what incentives exist 
to sell shorter-term assets--especially with regard to reduc­
ing interest rate risk. On the other hand, if a bank is faced 
with liquidity problems, it may indeed sell loans, even oper­
ating loans. 
The independent variables noncurrent loans to loans, 
NCLNLN; net charge-offs to loans, NCOLN; assets per employee, 
ASSTEMP; risk-based capital ratio, RBCR; USDA guaranteed loan 
volume, GLV; the classification dummy for an agricultural 
bank, AGBANK; loan-to-deposit ratio, LNDEP; deposit-to-asset 
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ratio, DEPASST; yield on earning assets, YLD; the cost of 
funding assets, COFA; the binary variable for other secondary 
market experience, SALNSM; and bank size, ASSETS; are all 
defined and expected to have the same effect on participation 
as outlined earlier. 
Loglt regression results: SOLFM 
The descriptive statistics of the variables included in 
the model for the sample appear in Table 7.7. The goodness of 
fit statistics suggest the model has modest explanatory power. 
Four of the independent variables have statistical signif­
icance. The estimation results appear in Table 7.8. Accord­
ing to this model, the average bank has a .19 percent (.0019) 
probability of participating in Farmer Mac II. The results of 
the logit regression are discussed below. 
Goodness of fit 
The measures used to assess che goodness of fit again 
include the likelihood ratio test, the Madalla R^, and the 
Cragg-Uhler . A classification table that compares the 
predictions of the model to the observed outcomes appears in 
Table 7.9. The obseirved groups and predicted probabilities 
for the model are presented in Figure 7.3. 
With regard to the likelihood ratio test, the model is 
67.826 with 15 degrees of freedom (df) . Since x^a=.oo5 with 15 
df is 32.8, we can conclude that the model taken as a whole 
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Table 1.1. Description of sample for SOLFM logit model 
Nonpar t i c ipan t s  (SOLFM=0)*  Pa r t i c ipan t s  (S0LFM=1)"  
Var iab le ' '  Mean  S .D.  Min  Max Mean  S .D.  Min  .Max 
NCLNLN 0  002  0  .005  0  .000  0  .  141  3  .  014  0  .015  0  .000  0  .077  
NCOLN 0  Oi l  0  .015  -0  .  008  0  .042  0  .003  0  .  005  -0  .002  0  .026  
ASSTEMP 2  498  0  .720  0  .750  t . 690  2  .553  0  .377  .167  4  .930  
RBCR 0  163  0  .062  0  .098  0  .573  0  .  140  0  .048  0  .088  0  .299  
OLD 2  965  1  .047  1  .  000  5  .000  3  .400  0  .317  t .  000  5  .000  
OLC 2  686  ]_ . 003  1  .  000  5  .000  2  .520  1  .046  1  .  000  5  .000  
GLV 1  791  2  .113  0  .  000  12  .500  4  .  108  3  .530  0  .600  14  .000  
AGBANK C 721  0  .449  0  .000  1 . 000  0  .680  0  .476  0  .  000  1  .000  
OLFMLN 0  631  0  .  191  c . 030  1  .000  0 . 649  0  .  195  0  .  190  0  .910  
LNDEP 0  735  0  .  145  0  .207  1  .296  0  .853  0  .  121  0  .  560  1  .098  
DEPASST 0  849  0  .063  0  .525  Q .  995  0  .834  0  .058  0  .710  0  .  920  
YLD 0  084  0  .008  0  .068  0  .  118  0  .090  0  .010  0  .079  0  .122  
COFA 0  039  n .  004  0  .027  0  .050  0  .041  0  .005  0  .  029  0  .054  
SALNSM 0  380  0  .486  0  .000  1  .000  0  .920  0  .277  0  .  000  T . 000  
ASSETS 1  378  11  .  444  0  .005  186  .000  0  .514  •1 . 689  0  .017  3  .547  
"  n=286 .  
^ n=25 .  
^ SOI iFM i s  the  d icho tomous  dependen t  va r iab le  which  t akes  on  a  
va lue  of  1  i f  a  bank  se l l s  USDA guaran teed  OL loans  to  Farmer  Mac  
11 ,  c ind  0  o thenv ise ;  NCLNLN i s  noncur ren t  loans  to  loans ;  NCOLN i s  
ne t  charge-of f s  to  loans ;  ASSTEMP i s  asse t s  per  employee  measured  
in  mi l l ions  of  do l la r s ;  RBCR i s  the  r i sk -based  cap i ta l  r a t io ;  OLD 
i s  a  sca la r  va r iab le  fo r  USDA guaran teed  OL loan  demand;  OLC i s  a  
sca la r  va r iab le  fo r  compet i t ion  among USDA guaran teed  OL l enders ;  
GLV i s  the  bank ' s  USDA guaran teed  loan  vo lume measured  in  mi l l ions  
of  do l la r s ;  AGBANK i s  a  dummy va r iab le  tha t  t akes  on  a  va lue  of  1  
i f  the  bank  has  17  percen t  o r  more  o f  i t s  loan  por t fo l io  in  
agr icu l tu ra l  loans ,  and  0  o therwise ;  OI iFMLN i s  opera t ing  loans  to  
fa rm loans ;  LI IDEF i s  the  loan- to -depos i t  r a t io ;  DEPASST i s  the  
depos i t - to -asse t  r a t io ;  YLD i s  the  y ie ld  on  ea rn ing  asse t s ;  COFA 
i s  the  cos t  o f  fund ing  ea rn ing  asse t s ;  SALNSM i s  a  dummy va r iab le  
tha t  t akes  on  a  va lue  of  1  i f  the  bank  has  o ther  secondary  marke t  
exper ience ,  and  0  o therwise ;  and  ASSETS deno tes  the  bank ' s  a sse t s  
measured  in  b i l l ions  of  do l la r s .  
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Table 7.8. SOLFM logit model results" 
Est .  S td .  E las t .  
Var iab le^  coef f .  e r ro r  t - ra t io  a t  means  
NCLNLN -3  .9313  20 .7284  -0  .  190  -0 .0455  
NCOLN 72  .  6714  53 .7758  1  .351  0 .1523  
ASSTEMP 0  .3702  0 .4212  0  .  879  0 .9239  
RBCR 12  .8312  7 .9993  1  .604  2  .0632  
OLD 0  .4771  0 .3300  T . 446  1 .4286  
OLC -0  .6523  0 .3230  -2  .  020  
* ie 
-1 .7404  
GLV 0  .3031  0 .0986  3  .  074  
* * • 
0 .5980  
AGBANK -0  .  1158  0 .6341  -0  .  183  - -
OLFMLN 1  .4540  1 .6236  0  .  896  0 .9184  
LNDEP 10  .  6394  3 .4938  3  .  045  
* * * 
7 .9007  
DEPASST 3  .  7430  6 .0637  0  .  617  3  .1658  
YLD 24  .  9364  38 .8887  0  .  641  2 .1106  
CO FA -12  .  0150  74 .0284  -0  .  162  0 .4677  
SALNSM 2  .  9808  0 .8705  3  .424  
it it it 
ASSETS 2  .  OE-04  1 .7E-04  1  .  176  -0 .2613  
CONSTANT' '  
-24  .2077  
LOG LIKELIHOOD ( res t r i c ted)  =  -86 .990  
LOG LIKELIHOOD (unres t r i c ted)  =  -53 .076  
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST =  67 .826  wi th  15  d . f .  
MADDALA R-SQUARE =  .196  
CRAGG-UHLER R-SQUARE =  .457  
* S0LFM=1 i f  bank  se l l s  USDA guaran teed  OL loans  in to  
Farmer  Mac  I I  and  SOLFM=0 o therwise .  
^  See  Tcdjle 7 .7  fo r  a  desc r ip t ion  of  the  var iab les .  
•  P rob=.0021  i f  AGBANK=0,  P rob=.0019  i f  AGBANK=1;  and  
Prob=.0005  i f  SALNSM=0,  P rob=.0106  i f  SALNSM=1.  
•* Ad jus ted  by  In  (p2) - In  (p i )  = ln  ( .  0473) - In  ( .  2907)  =  
1 .8157  due  to  d i f fe ren t  sampl ing  ra tes  of  the  
pa r t i c ipan t s  and  nonpar t i c ipan t s .  
*  S ign i f i can t  a t  the  .1  l eve l .  
**  S ign i f i cc in t  a t  the  .05  l eve l .  
***  S ign i f i can t  a t  the  .01  l eve l .  
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Table 7.9. SOLFM classification cable' 
Predicted 
Observed 
0 1 Total 
0 286 0 286 
1 24 1 25 
Total 310 1 311 
overall 92.2 8% 
l=participant in Farmer Mac II; O=nonparticipant. 
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Figure 7.3. Observed groups and predicted probabilities: SOLFM 
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has explanatory power. The values for the log likelihood 
functions (restricted and unrestricted) can be found in Table 
7.8. The Maddala for the model is .196; the Cragg-Uhler 
is .457. These statistics appear in the same table. 
Table 7.9 compares observed and predicted group member­
ship. Banks with a predicted probability of participating 
that is greater than .5 are classified as participants. Banks 
are also classified as to whether they actually participate or 
not. The model's overall percent correct is 92.28 (287/311). 
It correctly classifies every nonparticipant (286/286 or 100 
percent), but incorrectly classifies all but one participants 
(1/25 or 4.0 percent). In other words, the model has a zero 
false-positive rate (bank is predicted to participate but in 
fact does not) and a 96.0 percent false-negative rate (bank is 
predicted to not participate but in fact does) . The same pit­
fall applies here as before in placing too much emphasis on 
the classification table as a measure of goodness of fit. The 
classification table reflects the fact that there are so few 
banks that sell USDA guaranteed OL loans in the population. 
In addition, although the model has explanatory power, its ex­
planatory power is by no means exceptional. 
The observed groups and predicted membership depicted in 
Figure 7.3 show that the model does distinguish between par­
ticipating banks and nonparticipating banks. The power to 
distinguish between groups is evident in the pattern of the 
predicted probabilities. The banks that do not participate 
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(denoted by "0"s) tend to have lower probabilities than the 
banks that participate (denoted by "l"s) . Another way of 
thinking about it is that the "0"s should tend to group to the 
left and the "l"s should group to the right in Figure 7.3, if 
the model has the ability to distinguish between groups. 
Explanatory variables 
The coefficients on NCLNLN, NCOLN, ASSTEMP, AGBANK, 
OLFMLN, DEPASST, YLD, COFA, and ASSETS were all statistically 
insignificant. The signs on AGBANK, DEPASST, and COFA were 
the opposite of what was expected. 
Assets per employee and yield, which had statistically 
significant positive effects on the probability of participat­
ing as defined earlier, do not explain why banks sell OL 
loans. The deposit-to-asset ratio, which has a statistically 
significant influence on the sale of FO loans, does not affect 
the probability of selling OL loans to Farmer Mac. These 
results suggest that FO loans and OL loans are sold into the 
Farmer Mac II loan sale program for different reasons. 
RBCR. The risk-based capital ratio, RBCR, has a statis­
tically significant positive effect on the probability of 
selling OL loans to Farmer Mac at the a=.15 level of signifi­
cance. The significance of the RBCR variable is noteworthy 
for 2 reasons. First, the sign is opposite of what was ex­
pected. Second, the elasticity of RBCR is 2.1, which means 
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that increases in a bank's risk-based capital will have a 
fairly strong effect on its probability of participation--
especially compared to the other continuous variables. A one 
standard deviation increase in the average bank's RBCR in­
creases the probability of it participating by 77.9 percent, 
which amounts to a .15 percentage point increase. 
One possible explanation why an increase in a bank's 
risk-based capital ratio increases the probability of partici­
pating, given that a higher loan-to-deposit ratio also in­
creases the chances of participating, is that sellers have 
higher capital levels. 
OLD and PLC. The strength of OL demand, OLD, and the 
degree of competition among OL lenders, OLC, influence the 
probability of participation. OLC has a statistically signif­
icant negative effect at the a=.05 level of significance. OLD 
has a positive effect but is weaker in influence than OLC in 
teirms of elasticities. Furthermore, OLD is significant only 
at the Q!=.15 level of significance. OLD and OLC have the same 
qualitative effects on the probability of selling OL loans to 
Farmer Mac as FOD and FOC have on the probability of a bank 
selling FO loans. For the average bank, a one standard devia­
tion increase in OLD increases the probability of participat­
ing by 49 percent or .09 percentage points; a one standard 
deviation increase in OLC reduces the probability of partici­
pating by 65.5 percent or .12 percentage points. 
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GLV. USDA guaranteed loan volume, GLV, has a positive 
statistically significant effect on the probability of partic­
ipation at the a=.01 level of significance. Like the demand 
and competition measures, GLV repeatedly shows up as a signif­
icant explanatory variable. However, unlike these variables, 
GLV's elasticity is less than 1. In this model, its elastici­
ty is .60. So, although higher levels of GLV are associated 
with a greater probability of selling OL loans into Farmer Mac 
II, the effect is fairly weak. 
LNDEP. The coefficient on LNDEP has the expected sign 
and is significantly positive at the a=.01 level of signifi­
cance. LNDEP's elasticity calculated at the regressor means 
is 7.9. Not only does the loan-to-deposit ratio significantly 
explain the probability of selling OL loans into Farmer Mac 
II, but a 1 percent increase increases the probability of 
participation by nearly 8 percent:. For the average bank, a 
one standard deviation increase in LNDEP increases the proba­
bility of participating by 84 percent or .16 percentage 
points. This result suggests that Farmer Mac II provides an 
important liquidity management tool for USDA OL lenders. 
SALNSM. SALNSM is again the independent variable with 
the most explanatory power. The probability of participating 
for the average bank when SALNSM=0 is a paltry .0005 and in­
creases to .0106 if SALNSM=1. 
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Stunmary 
The variables related to USDA guaranteed lending (OLD, 
OLC, and GLV) are statistically significant determinants of 
the probability of participating in Farmer Mac II. A bank's 
loan-to-deposit ratio (LNDEP) and experience in other second­
ary markets have the greatest influence. Surprisingly, yield 
(YLD) and efficiency (ASSTEMP), which were important in ex­
plaining the sale of USDA guaranteed FO loans to Farmer Mac, 
are not helpful in distinguishing banks that sell OL loans 
from those that do not. This suggests that banks that sell OL 
loans into Farmer Mac II are not doing so in order to exploit 
a comparative advantage in originating loans. 
In the next two sections, participation will be redefined 
to mean the selling of "seasoned" USDA guaranteed loans into 
Farmer Mac II. The focus is two-fold. First, Can the theo­
retical model predict which banks will participate? Secondly, 
Do the variables that explain the sale of newly originated 
USDA guaranteed loans to Fairmer Mac explain the sale of "sea­
soned" loans? 
Sale of "Seasoned" USDA guaranteed Farm Ovmership (FO) Loans 
into Fanner Mac II 
A bank is considered to participate in Farmer Mac II if 
it sells "seasoned" (booked more than 12 months) USDA guaran­
teed Farm Ownership (FO) loans to Farmer Mac. 
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The logit model to be estimated is: 
SSFOFM = bo + b.NCLNLN + b.NCOLN + b.ASSTEMP + b.RBCR 
+ bpFOD + bgPOC + b-GLV + bgAGBANK + bgPLFMLN 
+ biaLNDEP + b-iDEPASST + b-jYLD + b,3C0FA 
+ b.^ SALNSM + b,5ASSETS u,. 
Dependent and independent variables 
SSFOFM: If a bank sells "seasoned" USDA guaranteed FO 
loans into Farmer Mac II, then SSF0FM=1. Otherwise, SSFOFM=0. 
Of the total 311 banks included in this analysis, 24 partici­
pate in Farmer Mac II as defined. Recall, 41 banks sold newly 
originated FO loans, so not all banks that sell newly origi­
nated loans sell "seasoned" FO loans. Furthermore, not all 
banks that sell "seasoned" loans into Farmer Mac II sell new 
FO originations. 
The independent variables noncurrent loans to loans, 
NCLNLN; net charge-offs to loans, NCOLN; assets per employee, 
ASSTEMP; risk-based capital ratio, RBCR; USDA guaranteed FO 
loan demand, FOD; competition among lenders for USDA guaran­
teed FO loans, FOC; USDA guaranteed loan volume, GLV; the 
agricultural bank classification dummy, AGBANK; farmland loans 
to agricultural loans ratio, FLFMLN; loan-to-deposit ratio, 
LNDEP; deposit-to-asset ratio, DEPASST; yield on earning 
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assets, YLD; the cost of funding assets, COFA; the binary 
variable for other secondary market experience, SALNSM; and 
bank, size, ASSETS; are all defined and expected to have the 
same effect on participation as for the case of selling new FO 
originations. 
Logit regression results: SSFOFM 
The descriptive statistics of the model variables for the 
sample appear in Table 7.10. The regression results can be 
found in Table 7.11. The model has very modest explanatory 
power. Of the 15 independent variables, only 3 are statisti­
cally significant. The average bank has a .35 percent (.0085) 
probability of participating. The goodness of fit is poorer 
than the SFOFM model and the number of significant explanatory 
variables have also decreased. This suggests that the inde­
pendent variables that explain SFOFM are not as useful in 
predicting whether a bank will sell "seasoned" USDA guaranteed 
FO loans. The results of the logit regression are discussed 
below. 
Goodness of fit 
The likelihood ratio test, the Madalla R^, and the Cragg-
Uhler measures are given in Table 7.11. A classification 
table comparing the predictions of the model with the observed 
outcomes appears in Table 7.12. The observed groups and pre­
dicted probabilities for SSFOFM are presented in Figure 7.4. 
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Table 7.10. Description of sample £or SSFOFM loqit model 
Nonparc ic ipancs  (SSFOFM=C)*  Pa r t i c lpancs  (SSF0FM=1) '  
Var iab le^  Mean  S .D.  Min  Max Mean  S  .D.  Min  Max 
NCLNLN 0  o i l  C .  015  0  .  000  0  .  141  0  010  0  008  0  .  000  0  .029  
NCOLN 0  002  0  .005  -0  .008  0  .  042  0  002  0  002  -0  .001  0  .006  
ASSTEMP 2  499  0  .733  0  .750  4  .  930  2  588  0  761  1  .  167  4  .963  
RBCR 0  162  0  .  063  0  .088  0  .  573  0  152  0  041  0  .099  0  .274  
FOD 2  694  0  .  958  1  .000  5  .000  3  208  0  884  1  .000  5  .  000  
FOC 2  674  1  .  008  1  .000  5  .  000  2  917  1  139  1  .000  5  .000  
GLV 1  852  2  .  176  0  .000  13  .600  3  458  3  516  0  .400  14  .000  
AGBANK 0  726  0  .447  0  .000  1  .  000  0  667  0  482  0  .000  1  .000  
FLFMLN 0  369  0  .  192  0  .  000  0  .  970  0  3  52  0  181  0  .  000  0  .810  
LNDEP 0  744  0  .  149  0  .  207  1  .296  0  749  0  118  0  .  550  0  .  990  
DEPASST 0  348  0  .063  0  .525  0  .  995  0  838  0  065  0  .591  0  .  920  
TLD 0  oas  0  .  ooa  0  .067  0  .  122  0  085  0  005  0  .  076  n . 0  93  
COFA 0  039  0  .  004  0  .027  0  .  050  0  038  0  003  0  .  029  0  .  040  
SALNSM 0  389  0  .488  0  .  000  1  .  000  0  833  0  381  0  .  000  1  .000  
ASSETS 1  371  11  .421  0  .  005  186  .  000  0  559  1  954  0  .010  9  .699  
•  n=287 .  
^  n=24 .  
SSFOFH i s  the  d icho tomous  dependen t  va r iab le  which  t akes  on  a  
va lue  of  1  i f  a  bank  se l l s  "seasomed"  USDA guaran teed  FO loans  to  
Farmer  Mac  I I ,  and  0  o therwise ;  NCLNLN i s  noncur ren t  loans  to  
loans ;  NCOIiN i s  ne t  charge-of f s  to  loans ;  ASSTEMP i s  asse t s  pe r  
employee  measured  in  mi l l ions  of  do l la r s ;  RBCR i s  the  r i sk -based  
cap i ta l  r a t io ;  FOD i s  a  sca la r  var iab le  fo r  USDA guaran teed  FO loan  
demand;  FOC i s  a  sca la r  va r iab le  fo r  compet i t ion  among USDA 
guaran teed  FO l enders ;  GLV i s  the  bank ' s  USDA guaran teed  loan  
vo lume measured  in  mi l l ions  of  do l la r s ;  A6BANK i s  a  dummy va r iab le  
tha t  t akes  on  a  va lue  of  1  i f  the  bank  has  17  percen t  o r  more  o f  
i t s  loan  por t fo l io  in  agr icu l tu ra l  loans ,  and  0  o therwise ;  FLFMLN 
i s  fa rmland  loans  to  fa rm loans ;  LNDEP i s  the  loan- to -depos i t  
r a t io ;  DEFASST i s  the  depos i t - to -asse t  r a t io ;  YLD i s  the  y ie ld  on  
ea rn ing  asse t s ;  COFA i s  the  cos t  o f  f i ind ing  ea rn ing  asse t s ;  SALNSM 
i s  a  dummy va r iab le  tha t  t akes  on  a  va lue  o f  1  i f  the  bank  has  
o ther  secondary  marke t  exper ience ,  and  0  o therwise ;  and  ASSETS 
deno tes  the  bank ' s  a sse t s  measured  in  b i l l ions  of  do l la r s .  
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Table 7.11. SSFOFM logit model results' 
Est .  S td .  E las t .  
Var iab le*  coef f .  e r ro r  t - ra t io  a t  means '  
NCLNLN -8 .6180  23  .3039  -0 .370  -0 .0948  
NCOLN 0 .9014  69  .3470  0  .  013  0 .0019  
ASSTEMP 0  .4038  0  .4000  1 .  010  1 .0034  
RBCR -1 .8568  S  .2387  -0 .298  -0 .2968  
FOD 0 .5863  0  .2955  
• * 
1  .  984  1 .5893  
POC 0 .0004  0  .2630  0  .  002  0 .0011  
GLV 0 .1328  0  .  0824  1 .  612  0 .2601  
AGBANK -0 .0203  0  .5847  -0 .035  - -
FLFMLN -0 .7953  1  .5412  -0 .516  -0 .2889  
LNDEP -1 .0663  2  .4974  -0 .427  -0 .7869  
DEPASST -2 .9779  4  .  7011  -0 .633  -2 .5023  
' iTLD -6  .  8636  47  .7495  -0 .144  0  .  5770  
CO FA -118 .1330  69  .  9779  -1 .688  -4  .  5680  
SALNSM 1 .9461  0  .6182  
* * 
3  .  148  - -
ASSETS 8 . lE-05  1 .  OE-04  0  .  810  0  .  1050  
CONSTANT" 0 .6399  
LOG LIKELIHOOD ( res t r i c ted)  = -84531  
LOG LIKELIHOOD (unres t r i c ted)  = -68 .844  
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST =  31 .375  wi th  15  d . f .  
MADDALA R-SQUARE =  .096  
CRAGG-UHLER R-SQUARE = .229  
* SSF0FM=1 i f  bank  se l l s  "seasoned"  USDA guaran teed  FO 
loans  to  Farmer  Mac  and  SSFOFM=0 o therwise .  
^  See  Tab le  7 .10  fo r  a  desc r ip t ion  of  the  var iab les .  
^ P rob=.0086  i f  AGBANK=0 and  Prob=.0085  i f  AGBANK=1;  
P rob=.003  8  i f  SALNSM=0 and  P=.0257  i f  SALNSM=1.  
Adjus ted  by  In  (p2) - In  (p i )  = ln  ( .  0475)  -  In  ( .  2667)  
=  -1 .7254  due  to  d i f fe ren t  sampl ing  ra tes  of  the  
par t i c ipan t s  and  nonpar t i c ipan t s .  
*  S ign i f i can t  a t  the  .1  l eve l .  
**  S ign i f i can t  a t  the  .05  l eve l .  
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Table 7.12. SSFOFM classification cable^ 
Predicted 
0 1 Total Correct 
0 287 0 287 100 .00% 
Observed 
1 24 0 24 0 . 00% 
Total 311 0 311 
Overall correc 92 .28% 
^ l=participant in Farmer Mac II; O=nonparticipant 
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Figure 7.4. Observed groups and predicted probabilities: SSFOFM 
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The model is 31.375 with 15 degrees of freedom (df) . 
Since x^a..oi with 15 df is 30.58, we can conclude that the 
model taken as a whole has explanatory power. The values for 
the log likelihood functions can be found in Table 7.11. The 
Maddala for the model is .096; the Cragg-Uhler R' is .229. 
This model does not fit as well as the one fitted to the sale 
of newly originated USDA guaranteed FO loans (SFOFM). In 
other words, the independent variables taken as a whole were 
more suited to distinguishing between banks that sell new FO 
originations vs. those that do not than they were suited to 
distinguishing between banks that sell "seasoned" FO loans vs. 
those that do not. 
Table 7.12 compares observed and predicted group member­
ship. The model has an overall prediction rate of 92.28 
percent. It correctly predicts all nonparticipants but incor­
rectly predicts all participants. In other words, the model 
predicts that none of the banks in the sample will participate 
in Farmer Mac II. Figure 7.4 illustrates that the predicted 
probabilities of participants tend to be somewhat higher than 
those of nonparticipants. However, it is also apparent from 
the figure that the model has modest explanatory power. 
Explanatory variables 
The coefficients on NCLNLN, NCOLN, ASSTEMP, RBCR, FOC, 
AGBANK, FLFMLN, LNDEP, DEPASST, YLD, and ASSETS were all 
statistically insignificant. Of these, LNDEP and YLD had 
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signs opposite of what was expected. Recall, ASSTEMP, FOC, 
FLFMLN, and YLD were all statistically significant determi­
nants of the probability of selling new FO originations into 
Farmer Mac II. 
COFA. The coefficient on the cost of funding earning 
assets has a negative sign and is significantly different from 
zero at the q;= . 1 level of significance. We find that, all 
else equal, a higher cost of funding reduces the probability 
of participating in Farmer Mac II. Moreover, with an elastic­
ity of -4.6, the effect is quite strong. A one standard 
deviation increase in COFA decreases the probability of the 
average bank participating by 50.4 percent or .43 percentage 
points. COFA had a negative sign in the model with SFOFM as 
the dependent variable but its coefficient was significant at 
only the 75 percent level and its elasticity was only -.02. 
The sign on COFA is contrary to the notion that banks 
with a comparative advantage in funding loans should hold 
them. This peculiar result might be the result of reverse 
causality--i.e., that by selling loans the cost of funding 
assets falls. This argument is consistent with the negative 
sign on DEPASST, which means that banks are more likely to 
participate if they fund less of their assets using deposits. 
Furthermore, the negative sign on LNDEP would then mean that 
increases in loan sales reduce the loan-to-deposit ratio. 
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FOP and GLV. USDA guaranteed FO loan demand, FOD, has a 
positive statistically significant influence on the probabili 
ty of participating in Farmer Mac II at the QT=.05 level of 
significance. FOD has an elasticity of 1.58. The effect of 
USDA guaranteed loan volume, GLV, is positive and statistical 
ly significant once again. Its elasticity is .26. FOD and 
GLV each have roughly the same quantitative effect on the 
probability of participation as in the case of selling newly 
originated FO loans. 
SALNSM. Other experience selling loans into secondary 
markets again has the most power to distinguish Farmer Mac II 
participants from nonparticipants. If the average bank has 
participated in other secondary markets, the probability of 
participating in Fairmer Mac II is 2.6 percent; if not, the 
probability falls to .38 percent. 
Summary 
Higher demand for USDA guaranteed FO loans, larger USDA 
guaranteed loan volume, and other secondairy market experience 
in part explain why banks sell "seasoned" FO loans. These 
variables also helped explain why banks sell new FO origina­
tions. The cost of funding, which is statistically signifi­
cant and has a strong impact on the probability of selling 
"seasoned" FO loans, is only significant at the a=.2S level 
and has a very weak impact on the probability of selling new 
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FO originations. Moreover, variables such as assets per 
employee, competition among lenders for FO loans, farmland 
loans to farm loans, deposits-to-assets, and yield, which 
could explain why banks sold new FO originations, do not ex­
plain the sale of "seasoned" FO loans. 
In the next section, a final logit model is fit to see if 
the explanatory variables are useful in predicting which banks 
sell "seasoned" USDA guaranteed Operating Loans into the 
Farmer Mac II loan sale program. 
Sale of "seasoned" USDA guareuiteed Operating Loans (OL) 
into Farmer Mac II 
The model in this section is similar to the third model 
estimated. The explanatory variables used in that model are 
the same as included here. The only difference is that they 
are fit using a different binary dependent variable. A bank 
is considered to participate in Farmer Mac II if it sells 
"seasoned" (booked more than 12 months) USDA guaranteed Oper­
ating Loans (OL) to Farmer Mac. 
The logit model to be estimated is: 
SSFOFM = b^ + b,NCLNLN + bjNCOLN + bjASSTEMP + b^RBCR 
+ bjOLD + bgOLC + b^GLV + bgAGBANK + bgOLFMLN 
+ b,oLNDEP + b,iDEPASST + b.^YLD + b.jCOFA 
+ bi^SALNSM + bjsASSETS + u, . 
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Dependent and independent variables 
SSOLFM: If a bank sells "seasoned" USDA guaranteed OL 
loans into Fairmer Mac II, then SS0LFM=1. Otherwise, SSOLFM=0. 
Of the total 311 banks included in this analysis, 14 partici­
pate in Farmer Mac II as defined. Recall, 25 banks sold newly 
originated OL loans, so not all banks that sell newly origi­
nated loans sell "seasoned" OL loans. And, some banks that 
sell "seasoned" OL loans do not sell new OL originations. 
The independent variables noncurrent loans to loans, 
NCLNLN; net charge-offs to loans, NCOLN; assets per employee, 
ASSTEMP; risk-based capital ratio, RBCR; USDA guaranteed OL 
loan dem^and, OLD; competition among lenders for USDA guaran­
teed OL loans, OLC; USDA guaranteed loan volume, GLV; che 
agricultural bank classification dummy, AGBANK; farm operating 
loans to agricultural loans ratio, OLFMLN; loan-to-deposit 
ratio, LNDEP; deposit-to-asset ratio, DEPASST; yield on earn­
ing assets, YLD; the cost of fiinding assets, COFA; the binary 
variable for other secondary market experience, SALNSM; and 
bank size, ASSETS; are all defined and expected to have the 
same effect on participation as for the case of selling new OL 
originations. 
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Logit regression results: SSOLFM 
Table 7.13 provides descriptive statistics for the sample 
with respect to each independent variable included in the 
model. The estimation results of this logit model are not as 
promising as the prior models. The overall fit is poor and 
only 2 of the 15 independent variables are statistically-
significant. The results of the regression are found in Table 
7.14. According to this model, the average bank has a .15 
percent (.0015) probability of selling "seasoned" OL loans 
into Farmer Mac II. The results of this logit regression are 
discussed below. 
Goodness of fit 
The measures used to assess the goodness of fit again 
include the likelihood ratio test, the Madalla R^, and the 
Cragg-Uhler . A classification table that compares the 
predictions of the model to the observed outcomes appears in 
Table 7.15. The observed groups and predicted probabilities 
for SSOLFM are presented in Figure 7.5. 
The model is 21.330 with 15 degrees of freedom {df) . 
Since with 15 df is 21.3, we can conclude that not all 
the coefficients in the model are zero--that is, the model has 
some explanatory power. The values for the log likelihood 
functions can be found in Table 7.14. The Maddala R^ for the 
model is .066; the Cragg-Uhler R^ is .216. This model has the 
poorest fit of the five estimated models in terms of the 3 
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Table 7.13. Description of sample for SSOLFM loqit model 
NonparCic ipan t s  (SSOLFM=0)"  Pa r t i c ipancs  (SS0LFM=1) '  
Var iab le" '  Mean  S  .D .  Min  Max Mean  S  .D.  Min  Max 
SCLNLN 0  o i l  0  .  015  0  .  000  0  .141  0  .011  0  012  0  .000  0  .046  
NCOLN 0  002  0  .005  -0  .  008  0  .042  0  .001  0  002  -0  .  001  0  .006  
ASSTEMP 2  .493  0  .  728  0  .750  4  .  960  2  649  a  .  839  1  . 550  t  . 130  
RBCR 0  162  0  .  062  0  . 098  0  . 573  0  149  0  030  0  .  113  0  . 211  
OLD 3  007  1  .  041  1  .  000  5  . 000  2  857  0  949  1  .000  4  .000  
OLC 2  678  1  .010  1  .000  5  .000  2  571  0  938  1  .  000  4  .000  
GLV 1  906  2  .248  0  .000  13  .600  3  464  3  574  0  . 400  14  .000  
AGBANK 0  722  0  . 449  0  . 000  1  . 000  0  64  3  0  .  497  0  . 000  1  . 000  
OLFMLN 0  633  0  .  193  0  . 030  1  .  000  0  630  0 .  166  0  .  190  0  . 380  
LNDEF 0  744  0  .  148  0  . 207  1  . 296  0  741  0  .  111  0  . 550  0  . 380  
DEPASST 0  847  0  .  063  0  . 525  0  . 995  0  849  0  .  067  0  .  640  0  . 910  
YLD 0  085  0  .  008  0  . 068  0  122  0  086  0  .  005  0  .  075  0  . 095  
COFA 0  039  0  .  004  0  .  027  0  . 050  0  041  0  .  003  0  .  029  0  . 054  
SALNSM 0  403  0  .491  0  .  000  1  000  0  857  0  .  363  0  . 000  1  .000  
ASSETS 1  362  11  .240  0  . 005  186  .000  0  175  0  .  180  0  012  0  . 628  
'  n=297 .  
"  n=14 .  
SSOI iFM i s  the  d icho tomous  dependen t  va r iab le  which  t akes  on  a  
va lue  o f  1  i f  a  bank  se l l s  "seasoned"  USDA guaran teed  OL loans  to  
Farmer  Mac  I I ,  and  0  o therwise ;  NCLNLN i s  noncur ren t  loans  to  
loans ;  NCOLN i s  ne t  charge-of f s  to  loans ;  ASSTKMF i s  asse t s  per  
employee  measured  in  mi l l ions  of  do l la r s ;  RBCR i s  the  r i sk -based  
cap i ta l  r a t io ;  OLD i s  a  sca la r  va r iab le  fo r  USDA guaran teed  OL loan  
demand;  OLC i s  a  sca la r  va r iab le  fo r  compet i t ion  among USDA 
guaran teed  OL l enders ;  GLV i s  the  bank ' s  USDA guaran teed  loan  
vo lume measured  in  mi l l ions  of  do l la r s ;  A6BAMK i s  a  dummy va r iab le  
tha t  t akes  on  a  va lue  of  1  i f  the  bank  has  17  pe rcen t  o r  more  o f  
i t s  loan  por t fo l io  in  agr icu l tu ra l  loans ,  and  0  o therwise ;  OLFMLN 
i s  opera t ing  loans  to  fa rm loans ;  LNDEP i s  the  loan- to -depos i t  
r a t io ;  DEPASST i s  the  depos i t - to -asse t  r a t io ;  YLD i s  the  y ie ld  on  
ea rn ing  asse t s ;  COFA i s  the  cos t  o f  fund ing  ea rn ing  asse t s ;  SALNSM 
i s  a  dummy va r iab le  tha t  t akes  on  a  va lue  o f  1  i f  the  bank  has  
o ther  secondary  marke t  exper ience ,  and  0  o therwise ;  and  ASSETS 
deno tes  the  bank ' s  a sse t s  measured  in  b i l l ions  of  do l la r s .  
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Table 7 .14. SSOLFM logit model results* 
Est  .  S td .  E las t .  
Var iab le"  coef f .  e r ro r  t - ra t io  a t  means '  
NCLNLN 1  .6283  24  .2206  0  .067  0 .0189  
NCOLN -86  .6173  109  .  9076  -0  .  788  -0 .1816  
ASSTEMP 0  .4774  0 ,  .4799  0  .  995  1 .1789  
RBCR 3  .  0560  7  .4588  0  .410  0  .4916  
OLD -0  .3329  0  , . 3438  -0  .  968  -0 .9972  
OLC -0  .2296  0  .  3445  -0  .666  -0 .6128  
GLV 0  .  1768  0  , .  1040  1 ,  .700  0 .3487  
AGBANK -0  .5614  0  .  6956  -0  , .  807  - -
OLFMLN 0  .  0445  1  .   7142  0  .   026  0  .  0279  
LNDEP -2  .5561  3  .  . 2486  -0  .   787  -1 .8996  
DEPASST 4  .2481  6 .  .5515  0  .  . 648  3  .5940  
YLD 26  .7086  45  .  , 6891  0  .  ,  585  2 .2615  
CO FA 101  .2842  86 .  9447  1 .  , 165  3 .9442  
SALNSM 2  .  1902  0 .  8984  2  .  
* * 
, 438  - -
ASSETS -0  .  0007  0  .  0015  -0  .  467  -0 .9149  
CONSTANT'  
-14  .3155  
LOG LIKELIHOOD ( res t r i c ted)  = -57 .09  
LOG LIKELIHOOD (unres t r i c ted)  =  -46 .42  
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST =  21 .33  wi th  15  d . f .  
MADDALA R-SQUARE =  .066  
CRAGG-UHLER R-SQUARE =  .216  
"  SS0LFM=1 i f  bank  se l l s  "seasoned"  USDA guaran teed  OL 
loans  in to  Farmer  Mac  I I  and  SSOLFM=0 o therwise .  
"  See  Tab le  7 .13  fo r  a  desc r ip t ion  of  the  va r iab les .  
^ P rob=.0022  i f  AGBANK=0 and  Prob=.0013  i f  AGBANK=1;  
P rob=.0006  i f  SALNSM=0 and  Prob=.0052  i f  SALNSM=1.  
Adjus ted  by  In  (p2) - In  (p i )  = ln  ( .  0488) - In ( .  3000)  
=-1 .8158  due  to  d i f fe ren t  sampl ing  ra tes  of  the  
par t i c ipan t s  and  nonpar t i c ipan t s .  
*  S ign i f i can t  a t  the  .1  l eve l .  
**  S ign i f i can t  a t  the  .05  l eve l .  
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Table 7.15. SSOLFM classification cable* 
Predicted 
Observed 
0 1 Total 
0 297 0 297 
1 14 0 14 
Total 311 0 311 
100 .00% 
0 . 00% 
overall 95.50% 
^ l=participant in Farmer Mac II; O=nonparticipant. 
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Figure 7.5. Observed groups and predicted probabilities: SSOLFM 
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goodness of fit criteria above. 
Table 7.15 compares the observed and predicted group 
membership. This model has the highest overall prediction 
rate at 95.5 percent. This is so for 2 reasons. First, the 
model predicts that none of the banks in the sample will 
participate. Second, since only 14 banks do participate, only 
14 of 311 are misclassified. Thus, although the model may 
appear superior to prior models using the percent overall 
correct, such a conclusion would be erroneous. 
Figure 7.5 reveals that the model does in fact have 
trouble distinguishing between participants and nonpartici­
pants. Notice that instead of the observed participants 
grouping together at higher predicted probabilities and the 
observed nonparticipants grouping together at lower predicted 
probabilities, the observed participants' predicted probabil­
ities are "nested" or "cradled" inside those of the observed 
nonparticipants. This is indicative of the model's lack of 
ability to distinguish well between participants and nonparti­
cipants . 
Explanatory variables 
The coefficients on NCLNLN, NCOLN, ASSTEMP, RBCR, OLD, 
OLC, AGBANK, OLFMLN, DEPASST, LNDEP, YLD, COFA, and ASSETS 
were all statistically insignificant. Moreover, the coeffi­
cients on DEPASST, LNDEP, RBCR, and OLD had signs opposite of 
what was expected. 
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GLV. The only 2 independent variables with statistical 
significance are GLV and SALNSM. USDA guaranteed loan volume 
has a positive statistically significant effect at the a=.1 
level of significance. Again, its elasticity calculated at 
the sample means of the regressors is .35. Although GLV is 
useful in explaining the probability of participating, its 
impact is weak. 
SALNSM. Experience selling loans into other secondary 
markets is a distinguishing characteristic of participants. 
Its coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 
the Q;=.05 level of significance. The probability of the 
average bank participating if it does not have other secondary 
market experience is .06 percent compared with .52 percent if 
it does. 
Sunmiary 
This model provides little insight into why banks sell 
"seasoned" OL loans other than that a higher guaranteed loan 
volume and experience selling loans into other secondary 
markets increases the probability of participation in Farmer 
Mac II as defined. None of the financial characteristics 
(e.g., yield) or external forces (e.g., competition) suggested 
by the theoretical model or empirical literature have statis­
tically significant explanatory power. The only conclusion 
that might be drawn is that participants may have a management 
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policy to sell these types of loans and that their strategy 
does not manifest itself in the chosen independent variables. 
Summary 
Five logit models were estimated in order to find which 
independent variables explained why banks sell USDA guaranteed 
loans of any kind, new FO originations, new OL originations, 
"seasoned" FO loans, and "seasoned" OL loans into Farmer Mac 
II. Each of the models displayed some explanatory power and 
statistical significance. The model fits for nev/ly originated 
FO and OL loans were the best in terms of the various R's and 
number of significant explanatory variables. The logit models 
estimated for "seasoned" FO and OL loans fit rather poorly and 
had many fewer significant variables. 
Two of the independent variables repeatedly showed up as 
significant across all the models. Higher USDA guaranceed 
loan volume and experience selling loans into other secondary 
markets increase the probability of selling USDA guaranteed 
loans to Farmer Mac, regardless of how participation is de­
fined. Although a higher GLV increases the probability of 
participating, its effect is weak in terms of its elasticity. 
Experience selling loans into other secondary markets has the 
largest impact on the probability of participating in every 
model that was estimated. 
The demand for USDA guaranteed loans and competition 
among lenders for USDA guaranteed loans had statistically 
254 
significant effects on the probability of selling new FO and 
OL originations into Farmer Mac II. As a rule, these vari­
ables were less effective in distinguishing between banks that 
sold "seasoned" loans to Farmer Mac and those that did not. 
No rule of thumb applies for the other independent vari­
ables' effects on the probability of selling newly originated 
or "seasoned" FO or OL loans. It appears that che reasons for 
selling FO and OL loans are quite different. 
For new FO originations, ASSTEMP, DEPASST, FLFMLN, and 
YLD are significant determinants of participation. Increased 
efficiency at the bank level, less deposits available to fund 
the loan portfolio, fewer farm ownership loans as a fraction 
of farm loans and a higher yield on earning assets increase 
the probability of participating in Farmer Mac II. 
For new OL originations, a higher loan-to-deposit ratio 
(LNDEP) and risk-based capital ratio (RBCR) increase the 
probability of a bank selling USDA guaranteed loans to Farmer 
Mac. It is not obvious why a higher risk-based capital ratio 
would increase the chances of participating. One reason may 
be that sellers have greater rates of capitalization. 
The only generalizations that will be made about partici­
pation with respect to "seasoned" FO and OL loans is that a 
bank with more of these loans in its portfolio and experience 
selling loans into other secondary markets is more likely to 
participate in the Farmer Mac II loan sale program. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter includes a summary of major findings: the 
significance of the research; the limitations of the model, 
data, and empirical analysis; followed by the implications for 
further research. 
Siumnary of Major Findings 
The intent of this dissertation was to better understand 
what incentives or other factors exist that would lead a bank 
to participate in the Farmer Mac II loan sale program. Two 
distinct methods of inquiry were employed to accomplish this 
task: a descriptive analysis and a logistic regression analy­
sis of participation. 
Descriptive analysis 
The descriptive analysis was based on bankers' responses 
to a series of survey questions. The questions asked bankers 
the degree to which various factors were relevant in their 
decision to participate or not participate in Farmer Mac II. 
The findings of the descriptive analysis were largely consis­
tent with the reasons for participation casually posited at 
the outset of study and formally developed in the literature. 
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Nonparticipants reported that weak USDA guaranteed and 
overall loan demand made participation unnecessary. They also 
indicate sufficient deposit and capital levels to fund USDA 
guaranteed loans, and prefer to hold the USDA loans they 
originate. In general, nonparticipants do not sell USDA 
guaranteed loans to buyers other than Farmer Mac. Although 
much of this group claims that USDA guaranteed loan sales are 
not a part of management strategy, their strategy is probably 
not independent of the current environment confronting their 
banks. That is, if the conditions above changed such that the 
incentives to participate in Farmer Mac II were increased, 
these bankers may well decide to participate in the program. 
Fairmer Mac II participants have a slightly different 
story to tell. They report that their decision to participate 
is based on enhanced liquidity, increased ROA, reduced inter­
est rate risk, added capacity to meet heavy USDA guaranteed 
loan demand, and ability to seirve cheir customers better. In 
fact, the added ability to serve their customers better was 
one of the most germane reasons banks cited for participating. 
Better service includes passing on better rates and terms to 
their customers as v/ell as originating a loan it would not if 
it could not be sold into Farmer Mac II. 
Logit regression analysis 
The second thrust of the inquiry was to predict the 
probability of a bank participating in Farmer Mac II and 
257 
identify the characteristics useful in making the prediction. 
This was done using a logit regression analysis. In total, 
five models were fitted. The first sought to predict which 
banks would sell any type of USDA guaranteed loans--be they 
newly originated or "seasoned" FO or OL loans--into Farmer Mac 
II. The next two estimations attempted to predict participa­
tion based on newly originated FO and OL loans, respectively. 
The final runs redefined participation in terms of "seasoned" 
FO and OL loans and included the same explanatory variables 
used to fit the FO and OL models. 
Each model displayed some explanatory power and statisti­
cal significance. The model fits for newly originated FO and 
OL loans were the best in teirms of the Maddala and Cragg-Uhler 
R^s and number of significant explanatory variables. The 
logit models estimated for "seasoned" FO and OL loans fit 
rather poorly and had many fewer significant variables. 
Two of the independent variables repeatedly showed up as 
significant in all the models. Higher USDA guaranteed loan 
volume and experience selling loans into other secondary 
markets increase the probability of selling USDA guaranteed 
loans into Farmer Mac II, regardless of how participation is 
defined. Although an increase in a bank's USDA guaranteed 
loan volume increases the probability of participating, its 
effect is weak in terms of its elasticity. Experience selling 
loans into other secondary markets has the greatest impact on 
the probability of participating in every model estimated. 
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The demand for USDA guaranteed loans and the degree of 
competition among lenders for USDA guaranteed loans have a 
statistically significant effect on the probability of selling 
new FO and OL originations into Farmer Mac II. Increases in 
demand increase the probability of participating in each case, 
while the opposite is true for the degree of competition. As 
competition increases, a bank must lower the interest rate it 
charges on USDA guaranteed loans thereby reducing the spread 
it would earn if the loan was sold--and the incentive to sell 
with it. As a rule, the demand and competition variables were 
less effective in distinguishing between banks that sold "sea­
soned" loans to Farmer Mac and those that did not. 
No rule of thumb applies for the other independent vari­
ables' effects on the probability of selling newly originated 
or "seasoned" FO or OL loans. It appears that the reasons for 
selling FO and OL loans are quite different. 
For new FO originations, higher assets per employee, a 
lower deposit-to-asset ratio, fewer farm ownership loans to 
total farm loans, and a higher yield on earning assets in­
crease a bank's chances of participating. More assets per 
employee implies greater efficiency at the bank level. Lower 
deposits as a fraction of assets indicates that a bank is less 
reliant on deposits for funding. Fewer farm ownership loans 
relative to all farm loans may be a signal that a bank avoids 
holding longer-tearm fixed-rate loans because of interest rate 
risk but is not dissuaded from originating them for sale. 
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For new OL originations, a higher loan-to-deposit ratio 
and risk-based capital ratio increased the probability of 
participating. Banks with higher loan-to-deposit ratios may­
be selling loans into Farmer Mac II because they do not have 
room for them in their portfolios. Higher risk-based capital 
ratios may be significant because participants are well capi­
talized, despite high loan-to-deposit racios. 
No generalizations will be made about participation with 
respect to FO or OL "seasoned" loans other than that increased 
USDA guaranteed loan volume and experience selling loans into 
other secondary markets increases the probability of partici­
pating in Farmer Mac II. 
Significance of the Research 
This research has implications that are relevant to other 
researchers, agricultural policy makers, and Farmer Mac. We 
will touch on each in turn. 
Other researchers 
This research makes a modest contribution to the theoret­
ical literature in finance. The model extends the simple 
model of portfolio selection by incorporating a downward 
sloping demand curve for the risky asset and including second­
ary market participation as a way to leverage the portfolio. 
This research adds to the body of literature regarding 
the sale of loans into secondary markets. In particular, it 
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looks at why a bank might sell a particular type of loan into 
a particular secondary market. Most studies of secondary 
market participation have used bank level characteristics to 
explain why a bank sells loans in general (i.e., the dependent 
variable is sells any loans). So the methodology used in this 
work would also be useful for those interested in guaranteed 
student loan or SBA guaranteed loan secondary market partici­
pation. 
Finally, this work attempts to replace some of the anec­
dotal claims and beliefs regarding the Farmer Mac II loan sale 
program with more solid evidence. That is not to say that 
this study is completely definitive. Quite the contrary. 
And, although the findings are not in stark contrast to widely 
held beliefs about the loan sale program, it is comforting to 
know that there is some evidence to support what we believe to 
be true. 
Agricultural policy medcers 
Farmer Mac II, in part, was established to ameliorate an 
increased burden on local credit supplies created by a policy 
shift away from direct lending by the USDA to commercial 
lending guaranteed by the USDA. The program supposedly ex­
panded vitally needed credit availability for financially 
troubled farmers and ranchers by providing a significant 
measure of liquidity to rural lending institutions. Without 
Farmer Mac II, it was believed that increased demand for USDA 
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guaranteed credit would exceed the ability of rural lending 
institutions to adequately respond. 
Farmer Mac was to provide an efficient source of liquidi­
ty by providing a continuous, predictable, and competitively 
priced secondary market for the sale of guaranteed portions of 
LTSDA guaranteed loans and to accept the guaranteed portions as 
they are generated by the USDA loan programs without involve­
ment in the administration of those programs. Banks would 
find the program attractive because of greater liquidity and 
lending capacity, interest rate risk reduction or elimination, 
fee income from origination and servicing, increased return on 
retained unguaranteed portions, and opportunity to offer more 
favorable loan terms to borrowers. 
The program does what it is designed to do, according to 
participants. For brevity, the descriptive analysis of the 
survey responses detailed in Chapter 6 will not be rehashed 
here. However, recall that as of the end of 1997, only 312 of 
the over 6,000 commercial banks guaranteeing loans have sold 
loans into Farmer Mac II since its inception in 1991. The 
aggregate principal amount of loans purchased by Farmer Mac II 
over this period was $3 64 million. To put this figure in 
perspective, as of the end of 1997, USDA guaranteed farm loan 
program principal outstanding totaled over $6.5 billion. But 
if this $6.5 billion in outstanding principal is divided by 
program area, slightly less than half is guaranteed FO debt. 
This roughly $3 billion in outstanding FO principal may be the 
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better measure to use in assessing Farmer Mac II's market 
penetration. The reason is because guaranteed OL debt is less 
likely to have the minimum of 12 months remaining until matu­
rity required to qualify for sale into Farmer Mac II. To 
understand the limited market penetration, we need only to 
revisit the descriptive analysis of the nonparticipants. In 
brief, they have little need or incentive to use the program. 
One could quickly conclude that the secondary market 
program benefits a few but cannot be viewed as "vital." But, 
such a strong determination requires some qualifying remarks. 
The legislation that mandated a secondary market for USDA 
guaranteed loans (Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Section 
1350) was passed in response to the farm financial crisis 
enveloping farmers at the time. However, Farmer Mac II has 
largely operated during a period of stability in the farm 
sector. The point is chat the need for the program may in­
crease as farmers' prospects change. 
What policy changes could be made to improve participa­
tion? The design of the program itself is as accommodating to 
lenders as can be. What would increase participation has more 
to do with the design of the USDA guaranteed farm loan pro­
grams. A higher guarantee rate (say, 100 percent) and the 
ability to sell loans to a third party without retaining the 
servicing obligation would increase participation. Adopting 
these changes to increase participation in Farmer Mac II could 
only be made after a thorough understanding of how they would 
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affect the USDA guaranteed farm loan programs. That analysis 
is far beyond the scope of this work. 
Finally, there is the issue of so-called mission drift. 
Farmer Mac currently engages in issuing discount notes and 
medium-term obligations and then buys interest-earning invest­
ment assets. Farmer Mac can borrow money at near U.S. Trea­
sury rates and invest the funds in high-quality higher-yield­
ing investments with similar maturities. Under this strategy, 
the larger the volume, the greater the profits. It is worth 
noting that other GSEs are "guilty" of this practice too. 
Nonetheless, Farmer Mac seems to take greater advantage of 
this opportunity than the other GSEs--perhaps based purely on 
the instinct to survive. What a GSE is created for and is 
authorized to do to meet its mission is an important policy 
issue. This issue is beyond the purview of this dissertation 
because it does not directly affect a bank's decision to 
participate. 
Farmer Mac 
Presumably, Farmer Mac officials know a great deal more 
about the banks that participate in the Farmer Mac II second­
ary market program than they do about the nonparticipating 
banks. However, it is helpful compare the two groups to 
create a useful contrast. 
Farmer Mac II is a secondary market for USDA guaranteed 
loans. Although secondary markets have existed for some time. 
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and participation in them for many banks is routine, the 
majority of banks that do not participate in Farmer Mac II do 
not participate in any secondary market. In effect. Farmer 
Mac officials have two hurdles to clear--convincing these 
banks of the advantages participation in a secondary market 
offers in general, and Farmer Mac II in particular. On the 
other hand, except for a very small minority. Farmer Mac II 
participants have experience selling loans into other second­
ary markets. 
Nonparticipants largely report that participating in any 
secondary market is not part of management strategy. Some of 
the banks that do report participating in other secondary 
markets indicate that selling QSDA guaranteed loans into a 
secondary market is not part of management strategy. Should 
these banks be "written-off" as lost causes? Not necessarily. 
This point is better understood if management policy is set 
endogenously rather than exogenously. By this we mean that 
managers are likely to adapt policy as conditions in their 
operating environment change--that is, loan sales are probably 
not part of management's policy because the incentives to use 
them are currently absent. 
What factors are behind the incentive to participate? 
Increased USDA guaranteed loan volume is associated with a 
higher probability of participating. An initial question at 
the outset of this project was whether participation rates 
differed between large volume lenders and smaller volume 
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lenders. In other words, if Farmer Mac focused its business 
development on large volume lenders, would it be overlooking a 
vast majority of smaller volume lenders that in the aggregate 
might create a large volume of Farmer Mac business? Apparent­
ly, the answer is no. Moreover, these banks report weak USDA 
loan demand. The implication is that loan volume, at this 
time, is not likely to expand. Of course, this could change 
as conditions in the farm economy change. 
Nonparticipants in general report that overall demand is 
also weak. If a bank has room in its portfolio for additional 
loans, many of the incentives of participating in a loan sale 
program are diminished. For example, greater liquidity and 
lending capacity are unnecessary. The fee income from origi­
nation and servicing retained after a loan is sold is only 
attractive if the seller can replace the sold loan with anoth­
er. The same applies to the increased return on the retained 
unguaranteed portion. Higher ROA is not a sufficient condi­
tion for secondary market participation. Higher profit is. 
However, not all the incentives to participate are elimi­
nated by weak overall or USDA guaranteed loan demand. In 
fact, the program paves an avenue for banks to expand their 
market. Lenders previously reluctant to extend long-term 
fixed-rate Farm Ownership loans due to interest rate risk 
exposure would find Farmer Mac II very useful. Participants 
cite a reduction in interest rate risk as very relevant in 
their decision to sell loans into Fairmer Mac II. By using the 
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program, a bank can originate a loan it does not wish to hold. 
This could include a long-term fixed-rate loan or foray into 
agricultural mortgage lending for a non-traditional lender. 
For the more traditional farm lender this could mean penetrat­
ing the USDA rural business and industry loan or community 
development loan markets. Although the focus in this disser­
tation concentrated on USDA guaranteed farm loan programs, the 
USDA guaranteed loans mentioned above are also qualified for 
purchase by Farmer Mac II. 
According to participants, the most significant reason 
for participating was the ability to serve their customers 
better through lower rates and better terms. Better rates and 
terms allow a bank to compete more vigorously so that loan 
volume can increase. 
With respect to business development then. Farmer Mac 
would be wise to place as much emphasis on the customer accom­
modation aspects their program has to offer as they do on the 
enhanced liquidity and increased return on assets benefits. 
Finally, banks that do not participate in Farmer Mac do 
not tend to sell USDA guaranteed loans to other third parties. 
The fact that Farmer Mac enjoys the lion's share of the sale 
activity in these loans reflects that the program is competi­
tive and attractive to those banks seeking the advantages that 
secondary markets afford. The downside is that this means 
that Farmer Mac cannot "simply" compete business away from 
other USDA guaranteed buyers. Rather, Farmer Mac must hope 
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that nonparticipants alter their credit delivery systems to 
include selling loans as a part of their management strategy. 
Given the farm economy conditions that prevail at this time, 
this is unlikely to happen. 
Limitations of the Research 
The limitations of the research fall into three general 
categories. They are: (1) limitations of the theoretical 
model; (2) limitations of the FDIC and survey data; and (3) 
limitations of the empirical methods employed in the analysis. 
Limitations o£ the theoretical model 
The model in Chapter 4 examines the asset portfolio 
decision of a risk-averse profit maximizing bank. The bank 
can invest its fixed internal resources of deposits and capi­
tal into USDA guaranteed loans and a risk-free security. The 
focus is on how much USDA guaranteed loan volume the bank 
wishes to hold. If it wishes to hold more than it has in 
internal resources, it can leverage its portfolio by partici­
pating in Farmer Mac II. This set-up stresses the liquidity 
f\anction that Farmer Mac II is supposed to provide. This 
limits the ability of the model to consider aspects of the 
participation decision which are as follows: the decision to 
participate in order to avoid interest rate risk; the decision 
to participate in order to pass on better rates and terms to 
borrowers; and the decision to participate in order to invest 
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the proceeds in higher earning assets elsewhere in the portfo­
lio . 
A major drawback of modelling the bank in this way is 
that the bank originates and holds the guaranteed loans until 
its own funding sources are exhausted, and then utilizes the 
loan sale program. This overemphasizes the liquidity aspect 
of the program. In other words, it assumes a bank would hold 
USDA guaranteed loans if it had the internal resources avail­
able and only sell them if it did not. But, we know this is 
not really true. For example, a bank may originate a long-
term fixed-rate USDA guaranteed FO loan with no intention of 
holding it despite the fact that the bank has the resources to 
fund it. A "loose" interpretation of the model might be that 
the bank did not have the "type" of deposits available to fund 
a loan of this nature, and then rely on the liquidity argument 
once again. 
A second deficiency in the model is that there is no 
explicit way to consider that a bank may use the program to 
pass on better rates and terms to its borrowers. Again, a 
"loose" interpretation of the model is that a decline in the 
risk-free Farmer Mac security rate leads a bank to make more 
USDA loans at a lower interest rate. 
Finally, the model's only alternative asset for a bank to 
invest in besides USDA guaranteed loans was a risk-free Fairmer 
Mac security. This limitation implied that an increase in the 
average yield on earning assets was interpreted in the model 
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as an increase in the yield of the Farmer Mac security. An 
increase in the yield on the Farmer Mac security then led to a 
reduction in USDA guaranteed loan volume v/hich would chen 
reduce the bank's chances of participating. But what happens 
is that increases in the yield on other assets causes banks to 
participate so that they can invest the proceeds in the higher 
yielding assets in their portfolio. This limitation is relat­
ed to the first deficiency outlined. 
Limitations of the data 
The data collected for the descriptive and empirical 
analyses had a number of obvious shortcomings. The issues 
involving the survey are addressed first. 
The survey instrument should have been sent to a larger 
number of banks in the pre-test. Some information was lost 
when a bank did not understand a question and therefore did 
not. answer it or provided an answer that was of no use. A 
brief example of each instance will illustrate. In an attempt 
to ascertain a bank's efficiency, banks were asked to indicate 
the "average number of man-hours historically required" to 
originate and service USDA guaranteed loans. The intent was 
to collect total hours needed to originate and hours per year 
to supervise, both on a per loan basis. The ambiguity was not 
detected during the pre-test. Some banks obviously reported 
total hours for all loans on a yearly basis. Others responded 
with a question mark. When this researcher does another 
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survey, more emphasis will be placed on pre-testing. 
The second shortcoming, and the most major, was the 
response rate. Of the 312 banks sampled using the Farmer Mac 
list, 94 responded. While more responses were hoped for, a 30 
percent was acceptable. More disappointing was the response 
rate of the banks sampled from the USDA list. Of the 1,941 
banks sampled, only 263 or 13.5 percent responded. 
A number of related explanations exist for the poor 
response rates. First, many people are simply not interested 
in filling out survey instruments. Second, many of the nonre­
spondents on the USDA list may not have a large USDA guaran­
teed loan volume and therefore thought their response was not 
important. Third, m.any banks that do not use Farmer Mac II 
may not have been interested in filling out a survey instru­
ment involving participation in it. Fourth, some banks may 
have interpreted the survey instrument as "invasive." Fifth 
and finally, some banks m.ay have viewed the survey inscrument 
as a business development ploy by Farmer Mac. For whatever 
reason, the response rate was less than hoped for. 
A means test was performed to see if various characteris­
tics between the sujrvey respondents differed from those in the 
sample that did not respond. They did not differ with respect 
to the characteristics selected, but they could well differ 
with information that was not available to compare. For 
instance, nonrespondents may engage in other secondary markets 
at a higher rate than survey respondents. Or they may have a 
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higher incidence of selling LTSDA guaranteed loans to parties 
other than Farmer Mac. 
The FDIC Summary Financial Report data posed a separate 
set of problems. The main two difficulties had to do with 
branch banks and changes in ownership. Many of the banks that 
were sampled were branches. Branch level data is not avail­
able from the FDIC. In the event that the bank sampled was a 
branch, the home office information was used. If a bank is 
smaller and its management structure is highly centralized, 
using the home office information may be reasonable. But for 
a very large bank or one that is more decentralized, using 
home office information is less satisfactory. 
The second problem was how to match a bank with its FDIC 
report if it changed ownership. A handful of the banks sur­
veyed changed ownership during 1997 (the year under analysis) . 
The survey was matched with the new bank's FDIC Summary Finan­
cial Report. This is unsatisfactory in the sense that the new 
bank's financial information may be quite different from the 
old bank's. Usually the buyer was a larger bank from an urban 
area. One example of how this could affect the data was if an 
agricultural bank (farm loans/loans > 17 percent) was pur­
chased by an urban bank that is not classified as an agricul­
tural bank. Or that same agricultural bank did not partici­
pate in any secondary market, but the urban bank does. These 
differences could also apply for a branch vs. its home office. 
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Limitations o£ the empirical methods 
The empirical tnechodology employed included a descriptive 
analysis of the reasons for participation presented in Chapter 
6 and a logit regression analysis in Chapter 7. The logit 
regression estimated the probability of a bank participating 
and showed what characteristics are helpful in making the 
prediction. Both methods are legitimate modes of inc[uiry if 
their limitations are understood. 
The descriptive analysis used asked bankers to rank the 
degree of importance to which various factors were relevant in 
their decision to participate and not participate in Farmer 
Mac II. This assumes the that the scale is approximately an 
inteirval scale (i.e., the distance between a 1 and 3 are is 
the same as the distance between 3 and 5). A second assump­
tion is that different individuals must interpret the scale 
similarly. This assumption is more reasonable the more the 
individuals are alike. Although the method used to develop 
the descriptive analysis is not ideal, it has widespread 
acceptance in the social sciences and is utilized here. 
The second method of inquiry used was a logit model 
regression to predict the probability of a bank participating 
in Farmer Mac II and to see what variables were useful in 
making that prediction. One limitation of thic method is that 
a bank that sells one loan into Farmer Mac II is given as much 
weight as a bank that sells many loans. Another technique 
would have been to use a tobit model. In a tobit regression 
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model, the dependent variable is limited or constrained. A 
bank would not only face the decision to sell or not sell, but 
would also decide how much, if any, to sell. Another way to 
estimate a model with a truncated dependent variable is using 
Heckman's two step approach. These techniques were not em­
ployed because the loan sale volumes reported in the surveys 
were incomplete. Fairmer Mac may be able to provide reliable 
data with respect to each bank's total volume of loan sales 
and sales by type of loan. 
Finally, the period of study under consideration was a 
single year. Banks that sell loans this year may not sell 
loans next year. Over time, the farm economy may change. And 
so on and so forth. A dynamic analysis of secondary market 
participation would add significantly to the literature. 
In^lications for Further Research 
This section is exploratory in nature. The goal is to 
put on paper some of the unanswered questions that might be 
addressed in future studies. One obvious implication for 
further research is that any model dealing with a bank's 
decision to sell loans should explicitly account for interest 
rate risk in the model. The literature contains models that 
base loan sales on regulatoiry reasons for selling (e.g., 
regulatory capital constraints) and non-regulatory reasons 
(e.g., yield, and now funding constraints) but not for what 
bankers claim to be a "very relevant" reason to sell--interest 
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rate risk. More work needs to be done in this area. 
Most of the literature on loan sales focuses on "bank 
level" reasons for selling loans. While this work attempts to 
consider bank level and loan level reasons for secondary 
market participation, more work needs to be done in this area. 
For instance, 3 0 percent of all SBA loans are sold, half of 
all student loans and home mortgages are securitized, and 
nearly 90 percent of FHA/VA loans are sold. Why such a varied 
range? Does the reason have to do with the type of loans? Of 
borrower? Of lender? Of program? Of investors? 
Farmer Mac claims that part of its failure to penetrate 
the farm real estate market has to do with farmers' preferenc­
es for adjustable-rate credit in lieu of fixed-rate financing. 
This strategy is understandable when the yield curve is steep, 
but less so as the yield curve flattens. Clearly, the demand 
for the types of credit that can be securitized is an area for 
further study. After all, a secondary market's volume is 
determined as much by the type of credit borrowers prefer as 
it is by a bank's incentive to sell. 
Finally, there is a policy issue concerning the nature 
and role of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) . Farmer 
Mac could not continue to exist without exploiting its status 
as a GSE. Yet, Sallie Mae went private to avoid the restric­
tions placed on its authority by being a GSE. Should legisla­
tion restrict the GSE so that it folds if its core business is 
insufficient for survival? Or should legislators keep expand­
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ing a GSE's authority so that a GSE can serve it purpose, even 
if its core business shrinks relative to its original mission? 
Although not germane to this study, the issue is paramount in 
a greater sense. 
Concluding Remarks 
The descriptive and empirical analyses included in this 
dissertation are an attempt to answer some of the questions of 
why commercial banks might choose to participate in the Farmer 
Mac II secondary market. Much has been learned. But much 
remains to be answered. This study is limited by its model, 
data, and empirical methodology. And certainly, removing 
these limitations would be an improvement. However, before 
any tinkering at the fringes of this work is undertaken, more 
thought and energy need to be expended to find out whether 
agricultural borrowers seek the type credit that is suitable 
for securitization. While this study [correctly] considered 
bankers a potential barrier to Fairmer Mac II's development, it 
[wrongly] ignored the importance of borrowers as a barrier. 
Until a better understanding of how borrowers fit into the 
process is developed, the larger question of whether Farmer 




IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY Ocrjnn'.c 
O F  S C I E N C E  A N D  T E C H N O L O G Y  
Hrtdx HjU 
\mci lOH-3 5i\»; 1 • 
515 
r  A \  5 1  5  
November 26, 1997 
Dear CEO: 
The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) maintains a secondary market for 
guaranteed portions of United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) guaranteed loans 
administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA). Farmer Mac purchases the guaranteed portions, 
assembles them into pools, and issues guaranteed securides backed by those pools. This program, 
referred to as "Farmer Mac II*, oflFers benefits to ag lenders who, for various reasons, do not wish 
to hold the guaranteed portions in their asset portfolio. 
We are conducting a research project in conjunction with Farmer Mac that hopes to better understand 
and improve the delivery of ag credit through its Farmer Mac II program. We understand your bank 
has originated USD A/FS A guaranteed loans. You may or may not sell the guaranteed portions. We 
would like to know what faaors are importam in making your decision to sell or not. We would also 
like some information about your USDA/FSA guaranteed lending activity. 
Your input is important because of your experience and expertise in financing agriculture. Tnis 
research will be of use to ag bankers, ag policy makers, and Farmer Mac. 
Please have a knowledgeable member of your staff complete the questionnaire and return it in the 
enclosed envelope. Any information provided on the questionnaire will be kept in strict confidence 
and ultimately d«troyed once the data are aggregated. 
We know that your time is very valuable. Thank you for your assistance. Please feel free to call 
Charles Murray at (816) 785-4324 if you have any questions regarding this survey instrument. 
Thank you again. 
Sincerely, 
Assistant Professor of Economics 
MC 209 C 
Truman State University 
Kirksville, MO 63501 
Dr. Robert Jolly 
Professor of Economics 
560 Heady Hail 
Iowa State Universir/ 
Ames. LA 500II-1070 
Phone; (816) 785-4324 
Fix; (816) 785-4181 
Phone; (515)294-6267 
Fax: (515) 294-3838 
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January 30, 1998 
Dear CEO; 
Recently we mailed you a quesdonnaire regarding your bailie's USDA/FSA guaranteed lending 
activity and your reasons tor holding those loans or selling them in a secondary market Each and 
every response is important to us, including yours. 
Many lenders have been kind enough to help us with this important research project by 
responding. If you were one of them, this is our way of saying, "Thank you." 
In case you received the questionnaire at an inopportune time and didn't have time to complete it 
before, may we ask you to do so now? We are enclosing copies of the materials sent to you this 
past November along with a business reply envelope. 
Your input is essential because of your expertise in financing agriculture and experience making 
USDA/FSA guaranteed loans. Without your help, we cant draw a clear picture of why 
USDA/FSA loans are held in portfolio as opposed to sold in a secondary market. We are 
especially interested in why you use or don't use the Farmer Mac II loan sale program. 
Lenders report that the survey takes roughly 15 minutes to complete. We know that your time is 
very valuable. If you feel that some questions do not apply to your bank, please answer only those 
which do. We need your quesdonnaire even if not completely filled out. 
We appreciate your earliest reply. Of course, any infonmadon you provide us will be kept in the 
strictest of confidence. 
Again, thank you for your time and sharing your lending experience and expertise with us. Your 
response is very important to us. 
Sincerely, 
Charles Murray 
Assistant Professor of Economics 
MC 209C 
Truman State University 
Kirksville, MO 63501 
Professor of Economics 
560 Heady HaU 
Iowa State University 
Ames, lA 50011-1070 
Phone: (816)785^324 




Farmer Mac n Participation Survey 
We are conducting a research project In conjunction with Farmer Mac that hopes to better understand and improve the 
delivery ofag credit throu^ its Farmer Mac n prognm. We understand your bank has originated USDA/FSA guaranteed 
loans. Tou may or may not sell the guaranteed portions. We vtoiddlike to know what factors are important in making your 
decision to sell or not. We would also like some information about your USDA/FSA. guaranteed lending activity. 
Your input is important because of your experience and expertise in funding agriculture. This research will be of use to 
ag bankers, ag policy makers, and Farmer Mac. 
Thank you for your assistance Please feel free to call Charles Murray at (SI6) 785-4324 if you have any questions 
regarding this survey instrument. 
Please fill in the following information below as indicated. If your bank is a branch location, please fill in the 
name and address of your branch location as well as the name, address and FDIC Certiiicate Number of your 
branch's home office below the branch's infbnnation. If your bank is not a branch location, please skip the section 
on Branch Bank Information and fill in your bank's name, address, and FDIC Certificate Number in the space 
provided below it 
Branch Bank Information (for surveys reaching branch locations only) 
Branch Name: 
Address: 
Ciiy . State Zip 
Branch banks please fill out the information about your home office below. 
Home Bank Office Information 
Home Office: 
Address: 
City State Zip 




Telephone Number Fax Number: 
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Section 1. Secondary Market Activity 
In this section, we are interested in information concerning your bank's overall activity in 
secondary markets such as Farmer Mac, Freddie Mac, Sallie Mae, Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae. 
If your bank does not sell any type of loan in a secondary market, please answer question 1 and then skip 
to Section II. If your bank does sell loans in a secondary market, please skip question I and answer 
questions 2 and 3 on pages 3 & 4. 
I. Using a 5 point scale, please indicate the degree to which each of the following faaors is relevant m your 




a. Loan sales are not part of our management 
strategy 
b. Insufficient loan demand at our bank relative 
to desired portfolio holdings make loan sales 
unnecessary 
c. Underwriting standards for our bank's loans 
dont conform to those of secondary markets 
d. Prefer to hold loans in portfolio and keep entire 
interest rate "spread" 
e. Our bank has sufficient liquidity to fund 
desired loan portfolio 
f Our bank is sufBciently capitalized to 
support desired loan portfolio 
g. We already sell loans to our affiliates 






• Please skip to Section II. page 3. 
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Using a S point scale, please indicate the degree to which each of the following &aors is relevant m your 
bank's decision to sell loans in the secondary market A higher rating implies the factor is more relevant. 
a. Loan sales enhance our portfolio liquidity 
b. Loan sales reduce need to attraa retail 
deposits to fimd desired loan portfolio 
c. Loan sales reduce need to purchase funds 
to fund desired loan portfolio 
d. Loan sales aOow our bank to satisfy 
heavy loan demand 
e. Loan sales reduce loan monitoring costs 
f Loan sales ofE^ insufSdent capital resources 
on hand at our bank to fimd desired loan portfolio 
g. Loan sales of&et insufScient capital resources on 
hand at our bank to fimd large individual borrowers 
h. Loan sales ofiE^ declining deposit base at 
our bank relative to demand for funds 
i. Loan sales enhance our return on assets 
j. Loan sales allow us to invest proceeds 
from sale into [oans of similar type 
k. Loan sales allow us to invest proceeds 
from sale elsewhere in portfobo 
[. Loan sales allow our bank to originate a loan 
it ordinarily would not if forced to hold the 
loan in poitfolio 
m. Loan sales reduce interest rate risk 
n. Loan sales allow for bener rates to our borrowers 




Part of management strategy to sell all 
loans of this type 
(indicate type) 
q. Other 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
(indicate factor) 
• Please answer question 3. page 4. 
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3. For each type of loan originated and subsequently sold over the past 12 months, please indicate the total 
dollar volume (in millions) of loans sold and the percentage of the total dollar volume of loans originated 
that were sold (e.g. 100% if all loans originated were sold). 
a. Home mortgage (e.g. Freddie Mac) 
b. SBA loans (SBAs Secondary Market) 













% of S Volume 
Originated Sold 
% 
• Please go to Section 11, page 5. 
4 
283 
Section IL Market and Bank Characteristics of USDA/FSA Guaranteed Lending 
In this section, we are interested in information concerning your bank's USDA/FSA lending 
activity. 
The USDA guarantees portions of various loans through its agricultural lending programs now 
administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA). These loans will collectively be referred to as USDA 
loans. The USDA/FSA loan programs of interest in this survey are as follows; 
FO - Farm Ownership OL - Operating Loans 
4. In your bank's relevant market area, rank the demand for the following types of USDA guaranteed loans 
relative to historical levels using a 5 point scale. A higher rating implies stronger demand. 
Very Weak Verv strong 
a. Farm Ownership 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Operating Loans 1 2 3 4 5 
5. In your bank's relevant market area, rank the de^ee of competidon for the following types of USDA 
guaranteed loans relative to historical levels using a 5 point scale. A higher rating implies stronger 
competition. 
Very Weak Ycry Strong 
a. Farm Ownership 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Operating Loans 1 2 3 4 5 
6. What is your total dollar volume (in millions) of USDA 
guaranteed loans outstanding? S 
7. What fraction of your USDA guaranteed loans were previously 
booked as conventional (not backed by federal guarantee) loans? % 
^ Please go to question 8, page 6. 
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8. Please complete the following table detailing your bank's current and projected USDA guaranteed loan 
activity. Indicate the total dollar volume (in millions) your bank has generated in guaranteed lending over 
the last 12 months for each type of loan. Also project the dollar volume your bank would hold under the 
"most likely scenario, an "optimistic scenario* (strong demand with mostly high quality borrowers), and 
a "pessimistic scenario" (weak demand with mostly low quality borrowers) for each type of loan over the 
next 12 months. Please mark "NONE" if your bank does not plan on making a particular type of loan in 
the coming year. 
Coming Year 
Last Most Optimistic Pessimistic 
Type Year Likdx Sccnario Sccnario NQNi: 
a. FO S M S M S M S M 
b. OL S M S M $ M S M 
9. Please complete the following table. Indicate the average number of man-hours historically required for 
the various activities associated with each type of USDA guaranteed loan. Please mark "NONE" if your 
bank docs not make a particular type of loan. 
Type Origination SupcmsioB Liquidation NONE 
a. FO hrs. hrs. hrs. 
b. OL * hrs. hrs. hrs. 
10. Please complete the following table. Indicate the rates your bank experiences on average with respect to 
the following USDA guaranteed loans. Please mark "NONE" if your bank does not make a particular 
type of loan. 
Interest Recovery Loan to Guarantee 
Type Rate Spread' Rate" Value Ralfi NQMTi 
FO % % % % 
OL % % % % 
The spread here is the difference between the loan rate and the funding rate. 
The recovery rate here is the percentage of principal and interest (net of all foreclosure costs) 
recovered in the event of default. 
Please go to question 11, page 7. 
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11. Please complete the following table. Indicate the de&uh rate* you most likeiy expect for each type of 
USDA guaranteed loan, the highest de&ult rate you have experienced (adverse conditions), and the 
lowest de&uh rate you have experienced (&vorable conditions). Please mark "NONE" if your bank does 
not make a particular type of loan. 
Most Likely Highest Lowest 
Type Defaalt Rate Defanlt Rate T>efaiilt Rate ffQNE 
a. FO % % % 
b. OL % '/o % 
The de&ult rate here is the percentage of the total dollar volume of the particular loan type that go 
into de&ult 
• Please go to Section III. page 8. 
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Section III. Farmer Mac II Secondaiy Market Loan Sale Program Activity 
In this section, we are interested in information concerningyottr bank's decision to sell or not to 
sell guaranteed portions of USDA/FSA guaranteed loans to Farmer Mac. 
The following questions refer to your bank's loan sale activity in the Farmer Mac n secondary market 
loan sale program. If your bank does not sell guaranteed portions of USD A loans to Farmer Mac please 
answer question 12. If your bank does sell loans to Fanner Mac, please skip question 12 and respond to 
questions 13, 14, and 15 of this section, starting on page 9. 
12 Using a 5 point scale, indicate the degree to which each of the following faaors is relevant in your bank's 
decision to not sell guaranteed portions of USDA loans to Fanner Mac. A higher score indicates the 
factor is more relevant than a lower score. 
Not Very 
Relevant Relevant 
a. Loan sales of any type are not pan of management strategy 1 2 3 4 5 
b USDA loan sales are not part of management strategy 1 2 3 4 5 
c Insufficient USDA loan demand at our bank 1 2 3 4 5 
relative to desired portfolio holdings make loan 
sales unnecessary 
d InsuflRcient overall loan demand at our bank 12 3 4 5 
relative to desired portfolio holdings make 
loans sales unnecessary 
e Prefer to hold USDA loans in portfolio and 12 3 4 5 
keep entire interest rate "spread" 
f Our bank has sufficient liquidity to fund USD.'K loans 12 3 4 5 
g Our bank is sufficiently capitalized to fund USD.A. loans 12 3 4 5 
h We already sell USDA loans to our affiliates or 12 3 4 5 
correspondent banks 
i We sell USDA loans to buyers other than 12 3 4 5 
Farmer Mac II 
(indicate other buyer) 
j Not familiar with Farmer Mac II program 12 3 4 
k Too much paperwork with Farmer Mac II 12 3 4 
1 Other 12 3 4 
(indicate factor) 
# You have completed the survey. Thank you! * 
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13. Using a 5 point scale, indicate the degree to which each of the following &ctors is relevant in your bank's 
decision to scff guaranteed portions of USDA loans to Fanner Mac. A higher score implies the &aor is 
more relevant than a lower score. 
a. Loan sales enhance portfolio liquidity 
b. Loan sales reduce need to attract retail deposits to fimd 
desired loan portfolio 
c. Loan sales reduce need to purchase funds to fimd 
desired loan portfolio 
d. Loan sales allow our bank to satisfy heavy loan demand 
for USDA loans 
e. Loan sales reduce monitoring costs 
f. Loan sales o£E^ insu£5cient capital resources on hand 
at our bank to fund desired loan portfolio 
g. Loan sales ofi^t insu£5cient capital resources on hand 
at our bank to fimd large individual borrowers 
h. Loan sales o£&et declining deposit base at our bank 
relative to demand for funds 
i. Loan sales enhance return on assets 
j. Loan sales allaw our bank to invest proceeds firom 
sale into more USDA loans 
Ic. Loan sales allow our bank to invest proceeds firom 
sale elsewhere in portfolio 
1. Loan sales allow our bank to originate a USDA loan it 
ordinarily would not if forced to hold the loan in portfolio 
ni. Loan sales reduce interest rate risk 
n. Loan sales would allow for better rates to our borrowers 
on USDA loans 
0. Loan sales would allow for better terms to our 
borrowers on USDA loans 


























14. For each type of USD A guaranteed loan originated over the past 12 months, please indicate the total 
number of loans sold to Farmer Mac n, the total dollar volume of loans sold to Fanner Mac II (in 
millions), and the percentage of the total dollar volume of loans originated that were sold to Farmer Mac 
U (e.g. 100% if all loans originated were sold to Fanner Mac II). Also indicate the desired "spread" your 
bank retains on the guaranteed portion after selling a USDA loan to Farmer Mac. Please mark 
if your bank did not originate a particular type of USDA loan. 
Total # Sold 
to Farmer Mac 
Total S Volume 
Sold to 
Farmer Mac TI 
% of Total S Volume 
Originated Sold to 
Farmer Mic II 
Desired 
"Spread" 
After Sale* NONi: 
FO M % 
KJL^ M 
• The desired "spread" after sale is the servicing fee Fanner Mac requires (.25%) plus what Farmer 
Mac calls the "management premium*. The desired spread then is the gross loan rate less the "net 
yield" (the rate which must be passed on to Farmer Mac). 
15. For each type of USDA guaranteed loan that is "seasoned" (booked previous to the past year), please 
indicate the total number of loans sold to Fanner Mac II and the total dollar volume of loans sold to 
Farmer Mac n. If no seasoned loans were sold to Farmer Mac II, please mark "NONE". 
Total# 
Sold to 
Farmer Mac n 
Total S Volume 
Sold to 
Farmer Mac n 
a. FO M 
b. OL M 
# You have completed the survey. Thank you! # 
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